

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS 3D LRIGADE, 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION APO San Francisco 96355

AVDDC-OP

4 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968

TO:


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SECTION 1 (C) SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION ACTIVITIES

- 1. (C) GENERAL: During the reporting period 1 February to 30 April 1968 the 3d Brigade (TF), 4th Infantry Division participated in Operation Wheeler/Wallowa for 28 days and Operation Patrick for 31 days. On 30 March the 3d Brigade returned under the operational control of the 4th Infantry Division and participated in Operation MacArthur for the remainder of the reporting period. The 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division has participated in 722 consecutive days in combat as of 30 April 1968.
- a. Mission: The 3d Brighde's TF mission in Operation Wheeler/Wallowa was to assume responsibility of the northern half of the Wheeler/Wallowa AO for:
- (1) Offensive and defensive operations designed to locate and destroy NVA elements, Viet Cong main force, local force, guerrilla units, and the well established Viet Cong infrastructure throughout the AO.
- (2) Assume responsibility for providing security for the 39th Engineer Battalion repair parties along Highway #535 and convoy escort.
- (3) Assume responsibility for security and road clearing of Highway #1 from BT114497 north to BT 102510 and south to BT 175418.
 - (4) Provide security for supporting units at LZ Baldy (BT131452).
- b. The 3d Brigade Task Force's mission in Operation Patrick was to assume responsibility within the Patrick AO:
- (1) Conduct reconnaissance in force, economy of force, and security operation north of the Bong Son River in close cooperation and coordination with the 40th ARVN Regiment and RF/PF Forces.


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- (2) Conduct search and clear operations south of the Bong Son River in close coordination with the 41st ARVN Regiment; RF/PF Forces, and CSF Units to support and provide security for the Revolutionary Development effort and to neutralize or destroy enemy forces throughout the AO.
- (3) Assume responsibility for security of LZ English (BS875010) and LZ Uplift (BR927755).
- (4) Assume responsibility for security of bridge sites from Bong Son Bridge north along Highway #1 to BS 922216.
 - (5) Secure Highway #1 from ICTZ/IICTZ Boundary north to BS 922216.
- (6) Be prepared within 1 to 6 hours to relieve or reinforce USSF, LLDB and refugee camps, District Headquarters, RF and PF outposts, Bong Son Bridge security force, critical signal installations, 3d Battalion, 506th Airborne Infantry at Phan Thiet (AN855100) and ROK Forces within their TAOR with forces ranging in size from a platoon to a battalion (TF).
- (7) Be prepared within 2 to 6 hours to provide two (2) rifle companies as a reaction force for MSF Operations in Darlac Province.
- (8) Be prepared to assist in relief/reinforcement of Brigade elements in Patrick AO by one brigade, lOlst Ariborne Division, and if relieved of AO be prepared to deploy by air/land movement elsewhere in IICTZ or 4th Infantry Division TAOR.
- (9) Conduct psychological and Medcap operations in support of tactical operations and Revolutionary Development.
- c. The 3d Brigade's mission in Operation MacArthur was to assume responsibility within the MacArthur AO:
- (1) Conduct recommaissance in force, bushmaster, and security operations designed to detect and destroy VC/NVA forces, extend GVN control, and interdict enemy LOC and infiltration routes within the AO.
 - (2) Defend the Provincial Orbital of Kontum.
 - (3) Provide security for 299th Engineer Battalion on Highway #14N.
- (4) Conduct road clearing operations, provide security for mine sweep teams and escort convoys along Highway #511 and Highway #14N.
- (5) Be prepared to provide one (1) infantry battalion within 1 to 4 hours to support and reinforce MSF operations north of Dak Pek.







- d. Operational Areas: (See Inclosure #1 for Wheeler/Wallowa AO, Inclosure #2 for Patrick AO, and Inclosure #3 for MacArthur AO.
- (1) The area designated as the 3d Brigade AO in Operation Wheeler/Wallowa encompasses Duy Xuyen, Que Son, and Duc Duc Districts in Quang Nam Province.
- (2) The area designated as the 3d Brigade AO in Operation Patrick encompasses Phu My, Hoai Nhon, Hoai An, and Binh Khe District in Binh Dinh Province and part of Duc Pho District of Quang Ngai Province.
- (3) The area designated as the 3d Brigade AO in Operation MacArthur encompasses Kontum District in Kontum Province.
- e. Task Organization: Principal units of the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division with commanders names and dates of command, and major supporting units are as follows:

Headquarters, 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
Commander: Colonel George E. Wear (1 Feb - 25 Feb 1968)
Colonel Eugene P. Forrester (25 Feb - 30 Apr 1968)

Deputy Commander: 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division LTC Harold F. Bentz (1 Feb - 30 Apr 1968)

Executive Officer
LTC Melton H. Kunze (1 Feb - 30 Apr 1968)

lst Battalion, 14th Infantry
LTC George L. Ball (1 Feb - 30 Apr 1968)


lst Battalion, 35th Infantry
LTC William W. Taylor Jr (1 Feb - 30 Apr 1968)

2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry
LTC William J. Livsey Jr (1 Feb - 30 Apr 1968)

2nd Battalion, 9th Artiller: (13) LTC Gerald B. Bobzien (1 100 - 30 Apr 1968)

Company C, 4th Engineer Battalion (DS) CPT Boyd A. Jones (1 Feb - 30 Apr 1968)

40th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog)
1LT Ery L. Davis (1 Feb - 30 Apr 1968)





3d Brigade Aviation Section
Maj Edward R. Castle Jr (1 Feb - 12 Apr 1968)
CPT Robert J. Drew (12 Apr - 30 Apr 1968)

Principal Staff:

S-1 MAJ Max E. Thomas (1 Feb - 30 Apr 1968)

S-2 MAJ William Campbell (1 Feb - 10 Feb 1968) MAJ Alva V. Hardin Jr (10 Feb - 30 Apr 1968)

S-3
MAJ William P. Doyle (1 Feb - 30 Apr 1968)


S-4 MAJ John S. Anderson (1 Feb - 30 Apr 1968)

S-5 CPT Converse B. Smith (1 Feb - 2 Mar 1968) CPT Robert Johnston (2 Mar - 30 Apr 1968)

2. INTELLIGENCE:

a. General: During this reporting period, 1 February 1968 through 30 April 1968, enemy activity is categorized in three phases, based on the three separate areas of operations.

b. Phase One: 1 February 1968 - 28 February 1968, Que Son - Thang Binh area of operation. The beginning of this phase coincided with the "Tet Offensive" which found well armed and well disciplined enemy forces attacking almost all friendly installations in the Tam Ky areas to the south of LZ Baldy and the Hoi An - Da Nang area to the north. Local force units in coordination with NVA elements conducted numerous standoff and harassing attacks in the Que Son - LZ Baldy area during this same period. ____lielligence sources indicated that the 2nd PAVN Division Headquarters and its three subordinate segments, the 3rd, 1st, and 21st, had a and north from its normal base areas into Duy Xuyen District in order to cont. ... their part of the offensive. The Brigade launched operations in this area in order to interdict any withdrawal or future attack plans of this division. On 6 February 1968 the 3rd NVA Regiment attacked Hoi An and suffered 103 NVA KIA. Elements of the 1st NVA Regiment were engaged by Task Force Miracle elements north of the Song Thu Bon River on 8 February 1968, resulting in 266 NVA KIA. On 9 February 1968, 1-14th and 1-35th Infantry in separate contacts with elements of the 2nd NVA Division Headquarters and 21st NVA Regiment killed 236 NVA and captured or destroyed approximately 100 weapons. After these contacts the 2nd NVA Division began to








withdraw to its base areas in the mountainous jungle area of Que Son and Thang Binh Districts. The remainder of this phase was spent in platoon and company size operations on search and destroy missions directed against the withdrawing enemy. Although the enemy fled in small groups in order to avoid observation and contact, elements of the 3d Brigade killed 129 enemy and captured 32 weapons during the last two weeks of Operation Wheeler/Wallowa.

