1932 Maneuvers - C.R. Hollister, Major, Dental Corps

U.S. Army Dental Bulletin, Vol. V, No. l, January 1934

THREE YEARS AS A BATTALION AND REGIMENTAL SURGEON IN THE JUNGLES OF PANAMA

(with the 14th Infantry Regiment)

by

C. R. Hollister, Major, Dental Corps

FORWARD

Due to the shortage of medical officers in the Canal Zone, certain dental officers are assigned, usually as battalion surgeons, occasionally as regimental surgeons, during maneuvers and rally calls. In addition they are required to care for all dental emergencies and often to serve as the sanitary inspector of the regiment. The writer served as such during a period of nearly three years, participating during that time in two annual and several minor maneuvers and two rally calls.

The assignment of a dental officer as a battalion surgeon is made to provide an officer of the Medical Department for supervision of first aid, sanitation and evacuation of the organization when and if separated from the regiment. During maneuvers in peace time, the Medical Department, due to the lack of men and equipment, can only hope to provide the actual medical necessities and to set up a skeletonized and often simulated set-up of a war-time installation. The set-up in the Canal Zone, therefore, usually consisted of a regimental surgeon, who also acted as a battalion surgeon, and a battalion surgeon for each of the battalions. The enlisted men were distributed one to each company, with a sergeant and one private with the surgeon.

Owing to the lack of space, only the two annual maneuvers and one rally call will be described.

THE CHORRERA MANEUVER

The 14th Infantry, to which the writer was assigned, entrained January 12, 1931, at Fort Davis, on the Atlantic side, for the trans-continental journey to the Pacific side, there to go into camp for two weeks to participate in the Departmental Athletic events, prior to marching into the interior of the Republic of Panama with the rest of the Panama Canal Division, of which it was a part. The two medical officers with the regiment alternated at sick call, the writer cared for dental emergencies. In addition, each battalion surgeon acted as sanitary inspector for his area.

In the installation of the Army Field Range No. 1, with alamo attachment, the fire-pit should be dug exactly eighteen inches deep and the bottom of the pit paved with stones. The fire will heat the stones to a cherry red and by carefully pouring the dish water into the pit a little at a time, all of it may be disposed of before the next meal, thus avoiding the unsanitary mess of an overflowing soakage pit. In washing mess kits, the water should be kept boiling until the last mess kit or other kitchen utensil is thoroughly washed. If the cans are removed from the fire, the temperature is soon lowered, the contents of the cans become a soupy mess, resulting in unclean, greasy, and unsanitary mess kits and cooking utensils. Additional space, if in camp long enough to justify it, can be provided by building a crude shelving space of small poles, using branches cut from trees, and the food protected by placing over it mosquito or sandfly bars. In preparation for resuming the march, the poles are burned and the bags and mosquito bars take up but little space in the mess wagon.

MARCHES AND MANEUVERS

The Chorrera Maneuver differed from others in that all marches were made at night, usually beginning at midnight and terminating between seven and eight o'clock the following morning. The Division moved either by different roads and trails on the same night, or by the same roads and trains on consecutive nights. For the treatment and evacuation of casuals, each regiment was provided with a motor ambulance in charge of a medical or dental officer. In addition, the 14th Infantry had an animal drawn ambulance.

The manner of policing all camps of the 14th Infantry on this maneuver was rather unique. As the writer had been placed in charge of the motor ambulance, he furnished transportation for the police detail of five men and the regimental police officer, and shared the responsibility of policing all camps with that officer. As all camps were policed between the hours of 1 a.m. and 4 a.m., flash lights were used for illumination. Upon completion of the policing of the camps, the detail, together with their equipment, also their full packs and rifles, were loaded into the ambulance. The detail would then rejoin their respective organizations, the animal-drawn ambulance would be relieved of its casuals, and the business of picking up and caring for casuals would continue until camp was reached.

Much adverse comment has been heard about men falling out during a march, that such men were "gold bricks," etc. The writer wishes to brand such comments as untrue for, after picking up and caring for large numbers of men, some of them lying by the roadside unconscious, he does not remember ever picking up the same man twice during any maneuver. Baring accidents, the principal cause of men falling out is exhaustion.

