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28 Feb 1979, DoDD 5200.10; AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980	

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

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IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P(M) (28 Jul 67) FOR OT

August 1967

Headquarters

SUBJECT: ~~Operational Report~~ Lessons Learned, 1st Cavalry
Division (Airmobile)

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11) 15 Feb 67

12) 103p.

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

9) Operational rept. for quarterly period ending 31 Jan 67.

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) for quarterly period ending 31 January 1967. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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
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1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (AIRMOBILE)

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OPERATIONAL REPORT LESSONS LEARNED

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1 NOV 66 ~ 31 JAN 67

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (AIRMOBILE)
APO San Francisco, California 96490

AVADCG

15 February 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (C) General

a. General Situation. Once again this reporting period, 1 November 1966 thru 31 January 1967 saw the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) successfully engage and defeat regular RVN and VC units throughout the 11 Corps Tactical Area. The division dominated the central highlands, maneuvering throughout the Binh Dinh, Pleiku, Kontum, Darlac, and Phu Yen Provinces. Operations extended from the South China Sea to the Cambodian Border along the axis of Highway 19, from North of Bong Son to Qui Nhon along the South China Sea and from Dak To to Ban He Thout along the Cambodian Border. Operations were characterized by hard hitting infantry relying extensively on the division's air assault capability. During most of the reporting period two brigades operated away from the division base, while the other brigade conducted offensive operations within the TAOR and improved base security. One battalion Task Force continued to operate in the vicinity of Phan Thiet under control of IFFV. Brigade missions during the period were mostly search and destroy with the emphasis on searching for and finding the enemy. The division concluded Operation PAUL REVERE IV along the Cambodian Border and continued to concentrate in Operation THAYER II along the coast in Binh Dinh Province. As of the end of the reported period THAYER II was the longest 1st Cavalry Division operation in Vietnam and has accounted for the highest enemy body count. In addition the major operations which will be discussed herein, various elements participated in squad to multi-company operations in the TAOR, characterized by day patrolling and intensive nighttime ambush activity. A vigorous base development program continued simultaneously with tactical operations.

b. Division Organization and key personnel during the reporting period were as follows:

(1) Division Headquarters

Major General John Norton	Commanding General
Brig General William A. Becker	Ass't Div Comdr (A)
Brig General George S. Blanchard	Ass't Div Comdr (B)
Colonel Herbert A. Wolff	Chief of Staff
LTC Ardle McClure Jr.	AC of S, G1
LTC William W Palmer	15 Dec 1966
LTC William B. Ray	AC of S, G2

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LTC James T. Root	AC of S, G3
LTC Robert A. Toler	AC of S, G4
LTC Harry J. Phelps	AC of S, G5
(2) 1st Brigade (Abn)	
Colonel Archie R. Wylie	CO, 1st Bde (Abn)
Colonel James C. Smith	18 Nov 66
LTC William C. Louisell	CO 1/8 Cav (Abn)
LTC Ardie E. McClure Jr	15 Dec 1966
LTC Thomas H Tackaberry	CO, 2/8 Cav (ABN)
LTC George W. Eggers	CO, 1/12 Cav (Abn)
(3) 2d Brigade	
Colonel George W. Casey	CO, 2d Bde
LTC Robert H Seigrist	CO, 1/5 Cav
LTC James H. HApp	19 Jan 67
LTC Reginald T. Lombard, Jr	CO, 2/5 Cav
LTC Robert D. Stevenson	25 Nov 66
LTC Jay A. Hatch	CO, 2/12 Cav
(4) 3d Brigade	
Colonel Charles D. Daniel	CO, 3d Bde
Colonel Jonathan A. Burton	28 Dec 1966
LTC Edward N. Markham	CO, 1/7 Cav
LTC George W. Orton	28 Dec 1966
LTC Billy N Vaughn	CO 2/7 Cav
LTC Fred E. Karhohs	10 Dec 1966
LTC Trevor W. Swett Jr.	CG, 5/7 Cav
LTC Charles O.W. Canhan II	3 Dec 1966
(5) Division Artillery	
Colonel William F. Brand	CO, Div Arty
LTC William H. Vinson Jr.	CO, 2/19 Arty
LTC James F. Culp	24 Dec 1966
LTC Lester C. Farewell	CO, 2/20 Arty
LTC William W. Palmer	CO, 1/21 Arty
LTC William C. Carlson	10 Dec 1966
LTC Arthur L. Kelly	CO, 1/77 Arty
(6) 11th Aviation Group	
Colonel Howard I. Lukens	CO, 11th Avn Grp