- c. Phase Two: 29 February 1968 30 March 1968. On 29 February 1968, the 3d Brigade commenced Operation Patrick in Northern Binh Dinh Province. Although the 1st Air Cavalry Division had inflicted very heavy casualties over a four month period in the AO, it was apparent that the 3d NVA Division was still conducting some offensive operations; probably because they had received numerous replacements during the month of January and February. On 2 March C, 1-50th Infantry OPCON to the 3d Brigade, contacted elements of the 2nd VC Regiment east of their base area in the Nui Miu Mountains and killed 43 NVA and captured 11 weapons. On 4 March 1968 the Phu My District Headquarters came under attack, results: 20 VC KIA, additionally 53 VC PW's were killed when the district jail took direct hits from 82mm mortar and B-40 rocket rounds. On 4 March LZ Crystal received heavy 120mm mortar and RR fire that resulted in light damage. The same night LZ Moon came under a heavy ground attack from an estimated NVA Battalion and 54 NVA were killed and 15 weapons were captured. On 8 March 1968 a IRP Team in the Cay Giep Mountains spotted an NVA company apparently on a supply mission. Artillery and tactical air strikes were called resulting in numerous secondary explosions, the destruction of a bridge, and 30 NVA KIA. Intelligence sources confirmed that the 22nd NVA Regiment had moved south from the Bong Son Plain area into the 506 Valley area and on 9 March 1968, LZ Litts Vic BR 911712, received a ground attack from the 8th Battalion, 22nd NVA Regiment resulting in 36 NVA KIA and 12 weapons captured. The mission of the 22nd NVA Regiment was to reinforce the 2nd VC Regiment in the Phu My Valley area and gain the confidence and support of the population in this area. On 9 March 1968, 1-50th Infantry again contacted elements of the 2nd VC Regiment and killed 23 NVA. The remainder of this phase was spent in platoon and company size recon in force operations against an enemy that withdrew to resupply and refit.
- d. Phase Three: 31 March 1968 30 April 1968. During this phase the 3d Brigade returned to the operational control of the 4th Infantry Division and assumed responsibility for the 173rd Airborne Brigade area of operation in southern Kontum Province. The energy in this area was capable of fighting a more conventional type of war because of their proximity to the Cambodian-Laotian Borders. Also a new energy road system which extends into southern Kontum Province has enabled the energy to infiltrate personnel and supplies with much greater rapidity. When the Brigade moved into the MacArthur AO, the 1st NVA Division Headquarters and its support elements were believed to be located in the vic of YA8287. This was believed to be an indication of an impending enemy offensive for the 1st NVA Division Headquarters had not been in country since the Eattle of Dak To. The newly infiltrated 209th Regiment was located southwest of FSB 14, which it attacked on the 26th of March 1968. The 24th NVA Regiment, directly








subordinate to the B-3 Front was located Vic YB9902 where they were receiving supplies and refitting. The 66th NVA Regiment was located in the Tri-Border area, but in early April joined the Division. As the Brigade began operations, 1-35th Infantry moved into FSB 14 and came under sporadic stand-off attacks from an unknown and unidentified energy. Over 400 rounds of mixed 82mm mortar and RR were fired at the FSB during an 8 day period. On 5 April A, B, & C Companies, 1-35th Infantry made heavy contact Vic YA9393 with an estimated enemy battalion and killed 48 NVA. On 15 April 1968, C, 1-35th Infantry made contact with a large enemy force Vic YA935937 with unknown results. Shortly after this contact, 2-35th Infantry was moved into FSB 14 and located numerous enemy KIA probably as a result of the 1-35th Infantry contact and heavy artillery and air strikes. On 20 April 1968 two Hoi Chanha rallied to the 2-35th Infantry. These individuals stated that they were from the 14th AA Company of the 320th Regiment and that their Regiment had taken the place of the 32nd NVA Regiment which had noved south into Darlac Province. On 16 April, 1-14th Infantry and 1-22nd Infantry established a fire base to the west of FSB 14 in order to inberdict infiltration and withdrawal routes. On 29 April 1968 at Vic YA 828906, Company B, 1-14th Infantry received a ground attack from elements of the K-4 Battalion, 320th Regiment and possible elements of the 66th Regiment resulting in 46 NVA KIA and 9 weapons captured. 1-22nd Infantry had sporadic contacts with an unidentified enemy force Vic LZ Pause during the period 24 - 30 April 1968 resulting in 25 NVA KIA. It appears that the enemy is concentrating and improving infiltration routes and has no plans for withdrawing. Future plans may include a new general offensive to be launched prior to the monsoon season.


e. Summary of enemy personnel and equipment losses: 1 Feb - 30 April 1968.

1 Feb - 28 Feb 1968 - Operation Wheeler/Wallowa 29 Feb 1968 - 30 Mar 1968 - Operation Patrick 30 Mar 1968 - 30 April 1968 - Operation MacArthur

	WHEELER/WALLOWA	<u>PATRICK</u>	MACARTHUR
AIL	522	234	255
PW/NVA	1	4	Ó
Pw/vc	15	10	0
CD	11	11	0
RETURNEES	0	0	2
S/A	105	40	56
c/s	1 9	14	19
S/A AMMO	10,935	1,286	13,882
81/82mm MORT RDS	19	28	209
60mm MORT RDS	16	5	329
GRENADES	118	59	390
B-40 PCCKETS	. 19 3	3 (2 B-50'S)	67
MINES	18	5	92
PACKS	37	76	23
UNIFORMS	49	44.	5

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	WHEELER/WALLOWA	PATRICK	MACARTHUR
MED SUPPLIES (LBS) PHONES	31 1	5 4	14
STRUCTURES	308	149	119
RADIOS	3	0	Ç
RICE (TONS)	32.5	. 5	0
40MM GRENADES	1	24	12
SALT (TONS)	•75	0	0
RICE MILLING MACH'S	3	0	0


(C) OPERATIONS AND TRAINING


a. Plans

- (1) During the period covered by this report the 3d Brigade Task Force was responsible for assisting Americal Division in the relief of 3d Brigade elements from the Wheeler/Wallowa AO and planning the relief of 2nd Brigade, lst Air Cavalry Division in the Patrick AO effective 291200H February 1968.
- (2) During the latter part of the reporting period, the 3d Brigade planned and conducted the relief of 173rd Airborne Brigade in the MacArthur AO effective 302000H March 1968.

b. Operations

(1) General: During the period 1 Feb - 30 March 1968 the 3d Brigade participated as a Task Force in Operation Wheeler/Wallowa and Operation Patrick. During Operation Wheeler/Wallowa (1 Feb - 28 Feb 1968) the 3d Brigade conducted recon in force operations in its respective area of responsibility with attachments from C Troop, 1st Squadron, 10th Armored Cavalry and the 2nd Battalion, 9th Artillery. The contacts during this period were heavy with the most significant action occurring during the Tet Offensive. At this time the 3d Brigade Task Force was employed to exert maximum pressure on the enemies! southwestern flank in order to relieve pressure during the attack on Da Nang, and to block the enemy withdrawal routes into his established base areas. In order to accomplish this mission, 3d Brigade elements were combat assaulted on controlling terrain features, where battalion fire support bases were established, From the FSB, companies conducted resen in force operations to block enemy routes of egress and deny the enemy access to previously established base areas. The action of the 3d Brigade Task Force in blocking routes of egress, interdicting enemy LOC, and making maximum utilization of extensive harassing and interdicting fires from artillery and air throughout the AO were factors in attenuating the enemy attacks in the Dang Nang-Hoi in area, On 28 February the 3d Brigade Task Force was ordered to pass responsibility for the Wheeler/Wallowa AO to the 196th Infantry Brigade (Lt) and relieve the 2nd Brigade, 1st .ir Cavalry Division in place and assume the responsibility for the Patrick AO effective 1200H








