Operation Fargo  12-Jun-66 to 14-Jun-66

On June 12, 1966 Operation Fargo commenced, designed to locate and destroy an estimated 100-manVC force responsible for ambushes, road mining and anti-aircraft incidents.  This is a report of that 3-day operation (A map of the area of operations is included at the end of the report). 

SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report (RCS:  MACV J3-32)

THRU:   Commanding General
        25th Infantry Division
        ATTN:  AVTLGC-MH
        APO US Forces  96225

TO:     Commander
        US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
        ATTN:  J343
        APO US Forces  96243

1. Operation FARGO:  1st Brigade Search and Destroy Operation to locate and destroy VC forces, supplies and base camps.

2. Dates of Operation:  120420 - 141515 June 1966.

3. Location: Area of operations was in the vicinity of     PHUOC HIEP-AP BAU DIEU Villages bounded by coordinates XT555195 North; XT570175 East; XT550153 South; XT540172 West.

4. Control Headquarters: 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division.

5. Reporting Officer:  Colonel William B. Sandlin, Jr.

6. Task Organization and Commanders:

    a. 2d Bn, 14th Inf (-) Lt Col Shultz, Cmdg.
       3d Plat, Troop B, 3/4 Cav
       Engr Sqd, 65th Engr Bn
       VN National Police

    b. 4th Bn, 9th Inf, Lt Col Booth, Cmdg.
       2d Plat, Troop B, 3/4 Cav
       Engr Sqd, A Co, 65th Engr Bn
       MP Sqd, 25th MP Co

7. Support Forces:

    a. Artillery: 7th Bn, 11th Arty was employed in Direct Support of the 1st Brigade.

       (1) How and when employed.

           (a) 7th Bn, 11th Arty (-) supported from base camp Cu Chi

           (b) B Btry supported from 2d Bn, 14th Inf base camp area XT556168.

           (c) Fire was used primarily as H&I fire.  56 H&I missions were fired totaling 224 rounds.   18 support missions were fired totaling 108 rounds.

       (2) Results: H&I fires denied VC freedom of movement during hours of darkness.

    b. Tactical Air: No suitable air targets were determined during this operation.

    c. Army Aviation: Forty (40) UH-1D and sixteen (16) UH-1B to lift an Infantry battalion and one Infantry company simultaneously into three landing zones.   During the operational period, 368 sorties were flown which consisted of airmobile assault, command and control, aerial reconnaissance, aerial resupply and medical evacuation.

8. Intelligence:

    a. Intelligence studies conducted prior to operation FARGO indicated VC activity within the operational area has been generally concentrated along Hwy 1 and Hwy 7.  Since 1 May, both routes have been the scene of numerous mine incidents.   Anti-aircraft incidents in the area have increased in the past month.  The C50 Company was reported in the vic XT506171.  Reports indicate the C50's mission is to stage attacks along Hwy 1, to collect taxes and capture GVN employees.  The C50 Company is reportedly armed with 1-60mm mortar, 1-lmg, 4-ARs, 2-M79s and assorted small arms.  The C26 Company, strength 100, was reported in the vic XT569168 on 18 May.   This is the 2d report of this company in the same area.  The company reportedly possesses 1-60mm mortar, 1-.30 cal MG, 5-ARs, 4 grenade launchers and assorted small arms.  Due to the large number of mine incidents, it is concluded that VC sapper units are also present and operating with local force guerrilla units.  The actual mission and organization of these sapper elements is unknown, however these squads have the mission of mining and interdicting Hwy 1 and 7.  The operational area is known to contain numerous guerrilla squads operate consistently vic PHUOC HIEP (XT569170).

    b. Recent significant activities revealed that on 1 Jun 3 National Police vehicles traveling from Cu Chi to Trang Bang were ambushed by a VC squad with AW's at XT554169.  One vehicle was destroyed, 6 ARVN's KIA, 1 WIA, and 20,000 piastres (payroll) stolen.  On 3 June, elements from Trung Lap Ranger Training Center were ambushed at XT593210 by 20 to 40 VC.

    c. During the operation VC contact was limited to occasional sniper fire.  The VC employed booby traps within the AO and a road block along Hwy 1.   Number of VC guerillas operating in AO could not be confirmed.

    d. The terrain in the area of operations consisted of thick hedge rows, some heavy brush and wooded areas which offered excellent concealment and cover from direct fire weapons.  There are also many clearings and rice fields which offered the VC excellent fields of fire.  There were no major obstacles which could affect the movement of track vehicles and dismounted troops.  The weather had no effect on the conduct of the operations.  The only natural obstacle within the area of operations is the Rach Ba Dap Creek that flows southward across Hwy 1 (XT543177), however, it would be an obstacle only during heavy rains which would make it untrafficable by track vehicles.

    e. Summary: Overall evaluation and accuracy of intelligence was rated B/2 (usually reliable and probably true).  The overall security of operation FARGO was considered excellent.