Upon arrival in camp, the surgeon should at once look to the water supply, sterilizing if necessary, so that the men can have a drink and the cooks can proceed with preparation of the meals. In the mean time, the hospital, under direction from the first sergeant, should be erected as soon as possible and sick call sounded. Bathing facilities, animal watering and clothes washing areas must be staked off on the streams beside which the camp is located. The location and installation of latrines must be looked into and if found undesirable, must be called to the attention of the commanding officer with recommendations for their correction.

The Chorrera maneuver consisted of five practice marches before going into camp at Chorrera for the annual maneuvers, which consisted of Battalion, Regimental, Brigade and finally Division problems, lasting for a period of a week and a half. Having been repulsed, the Division retreated by two marches to the Canal Zone and after a two-day rest, the 14th Infantry entrained for its home station.

As the 14th Infantry had been very badly handicapped the previous year by an epidemic of dysentery, every precaution was exercised on this maneuver to ward off that dreaded disease. Particular attention was given to the eradication and prevention of the breeding of flies. Box latrines were used for the two weeks in camp. The interior of these were sprayed with crude oil once each day. Seats were washed with hot water, soap and creosol once each day. Manure was hauled from the picket lines twice daily. The open latrines in the camp at Chorrera were burned out daily, using a mixture of crude oil and straw and kept burning for at least fifteen minutes. Water for both drinking and cooking was sterilized and stored by the engineer (regiment) using the large filtering and chlorinating plant. Before being served a meal, the men were required to rinse their mess kits in boiling water, in this way removing the dust and bacteria that probably had gathered upon them while lying in pup tents.

RALLY CALL

The purpose of the Rally Call is to test the ability of the troops in the Canal Zone to respond instantly, with full fighting equipment, to repel an attack.

About a month after returning from the Chorrera maneuvers, the garrison was awakened at two o'clock one morning by terrific reports from the big Rally Call guns, followed instantly by the repeated "Call to Arms" by every bugle in the garrison. The response was immediate and within thirty minutes the troops were under full pack, ready to march. However, the marching time read 3:15 A.M., allowing ample time for the cooks to prepare sandwiches and coffee. The movement consisted of an assembly of troops at a designated point on the Atlantic and Pacific sides of the Canal Zone. All troops of the Atlantic side, including the Coast Artillery, were assembled at France Field by marching, with the exception of the troops from Fort Sherman, and these were transferred by ferry. Upon completion of the concentration, a breakfast of sandwiches and coffee was served, and the troops returned to their respective garrisons by marching, motor trucks and ferry.

THE CHEPO MANEUVER

The maneuver of 1932 differed in most respects from that of the previous year. Animals and equipment from the Atlantic side were transported to the Pacific side via Gatun Lake by lashing a barge to the side of a mine planter. This was done on account of lack of money, for the depression was at its height. However, it did prove that troops could be transported in this way, quickly and economically, should the railroad ever be bombed. The troops, other than those who had gone on the barge and mine planter to care for the animals and equipment, were taken across on an Army transport, disembarking at Balboa. Animals and equipment were landed at Pedro Miguel and proceeded overland to Fort Clayton, going into camp there for two or three days before beginning the march into the interior.

The 14th Infantry was organized much as it had been the previous year, the senior medical officer as regimental surgeon and surgeon of the 1st battalion; the other medical officer as surgeon of the 2nd battalion; the writer as surgeon of the 3rd battalion; and the regimental sanitary inspector. As about one-third of the transportation of the 14th Infantry had been left behind, it was necessary to place the medical equipment of the two battalions in storage which left the regiment with but one medical and one prophylactic chest. Owing to the lack of medical personnel and equipment, a provisional brigade hospital was improvised to meet the evacuation situation. Casuals were evacuated to this hospital and from there to the hospitals in the rear.

As there was but one road to Chepo, the whole Division marched on one road at the same time, all marches being made in the day time, the distance from the front to the rear of the column being from eight to ten miles The first day's march consisted of march discipline only, cadence, spacing, etc., the whole Division going into camp at one place.

At the beginning of the second day's march actual war conditions were simulated: no one was allowed ahead of the column unless ordered, no bugle calls were sounded (not even sick call), all orders were written with a pencil, verbal orders were issued from the regiment down, and occasionally the building of fires for cooking was forbidden.