29 Feb 1968. During Operation Patrick (29 Feb - 30 Mar 68) the 3d Brigade Task Force with attachments from C Troop, 1st Squadron, 10th Armored Cavalry and 2nd Battalion, 9th Artillery conducted detailed recon in force, economy of force, and security operations north of Bong Son River and search and clear operations south of Bong Son River in close coordination with ARVN and RF/PF Forces to support the Revolutionary Development effort and neutralize and destroy enemy forces in the AO. Battalion operations were characterized by show of force, maximum utilization of ARVN, RF/PF Forces in combined operations, and : the use of rapid reaction forces which continually disrupted the enemy's capability to mount significant operations. Enemy contacts during this period were light due to the continous Brigade operations which forced the enemy to withdraw in small groups. Operations became a process of methodically searching for, locating, and destroying small groups of enemy in tunnels, caves, and spider holes. On 30 March the 3d Brigade Task Force passed responsibility for the Patrick AO to the 173rd Airborne Brigade effective 301200H March 1968 and assumed responsibility for the MacArthur AO effective 302000H March 1968 and reverted to 4th Infantry Division control. During the period 30 March through 30 April the Brigade conducted reconnaissance in force, bushmaster, and security operations to defend the Provincial Capital of Kontum, interdict LOC, and block enemy routes of egrees to the Cambodian Border. The contacts during this period were heavy and in some cases initiated by the enemy; however, in all cases enemy attacks were repulsed. The general plan was to have infantry battalions establish fire bases with the battalion command post and supporting artillery and mortars. The rifle companies were employed to guard the firebase and conduct local operations while the remainder of the infantry elements conducted operations throughout the TAOR. After the enemy was located and fixed, maximum artillery and tactical air power were employed to repulse attacks and enable the infantry to advance and destroy enemy forces. Arc Lights were also employed and exploited to the maximum extent to harass and destroy suspected enemy base areas and troop concentrations.

(2) 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry: During the reporting period, the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry participated in Operation Wheeler/Wallowa with the Battalion CP at LZ Hardcore, west of Hoi An Vic AT977501 under the operational control of the 3d Brigade Task Force, 4th Infantry Division. Later in the reporting period the battalion deployed to LZ English and conducted operations from LZ Geronimo (BS880174), the Battalion Fire Support Base, after relieving elements of the 1-8th Infantry, 1st Air Cavilin Division in zone. Operations continued in Patrick/Cochise Area of Operations under the control of the 3d Brigade Task Force. Upon departure of the 3d Brigade Task Force to Kontum City (MacArthur AO), the Golden Dragons reverted to the operational control of the 173rd Airborne Brigade and continued security missions and reconnaissance in force operations in the Cochise AO. On 6 April 1968, the Golden Dragons were relieved of missions in the Cochise AO by the 3d Battalion, 503rd Airborne Infantry and prepare! for deployment to the MacArthur AO. On 10 April 1968 the Battalion conducted multiple combat assaults to LZ No Slack (ZB997067) from Polei Kleng airstrip. On 17 April 1968, the Battalion was ordered to establish a new fire








support base vic YA 835965 in order to relieve pressure of LZ Mile High and LZ Incoming (FSB 14) and block enemy approach from the west. On 29 April 1968 the Battalion was ordered to conduct a combat assault and establish a new fire support base at the Chu Do Ridge vic YA 899933. During this reporting period the Battalion had many minor contacts and ambush engagements with a major enemy contact occurring on 29 April 1968.

- (3) 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry: During the reporting period the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry participated in Operation Wheeler/Wallowa with the Battalion CP located at LZ Baldy (BT132453) and LZ Cacti (BT059479) under the operational control of the 3d Brigade Task Force, 4th Infantry Division. On 19 February 1968 the Battalion moved to Pershing AO and became OPCON to the 2nd Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division. On 29 Feb the Cacti Green returned to the operational control of 3d Brigade Task Force and participated in Operation Patrick with the Battalion CP located at LZ English (BS875010). On 29 March 1968 the Cacti Green deployed to MacArthur AO and participated in Operation MacArthur and established a Battalion CP at LZ Mile High (YA937931) and at LZ Bass (ZAO27934). During the reporting period the Battalion had a number of minor contacts and ambush engagements with 3 major contacts occurring on 9 February, 5 and 15 April 1968.
- (4) 2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry: During the reporting period the 2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry participated in Operation Wheeler/Wallowa with a Battalion CP located at LZ Ross (ATO25043) under the operational control of the 3d Brigade Task Force, 4th Infantry Division. On 13 February 1968 the Battalion came under the operational control of the 196th Infantry Brigade (Lt), and established a Battalion CP at LZ Ryder (BT947345) and continued to participate in Operation Wheeler/Wallowa. On 20 March 1968 the Cacti Blue came under the operational control of the 11th Infantry Brigade and participated in Operation Champaign and established a new Battalion CP at LZ Thunder (BS874325). On 26 March 1968, 2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry deployed from LZ Thunder to Fire Support Base 7 (ZAO25933) and participated in Operation MacArthur under the operational control of 173rd Airborne Brigade. On 29 March 1968 the Battalion was released from operational control of the 173rd Airborne Brigade and became OPCON to the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division and established Battalion CP's at FSB 7 (ZAO25933) and LZ Mile High (YA937931). During the reporting period the Battalion had numerous minor contacts and ambush engagements and 4 major contacts occurring on 1 February, 27 - 29 February, 3 Mar and 30 March - 8 April 1968.
 - (5) C Company, 4th Engineer Battalion:
- (a) General: During the reporting period 1 Feb 30 Apr 1968, Company C, 4th Engineer Battalion continued to support the 3d Brigade with combat engineer support in the areas of operation and with construction and maintenance support at "LZ Baldy", "LZ English", and "LZ Mickey Mouse".
 - (b) Operations (LZ Baldy)
 - 1 Clearing landing zones




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
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<u>2</u> Destruction of enemy caves, tunnels, bunkers, and defensive positions.

2 Construction, perimeters.

- 2 Construction, maintenance, and clearing of defensive
- 4 Mine clearing operations on Highway 535.
- 5 Peneprime distribution.
- (c) Operations (LZ English)
 - Construction and maintenance of Brigade Forward Bane.
 - 2 Peneprime distribution.
 - 3 Maintenance of helipads.
 - 4 Construction of defenses around Bong Son Bridge.
 - 5 Mine clearing operations on Highway TL3A and Highway #1.
- (d) Operations (LZ Mickey Mouse)
- LZ Mary Lou).
 - 2 Road construction into LZ Mary Lou.
- 2 Destruction of enemy caves, tunnels, bunkers, and defensive positions.
 - 4 Clearing and construction of Battalion Firebases.
 - 5 Mine clearing operations on Highway 511.
 - 6 Maintenance of water supply point.
 - (5) 2nd Battalion, 9th Artillery:
- (a) General: During period 1 February to 30 April 1968, the mission of the 2nd Battalion, 9th mission of the 2nd Battalion, 9th mission of the 3d Brigade.
- l Battery A was in direct support of the 1-14th Infantry from 1 February to 27 February 1968. From 28 February to 17 March 1968 Battery A was in direct support of 1-35th Infantry. From 18 March to 30 April 1968, Battery A was in direct support of 2-35th Infantry.
 - 2 Battery B was in direct support of 1-35th Infantry from







- 1 February to 17 February 1968. From 18 February to 30 April Battery B was in direct support of 1-14th Infantry.
- 3 Battery C, was in direct support of the 2-35th Infantry from 1 February to 17 April 1968. From 18 April to 30 April 1968 Battery C was in direct support of 1-35th Infantry.
- 4 Additional artillery units which were under the operational control (OPCON) of this Battalion were as follows:


a Operation Wheeler/Wallowa

- (1) Battery D, 1-14th Artillery was OPCON from 13 February to 27 February with the mission of direct support.
- (2) Battery C, 3-82nd Artillery was OFCON from 3 February to 27 February with the mission of direct support of 1-6th Infantry.
- (3) Battery C, 3-16th Artillery (155) was general support, reinforcing the 2-9th Artillery during the period.
- (a) Battery W, 2-11th Marines (155) was attached to 3-16th Artillery with the mission of general support, reinforcing the 2-9th Artillery.
- (4) Battery B, 3-18th Artillery (8" and 175) was general support, reinforcing the $\overline{2}$ -9th Artillery throughout the period.
- (5) Four searchlight sections from Battery C, 29th Artillery were attached throughout the period.