9. Mission:

    a. 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division conducts search and destroy operations during the period 12-14 June 1966 to locate and destroy VC forces, supplies and base camps vic PHUOC HIEP (XT555170) and to interdict VC movements in area of operation.

    b. Conduct airmobile and ground assault 12 June 1966 into obj area to encircle VC forces.

    c. Conduct ROAD RUNNER operations in sector.

    d. Provide wire, pickets and technical advice on installation of RF and PD outposts in Brigade sector.

10. Concept of Operation: 1st Brigade conducts airmobile and ground operations in assigned area with two battalions (-) during the period 12-14 June 1966.  2d Bn, 14th Inf established blocking position in the AO as the 4th Bn, 9th Inf conducts S&D operations in area.  A Co, 2d Bn, 14th Inf is designated as brigade reaction force.   On 12 Jun 66, 2d Bn, 14th Inf moves one (1) rifle company from operation base camp (Operation Fort Smith) over ground to establish blocking positions from coordinates XT553155 to XT553178 to be completed by 0700 hrs.  In order to block VC attempting to move from PHUOC HIEP.  One (1) rifle company will be airlifted from Cu Chi base location to LZ 1 by 0630 hrs and will later link up with ground force to help establish blocking positions.  On order, upon completion of blocking mission, 2/14 Inf will continue to conduct S&D operations in Fort Smith AO.  4th Bn, 9th Inf airlifted from Cu Chi base camp lands at LZs 2, 3, and 4 and establishes blocking positions from coordinates XT557178 to XT568170 by 0700 hrs; initiates detailed search starting at 0730 hrs East to West from LD to boundary, linking up with 2/14 Inf blocking forces NLT 1500 hrs.  Upon link up continue detailed S&D mission with priority to location and destruction of VC caches and facilities in PHUOC HIEP.  On the second day of the operation, 13 June, 4/9 Inf will continue S&D operation and civic action activities.   Wire, pickets, and technical advice on installation to RF and PD outposts will be part of the civic action program.  Plan for helilift extraction of 4/9 Inf from AO 141500 June 1966.  [See Inclosure #1:  Map of area of operations]

11. Execution: 1st Bde OPORD 8-66 (Operation Fargo) was issued 101400 June 66.   Operation commenced 120430 June 66.

    a. 2/14 Inf: Co C and the Recon Plt moved from the battalion base camp location vic XT522198 (Operation Fort Smith area of operation) at 0430 hrs to establish blocking positions along PL RED.  The Cav Plt attached to the battalion moved from the battalion base camp at 0615 hrs to secure LZ 1 (XT52156) and occupy coordination point at XT551173.  B Co was helilifted from the Cu Chi base camp and landed on LZ 1 at 0630 hrs.  At 0630 hrs, C Co and the Recon Plt arrived at coordinates XT548167 on PL RED and immediately established blocking positions from this point to the coordination point at XT55178.  B Co linked up with the 3/4 Cav Plt after landing and established blocking positions from XT55155 to XT548167 along PL RED.   All blocking positions were maintained without incident until 4/9 Inf completed it's S&D mission in the area of PL RED.  At 1400 hrs all elements of 2/14 Inf withdrew from blocking positions and continued Operation Fort Smith.

    b. 4/9 Inf: At 0630 hrs the battalion departed from base camp Cu Chi by helicopter for the operational area of Operation Fargo.  The first element lifted, A Co, landed at LZ 2 and established contact with 2/14th Inf.  One (1) VCS was detained at XT564180 who stated that VC elements, size unknown, were moving south from LZ 2.  Co C & B landed at LZ 3 and 4 respectively, crossed LD at 0725 hrs and commenced S&D operations.  B Co detained 16 civilians and later released them after interrogation.  Elements of both companies discovered and destroyed 1 ton of rice in vic XT557166.  As the S&D operation continued B Co apprehended three VCS and 1 draft dodger.  Upon interrogation, one of the was determined to be a VCC.   At 1620 hrs the battalion closed on Obj 2 and established a base camp.   Resupply was effected immediately.  A Co located and destroyed 1 anti-tank mine vic XT553177 at 1645 hrs.  Ambush patrols were sent out during the night at locations XT545277, XT548172, and XT554177.  Patrols had negative VC contact and returned to base camp at 0600 hrs.