The third battalion of the 14th Infantry constituted the advance guard about four miles in advance of the main body. Orders were received about 3:00 P.M. to bivouac for the night on the side of the road, with one company on the point about a mile further down. We now had a battalion, four miles in advance of the main body, scattered over a mile and a half of road space, no ambulance and no medical chest, the only supplies available were a few bandages and a bottle of iodine in a saddle bag together with the contents of the medical belts. In a situation such as this and in battle situations also, the writer has found by experience the value of locating the battalion first aid station quite near the battalion C.P., using his fly or tent as an aid station with the pup tent of the sergeant nearby. Then an ambulance or supplies may be requested over the telephone or telegraph.

After a series of battles in which more than two battalions of infantry, a battalion of artillery and the Air Corps participated, the Division went into camp at Pecora, remaining for about two or three days for rest. Up to this point the 14th Infantry had led the Division and had done all the fighting. Early in the morning of the third day the 33rd Infantry moved out, some of the artillery and other organizations accompanying it, the remainder of the Division remaining in camp. However, orders were received that night to move at daybreak the following morning. Up at three o'clock, breakfast at four, the regiment filed out at the break of day, the artillery following in support, Air Corps scouts overhead. The remainder of the Division filed out about an hour later. Whenever one became hungry, he ate the sandwich he had for lunch and washed it down with water from his canteen. About 4:00 P.M. much excitement was evident, orders were received to the effect that the enemy had been sighted by the air scout and that we should get into the jungle at once. With the aid of machetes, the battalion--men, animals, wagons and all--disappeared. We learned later that the 33rd Infantry and the other troops that had accompanied it now constituted the enemy and had gone into defensive positions, where--no one knew. Fires were forbidden. Although they could not be seen in the dense jungle, the smoke would most surely be seen by the enemy air men.

The battalion C.P. was located and a hole cut out of the jungle large enough to set up the aid station with our pup tents. The red cross flag was placed on the edge of the jungle at the front entrance and everything was ready for business, and business was good. A soldier was kicked in the belly by a mule, both feet; a K.P. reported with his hand cut to the bone; another soldier with his foot cut to the bone on a rock while swimming. There was no antitetanic serum so these cases had to be evacuated at once. There were numerous toothaches, etc., all of which kept the wireless telegraph hot calling for ambulances and as they arrived casual had to helped out of the jungle into the ambulances and on their way to the rear. Finally, about 11:00 P.M. (we had been at it since 3:00 A.M.), a lull came and we rolled into our blankets and went dead.

Tomorrow was another day. Up and at it at 2:00 A.M., with breakfast at 3:00 A.M., packed up, and watered the animals at a stream a mile and a half away. All organizations were groping in the darkness for the proper position in line, and finally the word "lead out" was relayed back from one organization to another in voices a little above a whisper. Then after a short march of about a "break" and a half, we went into the famous battle of Chepo.

Needless to say, the 33rd Infantry and attached organizations were soundly trounced that day (according to plan). Many battalion aid stations were set up that day in secluded spots by streams and out of direct rifle and machine gun fire. Wounded were arriving constantly, some walking and others being carried on litters. Anesthetics were being administered and the surgeons rapidly operating. Soup was being prepared for the wounded in pots over the fire; canteens filled with water being heated over the other fires and placed about wounded men in a state of shock. The wounded were rapidly evacuated by litter bearers and by animal drawn ambulances. Men, stripped to the waist, and with perspiration streaming from their bodies and faces that hot muggy day there in the heart of the jungle, had hacked away with machetes and cleared space enough to accommodate the 75 or 200 prostrate men who lay there, many more dead than alive.

Another day, another battle. Having been repulsed at Chepo, rear guard actions were fought during the retreat by organizations from both regiments alternating. Arriving finally at Fort Clayton, spit and polish for three days in preparation for the review of all troops on the Isthmus in honor of the President of the Republic of Panama. The camp of the 14th Infantry was beautifully situated as it was in Fort Clayton's front yard. The grass had been mowed and was still green from a recent rain. Tents had been lined and relined with tent poles all set at exactly the same height. It was Saturday night, the big review would be held Monday morning. It was suddenly discovered that three days rations of meat had been issued, but no ice. Those men who hauled ice until midnight are still cussing the sanitary inspector.

The big review over, several trips across the lake by mine planter and barge, and the maneuvers of 1932 were over.

U.S. Army Dental Bulletin
Vol. V, No. l, January 1934

Thanks to Terry Bender, 1/14th Inf, for making this document available and for his dedicated efforts to preserve the history of the 14th Infantry Regiment.



1932 Maneuvers - C.R. Hollister, Major, Dental Corps
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Last modified: November 01, 2012