<u>b</u> Operation Patrick

- (1) 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery (AW) provided 16 M-42 (dusters), 3 Quad .50 Caliber machine guns, and 4 searchlights which were OPCON to 2-9th Artillery throughout the period.
- (3) Batteries A and B, 7th Battalion, 15th Artillery (8" and 175mm) were reinforcing the 2-9th Artillery throughout the period.
- (a) Battery C, 6th Battalion, 16th Artillery (155) was attached to 7th Battalion, 15th Artillery throughout the period with the mission of GSR to the 2-9th Artillery.





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c Operation MacArthur

- (1) Battery A, 4-42nd Artillery was OPCON from 30 March to 3 April 1968 with the mission of direct support of the 1-8th Infantry.
- (2) Battery C, 6-29th Artillery was OPCON from 30 March to 3 April 1968 with the mission of direct support of the 3-8th Infantry.
- (3) Battery C, 4-42nd Artillery was OPCON from 2 April to 30 April 1968 with the mission of direct support of the 1-22nd Infantry.
- (4) Battery A, 6-29th Artillery was OPCON from 3 April to 30 April with the mission of direct support of the 1-8th Infantry.
- (5) Battery C, 1-92nd Artillery (155) was GSR to the 2-9th Artillery during the period.
- (6) Battery C, 5-16th Artillery (155) was GSR to the 2-9th Artillery during the period.
- (7) Battery C, 5-22nd Artillery (175) was GSR to the 2-9th Artillery during the period.
- (8) Battery C, 6-14th Artillery (8" and 175) was GSR to the 2-9th Artillery during the period.
- (9) Battery D, 5-16th Artillery (8") was GSR to the 2-9th Artillery from 7 April to 30 April 1968.
- (10) Battery B, 1-92nd Artillery (155) was GSR to the 2-9th Artillery from 10 April to 30 April 1968.
- (11) 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery (AW) provided 3 M-42 dusters, 1 Quad .50 Caliber machine gun and one searchlight which were OPCON to 2-9th Artillery during the period.
- (b) Summary of rounds expended by 2-9th Artillery during the reporting period.

1 Operation Wheeler/Wallowa

TYPE	ROUNDS EXPENDED		
105 HE 105 WP 105 ILLUM 105 SAOKE	49,205 3,386 1,911 1.118		
Con Sider Market			



2 Operation Patrick

TYPE	ROUNDS EXPENDED
105 HE 105 WP	7,369 2,220 176
105 ILLUM 105 SMOKE	225
TO) Dilond	~~/

3 Operation MacArthur

TYPE	ROUNDS EXPENDED
105 HE	15,614
105 WP	311
105 ILLUM	15
105 SMOKE	461

(c) Summary of results of artillery fired in support of 3d Brigade.


OPERATION	ENEMY KIA BY ARTILLERY
Wheeler/Wallowa	146 - 25 Secondary Explosions 11 Structures Destroyed
Patrick	98 - 12 Secondary Explosions 4 Structures Destroyed
MacArthur	62 - 9 Secondary Explosions 1 X 57 RR Destroyed

(6) Aviation

(a) During the quarter the Brigade Aviation Section flew a total of 1,473 hours, 2,177 sorties, and carried 1,201 passengers. Of the total OH-23G flying time, 243 hours and 434 sorties were flown on scout operations. The section recorded 5 confirmed KIA and no weapons captured. One aircraft was damaged by mortars and 2 aircraft were what down and totally destroyed.

(b) Tactical Air Support statistics for the reporting period were as follows:

	FAC MISSIONS		COMBAT SKY SPOTS		
,	REG	FLOWN	REQ	FLOWN	
FEB	143	1.04	6 8	22	
MAR	104	62	46	16	
APR	397	_220_	130	61	
TOTAL	644	386 (. //	1-21/1 A	99	
		12	CILOL		



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(7) Training


(a) During the reporting period 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division personnel graduated from the following schools:

SCHOOL	GRADUATED
3d Brigade NCO Preparatory School	40
4th Infantry Division NCO School	34
MACV Recondo School	Ó
4th Infantry Division Pre-Recondo School	17


- (b) A one-day in country orientation and training course was conducted by the 3d Brigade NCO Preparatory School for replacements received during the period 1 February 30 March 1968. This training was supplemented during periods of stand-down or while units were providing security for battalion fire bases. This training consisted of individual instruction on the following subjects:
 - 1 Familiarization and zeroing of individual weapons.
 - 2 Artillery and mortar forward observer procedures.
 - 2 Patrolling and bushmaster techniques.
 - 4 CBR Proficiency.
- 5 Briefing on intelligence and operations by the Battalion S-2's and S-3's.
- (c) During the period 30 March 30 April 1968 mandatory and refresher training was conducted by 3d Brigade elements while participating in the Division Rotation Program at Camp Enari.
- (8) Chemical: During the reporting period extensive use was made of the airborne personnel detector in support of 3d Brigade operations. Bulk CS delivery systems were used in Operation MacArthur with 3550 rounds being dropped since 1 April 1968.

4. (C) LOGISTICS

a. General: The 3d Brigade Support Battalion (Prov) had the primary responsibility for logistical support of the Brigade until 31 March 1968. From 1 April 1968 through 30 April 1968, the 4th Supply and Transportation Battalion through their forward support elements located at Kontum, had primary responsibility for logistical support. General support was provided by TF FRAZIER from 1 February - 28 February 1968 while the Brigade







was at LZ Baldy. At LZ English general support was provided by FSA (Task Force Lathrop) from 29 February - 30 March 1968. At Kontum general support was provided by the 4th Infantry Division. At LZ Baldy repair parts requisitions were passed through the general support maintenance support unit, the 188th Maintenance Battalion at Chu Lai. At LZ English repair part requisitions were passed through the general support maintenance activity at Qui Nhon. From 1 February to 30 March all other requisitions were delivered by courier to Qui Nhon depot. From 30 March the forward elements of the Brigade at Kontum have been supported by B Company, 704th Maintenance for repair parts. The Brigade rear detachment at Camp Enari is supported by Headquarters and A Company, 704th Maintenance.

b. Supply

(1) Class I

- (a) Ration breakdown for the Brigade was accomplished by the 3d Support Battalion (Prov) until 30 March 1968. Perishables were stored in two $1\frac{1}{2}$ ton refrigerator vans and four 600 cubic feet refrigerators. From 30 March to 30 April 1968 ration breakdown for the Brigade was the responsibility of the forward support elements of the 4th S & T Battalion located at Kontum, RVN.
 - (b) Class I issue for the reporting period:

A Rations - 371,520 C Rations - 106,466

(2) Class II and IV

(a) From 1 February 1968 through 30 March 1968 Depot shipped directly to our activity address code through the Brigade Supply Officer to a Class II and IV storage and distribution area. This was made possible by the opening of a supply account which enabled all organic, attached, and OFCON units to requisition and draw directly from the Brigade Supply Officer. From 30 March to 30 April 1968 Class II and IV Items were handled by 4th Infantry Division Supply Officer at Pleiku. Fortification materials were issued from the Forward Support Element at Kontum.