13 June 1966

    4/9 Inf: At 0900 hrs, C Co, while conducting a S&D operation encountered sniper fire at coord XT655178.  Fire was eliminated as a result of friendly small arms fire.  100 rounds of ammunition marked 188 with large star figure were located and destroyed in vic of sniper fire.  The rounds were 127 cal and were assumed to be used for anti-aircraft purposes.  At 1000 hrs 25 persons were apprehended at XT555192.  All persons were questioned by the National Police element attached to the battalion.  The interrogation resulted in one of the 25 being held for further questioning by MP authorities.  B Co at 0900 hrs located and destroyed 1 booby trapped grenade, 1 tunnel, and 9 houses at coord XT548183 during it's S&D operation.  At 1050 hrs, generally at the same coordinated, the company was hit by heavy sniper fire and sustained 2 WIAs.  Fire was immediately returned by the company to establish a superiority of fire resulting in one (1) VC Killed (BC), 1 VC captured.   At 1420 hrs the battalion conducted a MEDCAP mission in the village of An Due at coord XT536180 and treated 29 individuals.  The engineer element attached to the battalion completed a triple strand concertina fence around the PD compound located at XT540276.  The last VC engagement took place at 1700 hrs as C Co encountered 2 VC at coord XT553177, which resulted in 1 VC killed (poss).  By 1800 hrs all battalion elements had returned to the operational base camp area.  Ambush patrols were located at coord XT548185, 549192, 55182, and 559178.  All patrols returned by 0600 hrs the following morning.  Patrols had negative VC contact.

14 June 1966

    4/9 Inf:  A Co with the Cav Plt departed the operational base camp at 0730 hrs to investigate a road block on Hwy 1 at XT603140 as reported by a captured VC.  The company, enroute, encountered several booby traps and apprehended two VCS in vic XT612163.  By 1030 hrs, the road was cleared.  The road block consisted of 16 dirt mounds, ranging from 6" to 18" high that covered the entire width of the road.  A Co then moved from the highway to a rich cache location pointed out by the same VC the previous day.  At this location, coord XT621159, the company uncovered and destroyed 500 lbs of loose rice located in a 5'X4' hole.  Extraction of the battalion commenced at 0800 hrs with B Co helilifted from base area to Cu Chi closing at 0842 hrs.  C Co began heliborne extraction at 1300 hrs and completed closing at Cu Chi by 1325 hrs.  Prior to extraction, C Co conducted two (2) plt sized S&D operations that commenced at 0615 hrs.  At 1005 hrs the company destroyed 1 booby trapped 105mm round in vic XT565184.  A Co, after completion of it's mission of clearing road blocks along Hwy 1, moved by road convoy and closed Cu Chi base camp 1515 hrs terminating Operation Fargo.

12. Results:

    a. Personnel losses:

       (1) Friendly.

           4th Bn, 9th Inf: 3 WIA

       (2) Enemy.

           VC (BC)   VC (poss)   VCC    VCS
           -------   ---------   ---    ---
              1          1         1      35

    b. Enemy Losses.

       (1) Captured 2 tons rice.

       (2) Destroyed.

           (a) AT Mine: 1

           (b) Booby trapped grenade: 1

           (c) Tunnel complex: 1

           (d) Houses: 9

           (e) 188 Ammunition: 100 rds

           (f) 105 How. booby-trapped: 1

           (g) Road block 6"x8": 16

           (h) Loose rice: 500 lbs

13. Administrative Matters:

    a. Supply.

       (1) Resupply was accomplished by UH1Ds and road convoy.

       (2) 77 UH1D sorties were flown totaling approximately 48 tons.

       (3) Due to the fact that the 4th Bn, 9th Inf established a battalion trains area and fed a modified A ration the amount of Class I and water needed accounted for 60% of resupply effort.

    b. Maintenance.  No significant problems were encountered.

    c. Treatment of Casualties.  Evacuation by dust-off helicopter was successful.

    d. Transportation.  A reduced headquarters and trains element moved by convoy and rifle companies were helilifted with no significant problems.

    e. Communications.  New radios were issued prior to the operation and effective communications were maintained.

14. Commander's Analysis: The overall results of this operation in conjunction with Operation Fort Smith has certainly won friends for the United States in this area.   During the operation on 13 June the 4th Bn, 9th Inf conducted a MEDCAP II in the vic AP MAY DUC at which 29 patients were treated.  Due to limited time period for this operation there were no discernable results of the one civic action activity.   But taken with CA operations in the Operation Fort Smith which was conducted in approximately the same area it can safely be assumed that it contributed to the overall success of the mission.  The 4/9 Inf distributed about 20.000 assorted leaflets, to include Safe Conduct Passes; Chieu Hoi (Open Arms); and 969 Reward leaflets throughout the Bn TAOR.  These leaflets were delivered mostly by hand and the effects of this distribution cannot be determined due to the shortness of the operation.  It is felt that this distribution assisted the overall operation.

    FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl                               JIMMIE B. SPIVEY
  Overlay to OPORD 8-66              Captain, Infantry
                                    Adjutant

 

Inclosure #1:  Map of the area of operations for Operation Fargo

 

 

This After Action Report has been reproduced to appear like the original.  The copy was obtained by and has been generously contributed by Matt Vuolo, HHC Co., 2/14th Inf.

Operation Fargo: After Action Report  12-Jun-66 to 14-Jun-66
Copyright © 2008 Kirk S. Ramsey
Last modified: January 20, 2020