Battalion Operational Report:

Monthly Evaluation Report (August 1967)

HEADQUARTERS,
1ST BATTALION, 14TH INFANTRY
(GOLDEN DRAGONS)

APO San Francisco 9635$
31 May 1967

SUBJECT: Monthly Evaluation Report (Moneval – May 1967)

TO: Commanding Officer

196th Light Infantry Brigade

APO San Francisco 96256

   1. General.

a. During the month of May, the 1st Bn, 14th Inf continued its mission of assisting in providing security for the CHU LAI Defense Command. Numerous search and destroy operations were conducted, primarily in the western portion of the AO, as this is a likely route to be used by the enemy should he attack the CLDC. In addition the areas around the base camp, hill 54 vic BT397145 were saturated with squad size patrols and ambushes. On 5 May, Co C began S&D operations in the southeastern portion of AO RHINO. On 15 May, Co B helilifted into AO RHINO vic coord BT270124 and conducted S&D operations to the northeast. F/2-11 ACR, with 2/H/2-11 ACR attached, conducted several reconnaissance by fire missions into the northeastern portion of AO RHINO and fired H&I fires in the western portion of the AO. On 19 May, the Bn Hvy Mortar Section and F/2-11 attached were deployed vic coord BT303134 to increase the H&I fires in AO RHINO and extend the coverage of indirect fire support. In addition to the heavy H&I fires, numerous air strikes were placed in AO RHINO on suspected enemy locations and routes of movement. The operations planned and executed were intended to strike at the enemy's homeland, to disrupt his movement to pacified areas, and to deny him food from the rich valleys in the western portion of AO BOBCAT.

b. The waterways in the southeastern portion of AO BOBCAT were interdicted with elements of the 1/14th Infantry along with Popular Forces troops from Ly Tin District on joint operations. Several search and ambush operations were conducted (on the island center of mass vic coord BT425150) by US and PF troops.

c. It is believed that the operations conducted by 1/14th Infantry denied the enemy the northern route of approach to the CHU LAI area. The enemy was forced to fight in his homeland and was therefore unable to attack and harass the R&D cadre and pacified areas within the AO.

* Note: See attached overlays of AO RHINO and AO BOBCAT. All coordinates mentioned in this report are reference Map, VIETNAM, 1:50,000,Series L7014, Sheets 6639I, 6640II, 6739IV, and 6740III.

   2. Operations.

a. The majority of operations conducted by the battalion during the month of May were search and destroy. Emphasis was placed on night ambushes.

(1) Contact was made with the enemy on 21 of the above operations. The majority of the platoon operations were of one to three day duration. Two contacts were made on platoon operations. The company size operations were from five to fifteen days duration with enemy contact being made almost daily.

b. Operations

(1) The battalion conducted a reinforcing operation on the night of 3 May when an estimated VC squad attacked and burned the AN TOAN refugee hamlet vic coord BT384174. One cavalry platoon with a platoon of infantry attached relieved the Popular Forces Company on the AN TOAN Bridge allowing them to reinforce the PF forces in the refugee hamlet, forcing the enemy to withdraw.

(2) See enclosure #3 for results of operation conducted by Co A during period 5-8 May.

(3) On 141814 May, vic BT330695 3/B/1-14 received approximately 6-10 rounds sniper fire from a distance of 200 meters NW of their location. Two squads provided a base of fire and pursued while the remainder of the platoon maneuvered to the rear of the enemy position and caught 8 VC by surprise fleeing from a small hut. The maneuvering element quickly engaged the VC with a heavy volume of fire, resulting in 8 VC KIA; 3 BAR's, 3 Russian carbines, 1 US carbine, a large quantity of small arms ammo and misc documents captured.

c. A total of 19 close support air strikes were delivered within the AO during the month of May, resulting in 31 enemy KIA (BC), 15 bunkers, 24 structures, 13 gun positions destroyed; 3 secondary explosions and 2 secondary fires. There were 13,694 artillery rounds fired during the month resulting in 23 enemy KIA (BC), 19 enemy KIA (Poss), 30 sampans sunk, 20 structures and 45 structures destroyed. It is believed that more damage was inflicted upon the enemy than is reflected in this report, however due to the dense vegetation and thick underbrush it was impossible to make a thorough search of the battlefield.

   3. Enemy Activity.

a. The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry recorded 46 separate enemy contacts ranging in size from a single sniper to an estimated platoon. These contacts included a grenadier attack by confirmed elements of the 70th Co, 409 Sapper Bn, elements of the V-14 (AKA K-53) LF Co and possibly elements of the 706 LF Co. The results of these contacts are as follows:

Enemy KIA (BC)	Enemy KIA (est)	Enemy CIA	Enemy Wpns CIA
127	136	3	11

b. In addition to the above, the following incidents occurred in our area of operation during the past month.

	Sniper Incidents	-	57
	Punji Stake Incidents	-	2
	Booby Trap and Mine Incidents	-	11
	Terrorist Incidents	-	1

4. Revolutionary Development Support.

a. This battalion has worked closely with Tam Ky Province and Ly Tin District conducting screening operations within its area of operations. The results of these operations are as follows:

	(1)	VN civilians relocated to Tam Ky	-	244
	(2)	VN civilians relocated to Ly Tin	-	90
	(3)	VCS forwarded to Brigade	-	31

   5. Psychological Operations/Civic Action.

a. This battalion is not equipped for psychological operations therefore these missions conducted in our area were controlled and evaluated by the 196th Light Infantry Brigade.

b. The following Medcap missions were conducted in the village of DIEN PHO (1), Ly Tin District, Quang Tin Province during the past month.

	15 May - 54 persons treated
	17 May - 41 persons treated
	20 May - 75 persons treated
	22 May - 35 persons treated
	24 May - 78 persons treated
	29 May - 51 persons treated

   6. Logistics.

a. During May the battalion brought forward critical supply items from Pleiku. In some instances these items were not readily available from the 8th Support Bn due to that unit not being fully operational at the time. Now that the 8th Spt Bn is fully operational the logistical support has been outstanding.

b. Aerial resupply of the Bn's maneuver elements has improved considerably. Aerial support now rendered to the Bn could not be better.

c. Potable water is now available at hill 54. Task Force Oregon has provided a complete tactical potable water unit which services the battalion and attachments. The presence of this equipment has greatly reduced the number of vehicular miles previously driven to haul water. The equipment is presently producing between 5 and 8 thousand gallons daily.

d. The self-imposed limitation on the number of vehicles on hand. As a result vehicular maintenance has been a problem. Efforts toward more complete 2d echelon support are being made. A sea plan has been initiated to bring additional vehicles and tools to the CHU LAI AO.

 
 

Our special thanks to Cpt. Mark Morris, former 1967 Bn Artillery LNO to 1/14th Infantry, for supplying the 1967 Bn Operational Reports.

OPERATIONAL REPORTS TIMELINE 1967