(3) Class III

(a) At LZ Baldy, all fuels were wholesale issued by 3d Support Battalion (Prov). Stockage capacity was 100,000 gallons. At LZ English all fuels were wholesale issued by the FSA (Task Force Lathrop). At Kontum the responsibility of Class III was the responsibility of the Forward Support Element of the 4th S & T Battalion.

(b) POL issue for the reporting period (gallons): JP-4 (1,012,000)-AVGAS (963,500) - MOGAS (329,400) - Diesel (372,000).



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(4) Class V

(a) At LZ Baldy, TF FRAZIER operated the ASP and resupply of Class V originated from Chu Lai. At LZ English FSA (Task Force Lathrop) operated the ASP and resupply of Class V originated at Qui Nhon. At Kontum the 3d Brigade operated its own ASP with resupply coming from Pleiku.

(b) Class V issues for the reporting period:


TYPE	MOUNT
155mm HE 105mm HE 4.2" HE 81mm HE	18,942 64,709 21,663 17,982

(5) Transportation

- (a) Two (2) light truck squads and one (1) medium truck squad from the 3d Support Battalion (Prov) supported the Brigade until 30 March 1968. From 30 March to 30 April 1968 the 4th Infantry Division Transportation Officer provided support to the Brigade.
- (b) At LZ Baldy Air Force C-123 aircraft provided by Americal Division Transportation Officer, arranged scheduled aircraft between the Brigade and its rear detachment at Pleiku. At LZ English the 4th Infantry Division Transportation Officer provided scheduled C7-2 aircraft between the Brigade and its rear detachment at Pleiku. At Kontum the 4th Infantry Division Transportation Officer provided scheduled C7A aircraft between Kontum and the 3d Brigade rear detachment at Pleiku. Air Force C-123 aircraft also make scheduled airlifts between Kontum and Pleiku. During the reporting period the following air movement record was compiled:
 - 1 Sorties 273
 - 2 Passengers 3,601
 - 3 Cargo 74 tor.

(6) Medical

(a) D Company, 4th Medical Battalion provided immediate medical support for the 3d Brigade during the reporting period. Medical evacuation support in Operation Wheeler/Wallowa was provided by the 54th Helicopter Ambulance Company with patients being sent to 2nd Surgical Hospital in Chu Lai







and the Naval Station Hospital in Da Nang. During Operation Patrick evacuation facilities were provided by the 498th Helicopter Ambulance Company with patients being evacuated to the 67th and 85th Evacuation Hospitals in Qui Nhon. During Operations in the MacArthur AO, medical evacuation facilities have been provided by the 283rd Helicopter Ambulance Company with patients being taken to the 71st Evacuation Hospital in Pleiku.

(b) Medical statistics for reporting period:

Disease Patients - 772
Battle Casualties - 551
Non-battle Casualties - 237

TATOT

1,560

5. (C) CIVIL AFFAIRS:

a. General: Priority of effort was directed towards the following three areas: Public health and sanitation, refugee relief, and civic construction. All projects were designed to be short range and high impact in nature. All projects were coordinated with GVN Officials and most of the work was performed by indigenous personnel. US personnel and units participating in civic action were the 3d Brigade S-5 Section, 51st AA Platoon, 29th Civil Affairs Team, 13th VA Team, 41st Civil Affairs Company; and three subsector MACV Advisory Teams. GVN agencies included ten RDC Teams; GVN refugee relief personnel, VIS personnel, and a New Zealand Medcap Team.

b. Public health and sanitation


(1) Medcap results


(a)	Sick Call	8408
(b)	Youth Health Baths for Children	1478
(c)	Baths for Children	1.32

- (2) GVN health workers trained 9
 (3) Latrines constructed 5
- (4) Public health films show 11
- (5) Bong Son Hospital was conduted 6,500 lbs of Medical supplies.

c. Public education:

- (1) Construction began on two schools with five class rooms being completed,
 - (2) Seven English Classes were taught to a total of 140 children.





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
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- (3) Fifty-one pounds of school supplies were distributed.
- d. Refugee Relief: Three thousand (3,000) pounds of food, and one hundred and six (106) pounds of clothing were distributed.
 - e. Civil Construction
 - (1) Homes repaired 4
 - (2) Roads built and repaired 40 Km
 - (3) Dispens ries built 2
 - (4) Bridges repaired 3
 - f. Psychological Warfare:
- (1) Psychological Operations included leaflet drops, ground and aerial speaker missions (both live and taped).
- (2) Leaflet drops and aerial speaker missions were accomplished using CH-47, 0-2B, and UH-1D aircraft. Ground missions were accomplished with 250 Watt and 500 Watt speakers.
- (3) Armed Propaganda Teams were very effective when used during medcaps conducted in contested villages and when employed with rifle companies operating in populated areas.
 - (4) Summary:
 - (a) Leaflets dropped 34,001,387
 - (b) Aerial speaker time 215 hours
 - (c) Ground speaker time 90 hours
 - (d) Ralliers 2
 - (e) Leaflets made 1;
 - (f) Tapes made 5

6. (C) PERSONNEL:

a, Unit strengths as of 1 February, 1 March, and 1 April were as follows:

HHC 225 223 232 -18-



	1 FEB	1 MAR	1 APR
1-14TH INF	893	805	782
1-35TH INF	884	779	819
2-35TH INF	879	775	732
TOTAL	2,881	2,582	2,565

b. Total numbers of casualties suffered during the period:

	FEB		MA	MAR		PR	
	<u>KIA</u>	AIW	<u>KIA</u>	WIA	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	
HHC	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1-14TH INF	37	121	0	9	4	31	
1-35TH INF	28	90	3	10	16	79	
2-35TH INF	13	60	6	28	8	32	-
TOTAL	78	271	9	47	28	142	

c. Total replacements received during the period:

	FEB	MAR .	APR
HHC	23	21	13
1-14TH INF	48	36	91
1-35TH INF	37	64	131
2-35TH INF	17	76	144
TOTAL	125	197	379

d. R & R Program

(1) R & R utilization figures for the period are as follows:

	ALLOCATIONS RECEIVED	ALLOCATIONS USED	PERCENT JSED		
FEB	194	187	96		
MAR	277	272	98		
-19-					



ALLOCATIONS RECEIVED ALLOCATIONS USED PERCENT USED

	APR	299	299		100
∍.	Awards pr	esented during the repo	orting period:		
			<u>FEB</u>	MAR	APR
	Distingui	shed Service Cross	0	0	0
	Distingui	shed Service Medal	0	0	0
	Silver Sta	ar Medal	1	8	5
	Legion of	Merit	0	0	0
	Distingui	shed Flying Cross	0	0	3
	Bronze St	ar with "V"	15	12	34
	Bronze St	ar Medal	6	13	13
	Air Medal		8	4	11
	Army Commo	endation Medal with "V"	2	ı	11
	Army Comm	endation Medal	44	76	153



S. Sidential


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
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SECTION 2 (C) COMMANDERS OBSERVATIONS

Observations (Lessons Learned)

- 1. (U) Personnel: Not Used
- 2. (C) Intelligence:
 - a. Infra Red Mission
- (1) Observation: Rapid dissemination of red haze read-outs will enable artillery to place effective fire on located targets.
- (2) Evaluation: Using the data link system at Dragon Mountain, targets can be identified and the information disseminated to Brigade Headquarters before the target can relocate.
- (3) Recommendations: Information gathered on infra-red missions should be disseminated to Brigade level within two (2) hours.
 - b. Use of OlE aircraft as artillery forward observers
- (1) Observation: Headhunter aircraft may be used effectively for artillery spotting when operating on artillery communication channels.
- (2) Evaluation: By entering the artillery command net headhunter aircraft will have immediate access to artillery support and can coordinate with artillery liaison officers for movement between battalion area of operations.
- (3) Recommendation: Headhunter aircraft should enter the artillery command net concurrent with entry into the Brigade AO.
 - c. NVA Road Network
- (1) Observation: The NVA have constructed a road network in western Kontum Province and are using it to facilitate resupply.
- (2) Evaluation: The road custem has greatly increased the NVA resupply capability and it is expected that $\epsilon_{\rm exp}$ and it is expected that
- (8) Recommendation: The USAF should develop a comprehensive interdiction program and be given the road network as an area of operation.
 - d. NVA Dummies
- (1) Observation: In contacts made with the NVA in April 1968, dummies made of clothing stuffed with leaves were found tied to trees.







- (2) Evaluation: These dummies were positioned to draw fire and disclose US positions. The degree of success enjoyed was directly related to the care taken in placing the dummies.
- (3) Recommendation: US Forces should be made aware of this technique and be prepared to cope with the situation.


3. (C) Operations


a. Combined Operations

- (1) Observation: Experience in operations with ARVN intelligence teams has proved beneficial to the combat operations of the Brigade. A specific squad was normally assigned a mission to support a given Battalion and a rapport was quickly established that enhanced combat operations.
- (2) Evaluation: In an attempt to further integrate both US and ARVN Forces in combined operations, intelligence teams were furnished upon request down to company level. These teams proved to be of great assistance in that they provided valuable information, which was extremely beneficial to US Troops. Their ability to communicate as well as their knowledge of VC/NVA tactics have proven invaluable to Brigade operations.
- (3) Recommendation: Whenever the tactical situation permits, US Units should employ ARVN Intelligence Teams. Results obtained will be beneficial to FWF Operations.


b. Minibase Concept

- (1) Observation: The Minibase concept has proven effective in enhancing the distribution of combat power to support attacking rifle companies. The minibase compliments and provides the needed fire power from the battalion's 4.2" Platoon. Further combat power is given the minibase by restricting the Recon Platoons activities on or near the base. Security of the minibase is further enhanced by its selection of difficult commanding terrain from which 106 RR can provide direct fire on targets of opportunity. In conjunction with the Battalion CP, the minibase also solves the problem of security of the Battalion Command Group.
- (2) Evaluation: In a search for methods to further enhance the combat fire power and effectiveness of the attacking companies without a major change in the Battalion CP and Battalion Trains, the minibase concept was developed.
- (3) Recommendation: Whenever the tactical situation prohibits the redeployment of the Battalion CP and the accompanying trains, it is highly recommended that the minibase concept be employed.





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c. Non-permissive Air Operations


- (1) Observation: During operations by the 1-14th Infantry, vic LZ Hardcore, a unique and unusual experience was encountered. Upon the establishment of the Battalion CP the entire area was designated a "non-permissive entry" area to helicopters and light aircraft due to intensive enemy anti-aircraft emplacements throughout the area. LZs marked with smoke were constantly in danger of enemy mortar and recoilless rifle fire. To offset this situation the Battalion established flight corridors and all aircraft entering this area were required to check in with a Battalion Air/Ground Center. Furthermore all resupply, medevac, and CH-47 sorties were supported by artillery, gunships, or close air support. Gunships were used extensively throughout the period with the responsibility for the tactical briefing often coming from the Battalion Commander while in flight and, on occasion, from the infantry company commander in contact.
- (2) Evaluation: In a search for a solution to the "non-permissive" air conditions, ground commanders readily adopted to the situation by establishing Air/Ground control elements with the responsilibity of controlling all aircraft within this area. Signaling mirrors as well as other items were utilized to control the aircraft coming into landing zones rather than smoke. Ground unit commanders became proficient at delivering in flight briefings, as often this was all the tactical situation permitted.
- (3) Recommendation: Whenever a situation such as this arises the unit commander must remain flexible and be prepared to adjust to new situations as they arise.


d. Chemical Munitions Employment


- (1) Observation: During the reporting period the 3d Brigade had the opportunity to employ CS by means of the 4.2" delivery system. Difficulty was experienced during the TOT due mainly to fuze timing problems. In general the rounds exploded early and therefore did not cover the objective area effectively. Upon insertion of ground troops, only minutes later, it was discovered that ground troops did not need protective masks.
 - (2) Evaluation: Not Appl: 10
- (3) Recommendation: It is felt that if the fuze timing (and concurrently the adjustment problem) and the persistency of the round is improved, the terminal effects will match the capabilities of the delivery weapon and the weapons system will be effective in surprise actions for the infantry battalions.

e. Command and Control Helicopters

(1) Observation: Helicopters utilized by battalion commanders are not







equipped with sufficient radio drop cords to allow all members of the aircraft to properly communicate.


- (2) <u>Evaluation</u>: Helicopters provided as command and control ships with insufficient radio drop cords hamper the tactical operation by forcing the battalion commander to communicate with the pilots on the Battalion Command Net.
- (3) Recommendation: All command and control ships utilized by Battalion Commanders should be equipped with sufficient radio drop cords to allow the commander to communicate with crew members and pilot without jamming the Battalion Command Net with his instruction.


f. Combat Assaults and Extractions

- (1) Observation: On numerous ocassions aircraft coming into a pick-up zone or a landing zone have had their side doors on and their seats down. This oractice is considered extremely hazardous, as it hampers the infantry personnel lovement, thus forcing the principle to stay on the ground longer than would normally be necessary.
- (2) Evaluation: In an attempt to reduce the time involved at pick-up zones and landing zones, aircraft have been instructed to remove their doors and raise their seats.
- (3) Recommendation: Whenever aircraft are reporting for a combat assault or an extraction, it should be a matter of Division SOP that all doors be removed and all seats remain in the upright position.

g. Aircraft Consoles

- (1) Observation: It has been determined that the command and control ships provided the battalion commanders have insufficient communication systems. The FM radios of most aircraft are unreliable, thus requiring the commander have a UHF and back up FM capability.
- (2) Evaluation: To cope with this problem the Battalion Communication Sections have constructed consoles with 2 FM radios (AN/VRC 46s) and 2 PRC 25s to provide the battalion commander with an adequate communications system.
- (3) Recommendation: Aircraft consoles should be made available for command and control ships to increase unit commander's control of gunships, lift ships, airborne FACs, participating ground units, and airborne members of the command group.





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
- h. Use of the .45 Caliber Pistol in Holes and Tunnels
- (1) Observation: The use of the .45 Cal Pistol during tunnel clearing operations has proven impractical due to the deafening effects from the pistol being fired in a confined area.
 - (2) Evaluation: Not Applicable
- (3) Recommendation: One (1) .38 Cal Pistol with silencer should be issued to each company to support tunnel clearing operations.

i. Clearing Ridges

- (1) Observation: During recent operations the enemy has been observed allowing friendly units to nove unhandered along ridgelines. When a U. S. unit reaches a pre-selected location along a ridge, the enemy fires direct and indirect fire weapons from concealed draws that lead into the ridge.
- (2) Evaluation: A method of reconnaissance by fire is now being employed by maneuver elements to insure that reverse slopes and gullies do not provide concealment for the enemy along routes of advance.
- (3) Recommendation: The necessity for flank security must be emphasized to small unit leaders, with specific attention directed to clearing all adjacent ridge lines and draws, and making maximum utilization of reconnaissance by fire to those draws immediately to their front.
 - j. Use of Aerial Reconnaissance Teams in Fortified Areas
- (1) Observation: During the Battle of AP BON, aerial reconnaissance teams were of great assistance in picking up enemy movement along hidden trenches flanking friendly forces.
- (2) Evaluation: In all situations friendly units were alerted of enemy movement on their flanks in sufficient time to react and employ artillery blocking forces to prevent the enemy in gaining their objectives.
- (3) Recommendation: Aerica reconnaissance aircraft should be provided to elements entering known enemy fortified areas so that early warning of enemy activity and quick reaction by friendly forces can be achieved.

k. Hoi Chanhs

(1) Observation: On 20 April 1968, 2 NVA NCOs rallied to Company A, 2-35th Infantry at FSB 14. Upon entering the perimeter they set off a trip flare causing them to run away. Only after intensive persuasion did they enter








the company perimeter. Upon interrogation they revealed that they had read numerous Hoi Chanh Leaflets but did not know how the proper way to surrender.


- (2) Evaluation: Not Applicable
- (3) Recommendation: A common surrender technique should be developed to disseminate to all US Troops to facilitate future surrenders of Hoi Chanhs.


4. (C) LOGISTICS

a. LRP Rations

- (1) Observation: LRP rations were designed to support elements on extended operations.
- (2) Evaluation: Although the Brigade had planned many extended operations. LRP Rations have not been available through normal supply channels to support a battalion operation.
- (3) Recommendation: LRP Rations should be made available and issued to units planning extended operations for a period of three days or longer.
 - b. Disposable Food Containers
- (1) Observation: Operations have been frequently delayed due to non-availability of aircraft to extract food containers.
- (2) Evaluation: Disposable Food Containers made available on a limited basis, appear to be the solution. By utilizing these containers on a larger scale, aircraft sorties may be significantly reduced and operational delays minimized.
- (3) Recommandation: Disposable Food Containers should be provided in sufficient quantity to eliminate the need for daily extraction of food containers prior to the conducting of tactical operations.
 - c. Air-dropable water container
- (1) Observation: Operation during the past have demonstrated a need for a water container durable enough to withstand an air drop, yet light enough to be carried until extraction.
 - (2) Evaluation: Not Applicable
- (3) Recommendation: A dropable water container should be developed to allow resupply of elements operating in mountains or in terrain where it is either impractical our operationally undesirable to cut landing zones.







d. Forward Logistical Support

(1) Observation: While operating as a separate task force, the 3d Brigade received it's logistical support from the 3d Provisional Support Battalion which has since been dissolved. Currently the Brigade has only a limited FSE which provides fast moving Class II and Class IV items composed mainly of defensive materials, i. e., Concertina barbed wire and sandbags. This necessitates procurring items essential to tactical operations from the Division Supply Officer in Pleiku. Experience has proven this to be a time consuming process that could be eliminated by stockage of these items at the Brigade FSB.

(2) Evaluation: Not Applicable

- (3) Recommendation: The FSE supporting the Brigade should be required to stock Class II and Class III at Kontum. This would make the supply system much more responsive to the requirements of the combat battalions.
 - e. Cargo Rigging for External Chinook Loads
- (1) Observation: Due to the non-availability of secure LOC in the Brigade AO and the shortage of UHl aircraft for resupply, it is necessary to move Class I and Class V by Chinook. The wear out period for cargo slings presently in use by this brigade is 10 external loads. The slings available to the Brigade have been used in excess of the prescribed 10 loads. Net failure has been experienced and may continue in direct propertion to the number of loads carried.
- (2) Evaluation: Although attempts have been made to procure these slings through supply channels only limited quantities have been received.
- (3) Recommendation: Immediate command emphasis be given to the procurement of rigging equipment for Chinook sorties.

5. (C) PSYCHOLOGICAL/CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS


- a. Psychological Warfare Loudspeaker System
- (1) Observation: Psychological warfare loudspeaker systems currently being used by elements of the 4th Dission have many short comings.
- (2) Evaluation: A completely satisfactory power source for the speaker systems employed on the ground in support of infantry units has not been developed. The 250 watt system is currently being powered by the two PRC 25 batteries connected by WD-1 commo wire. Two 12 volt batteries are being used to power the 500 watt system but frequent recharging is necessary. The equipment is very sensitive and frequent malfunctions occur due to normal handling under field conditions. During the monsoon excessive moisture causes shorts in the system because component parts are not waterproof.

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- (3) Recommendation: Lightweight, compact, durable, water-proof, speaker systems with adapter plugs for batteries commonly used by infantry units should be adopted for employment with psychological warfare field teams.
- b. Hoi Chanh reaction to US/South Vietnamese Ultimate Victory Claims in Psychological Warfare Propaganda
- (1) Observation: Two Hoi Chanhs who rallied to the 3d Brigade on 20 April 1968 stated that US/South Vietnamese ultimate victory claims are being repudiated by NVA political officers.
- (2) Evaluation: NVA political officers are telling the NVA soldiers that the goal of US/South Vietnamese forces is to totally destroy North Vietname and the North Vietnamese Army. Propaganda developed from these claims tends to make the NVA soldiers fight harder.
- (3) Recommendations: Ultimate victory claims should be eliminated from propaganda leaflets, broadcasts, and newsletters.
 - c. Employment of Armed Propaganda Teams
- (1) Observation: Armed Propaganda Teams can be employed effectively at battalion and company level.
- (2) Evaluation: An effective method of employing Armed Propaganda Platoons is to attach them to battalions in two man teams. The teams should be provided with US fatigues, boots, weapons, and field gear. They should further be attached to rifle companies to participate in operations being conducted in populated areas. The teams can also be effectively employed during Medcaps in support of tactical operations or with psychological warfare loudspeaker teams.
- (3) Recommendation: When Armed Propaganda Teams are available, they should be employed by Infantry battalions and companies.
 - d. Leaflet Drops over North Vietnam
 - (1) Observation: Leaflet man over North Vietnam should be continued.
- (2) Evaluation: In an interview with Sgts Nguyen Si Bo and Hoang Van Can, Hoi Chanhs who rallied to the 3d Brigade on 20 April 1968, both men stated that leaflet drops over North Vietnam have a demoralizing effect on NVA Soldiers before they reach South Vietnam.
- (3) Recommendation: Leaflet campaigns over the trail complexes in North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia should be continued.





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AVDDC-OP

4 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968 (Cont'd)

- e. Variations in Leaflet Appeal
- (1) Observation: Attaching blank envelopes and/or writing paper to leaflets would cause more leaflets to be read by the enemy.
- (2) Evaluation: Hoi Chanhs have stated that if plain pieces of paper or envelopes were attached to propaganda material there would be more incentive to pick up the leaflets and thus be exposed to the literature. NVA soldiers would like to use the paper and envelopes in writing home. If the political officers denied the soldiers use of the writing materials morale problems could result.
- (3) Recommendation: Selected leaflets and newsletters should have paper and envelopes attached.

f. Civil Affairs.

- (1) Observation: Village improvement projects are most effective when the villagers are required to participate in the projects.
- (2) Evaluation: In some cases improvement projects which have been completed solely by US Civic Action Teams are not even used by the Vietnamese. However, when the Vietnamese participate a sense of pride in the project is derived and community spirit is generated.
- (3) Recommendation: A civic action project should not begin without the approval of the villagers and their pledge to participate in its construction until completion.

EUGENE P. FORRESTER Colonel, Infantry

Commanding

3 Incl:

1 - Map of Wheeler/Wallowa AO

2 - Map of Patrick AO

3 - Map of MacArthur AO

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AVFA-GC-Of (L May 68) low Ind.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division .
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RUS CaFOR-65 (kl)

DA, Headquarters, I field Force Victors, APO 96350 13 JUL 1888

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnem, - ATTN: AVRIGGIBT, APO 90375


- (C) This headquarters has evaluated subject report and makes the following recommendations and comments.
- * a. Reference paregraph to Section 2 page 21, Use of Ols aircraft as artillery forward communes. All US artillery units of IFFORCEV have been directed to establish lisison with army Air and Aif Force (FAU) elements, exchange SOI/SSI's and insure that pilots are familiar with artillery fire request procedure.
- to Reference paragraph le dection 2 page 21, Command and Control Helicopters. The shifting of eviation assets from one unit to another makes it impractical to designate certain helicopters as C and C helicopters. Mether then equip all helicopters with extra drap order each unit should obtain I cords which can be plugged into the erew chief or gunner's dropport to serve the same purpose.
- c. Reference puragraph 3g Section 2 page 24, Aircraft Consoles. The present radios are considered reliable. With present aviation assets only consenders of brigades or higher have the exclusive use of C and C helicopters. The solution used by the 3d Brigade appears the test colution at this time.
- d. Reference paragraph ik Section 2 page 25, Hol Chanks.


 Ourrent national rainy instructions are widely disseminated but are at the general in nature. This deficiency has been noted and MACV has requisted ith PSYOPS Group study the problem nationwide. here specific media will be developed.
- e. Reference paragraph ha Section 2 page 26, LRP mations.

 Out When Support Command indicates that LRP rations are on hand and that no shortage has existed for two months. The 4th Division U4 could provide no data to indicate inability to obtain these rations. This headquarters requested 4th Division 34 to advise the 3d Brigade of the availability of these items and the procedure for obtaining them.

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GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years
DOD DIR 5200.10 Applies





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AVFI-OC-CT (L Eay (3) 1st Ind

BUBJECT: Grant and Report of 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

T. Reference paragraph 55 Section 2 page 28, Hoi Chanh reaction to US/Scuth Victoriance Vitimate Victory Claims to Psychological Warfare Transpands. Mencapeur, as the psychological objectives of our effort in Vietness are contained in JUSPAO Guidance 20 and PSIOFS amount to the Combined Campaign Plan (AB 143) and are official US Hission Policy.

g. Reference paragraph 5c Section 2 page 28, Saployment of Armed Propaganda Teams (APT). In order to be more subcessful AFT should be employed in equal strength instead of the recommended two man teams.

Reference paragraph Se Suction 2 page 29, Variation in .

Leaflet Appeal. Since note paper is in short supply for the W/NVA; I'll!

simply printing some leaflets on one side would have the same

effect. Dissemination of paper and envelopes attached to a leaf
let would be difficult by mir.


FOR THE COMMANDER:

3 Incl

Copies furnished: 2 - ACSFOR, DA, Wesh DC 20310 1 - De Bie, ath Thi Div ROTERY C. GABBARD

ASST ADDITANT GENERAL





CPT Arnold/ms/LBN 4485

HEAD-MANTERS, US AFRY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 2 7 JUN 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968

- TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pasifie, ATTN: OPOP-DT, APO 90558
- 1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 from Headquarters, 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division.

2. (C) Commente follows

AVHGC-DST (4 Hey 68) 2d Ind (C)

- a. Reference item concerning NVA Road Network, page 21, paragraph 20: Concur. Enemy road-building efforts in western Kontum Province are part of his country-wide effort to apprade his LOC to permit faster supply movement and movement of heavier weapons and equipment. The pattern of enemy road building activity in Vestern Kontum Province indicates that it is designed to the-in with Base Area 609, a known enemy supply area. Friendly air interdiction of these roads will slow and reduce infiltration, but the enemy has been known to by-page these areas of interdiction when he has to.
- b. Reference item concerning NVA Dummies, page 21, paragraph 2d; Concur. The VC/NVA have used deception on previous occasions in other Corps areas. One example of deception in I CTZ several months ago was noted in the IMZ where the enemy had constructed mode-up tanks and artillery pieces to draw US fire. Information conserving VC/NVA uses of deception has been and will continue to be disconinated through the USARV Heekly Combat Intelligence and Security Review.
- c. Reference item concerning chemical munitions employment, page 23, paragraph 3d. The problem of setting the fuse to obtain a height that would produce effective results in the target area was detected in the operational evaluation of this EN URE munition. Units experienced difficulty because information concerning the optimum height of burst was not available at the time and partially because of unfamiliarity with the round. The height of burst recommended by US Army Material Command, 120 meters, was furnished to USARV units on 10 June 1968 and should remedy the problem noted in the referenced paragraph. Meet unit evaluation reports have indicated that the munition is effective when properly explayed and when rapidly exploited by fire and/or maneuver.

GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years
DOD DIR 5200.10 Applies

CONFIDENTIAL




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AVHCC-DST (4 May 68) 2d lnd (C) 27 JUN 1968 SUBJECT: Operational Report for quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968

- d. Reference item concerning use of the .45 caliber pistal in holes and tunnels, page 25, paragraph 3h: Monococur. Tunnel Exploration Kits presently arriving in-country under EMSURE 64 contain .22 caliber pistals which are considered to have a lower noise level than either .38 caliber or .45 caliber pistals.
- e. Reference item concerning LRP Rations, page 26, paragraph Assessential for the successful conduct of their operations. The bettalion has an aerial resupply capability not always possible for LRP's because of the probability of compromising the location of the LRP. In the past LRP units have had difficulty in obtaining adequate LRP rations to support their operations. The supply situation has improved and ACofS, G4 indicates 700,000 rations per month will be available for issue. Since this excellent ration is available in larger quantities, issue to regular infantry units for extended operations is desirable.
- f. Reference item concerning disposable food containers, page 26, paragraph 4b: Concur. Recommend that unit submit sufficient justification for items in accordance with provisions of USARY Regulation 705-2 so that a requirement may be established under ENSURE papacedures.
- g. Reference item concerning air-dropable water container, page 26, paragraph 40: Moneondur. A three gallon free drop water container is a standard item of issue available through normal supply procedures.
- h. Reference item concerning cargo rigging for external Chinook loads, page 27, paragraph 2e: Concur. Command emphasis is being given to the whole external helilift field; specifications are as follows:
- (1) DA/CINCUSARPAC/USAAVCOM airdrop equipment liaison team visited RVN during 30 May 12 June 1968 and informed this headquarters that efforts are being made by higher headquarters to expedite the delivery of FSC 1670 alings used in external helilift. One member of this team was the commodity manager for FSC 1670 alings; he spent two days at the 14th 100 gathering information on requisition objectives, duse-in, and dues-out. The commodity manager is now in USARJ reconciling lath 100 a records with Sagami Depot in efforts to improve requisitioning procedures between 14th 100, Sagami Depot, and USAAVCOM.
- (2) The Transportation Engineering Agondy, Fort Eustis, Virginia has prepared an interim manual on external helilift operations utilizing







2 7 JUN 1968 AVHCC-DGT (4 Hay 68) 2d 1nd (C) SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968

16'/O slings. This manual provides unit commanders with rigging requirements and lists of equipment required to prepare typical loads for external helilift. The AHC Project Officer for this mamual is scheduled to visit RVN 18 - 30 June 1968 to make distribution of 50 of these samuals and to obtain comments/recommendations for inclusion in the final text.

- (3) The ACofS, G3 is currently preparing a Table of Allowances for equipment utilised in external helilift.
- (4) The requisitioning objectives of equipment utilised in external. helilift were doubled on 16 February 1968 to meet enticipated increases in this type operation in RVN.
- i. Reference item concerning psychological warfare surface loudspeaker system, page 27, paragraph 5a. The tactical loudspeaker system used by FSTOP units during the reporting has been recognised as having the defects mentioned in the report. In May 1968, US Ammy PSYOP units received a new system, AN/VIH6, which should correct the majority of these deficiencies.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

3 lncl na

Copies furnished: Hu, 3d fide, 4th Inf Div HG. 1 PYORCEV

C. S. NAKATSUKASA Captain, AGC Assistant Adjutant General

MFR: ORLL was staffed through:

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LTC Davis/4841

G3 Opn

LTC Pittman/4544

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MAJ Harvey/4209

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MAJ Bryant/4781

ACTION OFFICER: CPT ARNOLD/LBN 4485

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