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LTC A. T. Humphrey	CO 227 Avn Bn
LTC James F. Hamlett	18 Nov 1966
LTC Robert H. Michaelson	CO, 228 Avn Bn (ASHB)
LTC Leo D Turner	CO 229 Avn Bn
LTC John W Clair	8 Dec 1966
LTC Frank T. Nadeau	CO, 11th Avn Co (GS)
Major Francis A. Sawyer	18 Nov 1966
(7) Support Command	
Colonel Jonathan R. Burton	CO, Spt Comd
Colonel Charles S. Daniel	28 Dec 1966
LTC Harry L. Corkill, jr.	CO 15 SWS Bn
LTC Henry A. Leighton	CO, 15 Med Bn
LTC Keith J. Bauer	CO, 15 TC Bn
LTC Shreve S Squires	CO, 27 Maint Bn
Captain Hunter W Haynes	CO, 15 Admin Co
Captain William D. Henderson	26 Dec 1966
(8) Colonel James C. Smith	CO, 1/9 Cav
LTC A. T. Humphrey	18 Nov 1966
(9) LTC Charles G. Clentine	CO, 8th Engr
(10) LTC James C. Struthers	28 Jan 1967
(11) Captain Gary E. Lawhead	CO, 545th Co
(12) Captain William J. Rowe	CO CO, HHC 1st Cav Div
Captain Milton H. Peterson	11 Nov 1966
(13) Special Staff	
LTC James Ransome	Surgeon
LTC William G. Jenkins Jr	IG
Captain John L. Herle	Chem Off
LTC Emory N. Sneed	SJA
LTC Thomas McGrath	Chaplain
LTC Daniel Myler	AG
LTC Lowell G. Autrey	Fin Off
LTC James Oliver	PM
Major Wesley G. Jones	IO

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(14) Attached Units

LTC Norman P. Chandler	CO, 2 nd 17 Arty
LTC Fred C. Parker III	5 Dec 1966
Major James E. Moore	CO, 478 Avn Co
Captain Donald A. Patterson	CO, 586 Sig Co (Spt)
Major Peter J. Samulevich	CO, 14 Mil Hist
Captain Michael Schnider	CO, 10th RRU
1/Lt Shirley E. Boseley III	CO, 24 Oct, 5 Waz Sqdn

(15) Supporting Units

Major Francis J. Palmer Jr.	CO, 34 S&S Bn
LTC John R. Redman	CO, 70 Engr Bn
Major Anthony Ballard	CO, 2d Surg Hosp
LTC Harold G. Carter	CO, 56 Inf Det
Major Joseph L. Scoppi	CO, C/6 th 16 Arty
Captain Robert D. Middleton	27 Dec 1966
LTC Ralph C. Benefield	CO, E/82 Arty
Major Stuart G. McLennan Jr.	18 Jan 1966
Captain Benjamin Buckley	CO, 11 Avn Gp Pth Co
Lieutenant Gary E. Harvey	CO, 184 Cml Flt
Lieutenant Richard L. Carzoli	CO, Det 1, 54 Sig Bn
Major Gillie C. Faurot	CO, 383 TC Det

2. Personnel.

a. Strength: authorized and assigned strength at the beginning and close of the reporting period were as follows:

(1) Begin Report Per	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WC</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>AGG</u>
Authorized	1217	677	15,024	16,918
Assigned	1411	420	16,998	18,829
(2) Close Report Per	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WC</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>AGG</u>
Authorized	1217	677	15,024	16,918
Assigned	1485	469	16,240	18,194

b. Replacements: A total of 4929 enlisted replacements were received. During the same period division losses were 4816. Some 189 emergency leaves were processed during the period.

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c. Morale and Personnel Services:

(1) Morale throughout the division and attached elements remained excellent.

(2) Decorations Awarded:

Medal of Honor	1
Distinguished Service Cross	5
Silver Star	73
Legion of Merit	1
Distinguished Flying Cross	45
Soldier's Medal	37
Bronze Star with V Device	256
Bronze Star	340
Air Medal with V Device	31
Air Medal	7348
Army Commendation Medal with V Device	90
Army Commendation Medal	299
Purple Heart	361
Certificate of Achievement	9
TOTAL	8900

(3) Combat Badges

Combat Infantry Badge	973
Combat Medical Badge	115
Aircraft Crewman Badge	279
TOTAL	1367

d. Promotions: A total of 4330 enlisted personnel were promoted during the reporting period.

e. Reenlistments: 221 reenlistments or extensions elections were completed. The enlistment/extensions breakdown was: First term RA reenlistments 42, RA career reenlistments 116, AU reenlistments 9, ER/NG reenlistments 1, and 53 extensions.

f. Postal.

(1) Money Order Sales	\$2,064,729.20
(2) Postal and Parcel Post Fees	\$82,014.22

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(3) Incoming Mail	1,631,271 lbs
(4) Daily Average	17,943 lbs
(5) Outgoing Mail	381,129 lbs
(6) Daily Average	4,214 lbs
(7) Number of incoming mail days	84
(8) Number of outgoing mail days	90

g. Special Services: During the reporting period a total of 89 movies and TV films were circulated throughout the division. 7 USO shows played to an estimated attendance of 16,000. R&P quotas received were 3,920 out-of-country and 1,230 in-country.

h. Financial Service:

(1) Conversion of Military Payment Certificates.

(a) In December 1st Air Cavalry Division SOP outlining the procedures pertaining to the Conversion of one series of MFC to another was published. This directive required all major subordinate units assigned or attached to this command to prepare a C-Day SOP; to prepare a list designating positions by title, the incumbents of which will act as Collection Officers; and to forward requests for orders to the Division Adjutant General appointing Collection Officers to the Division Finance Office.

(b) Copies of the major subordinate unit SOPs were forwarded to the Division Finance Office for review.

(c) An SOP outlining the procedures to be implemented on C-Day in the Division Finance Office was prepared in accordance with USARV Reg 37-10. Further copies of both the Division SOP and the Finance Office SOP were furnished to HQ, USARV, ATTN: Comptroller.

(d) These actions were accomplished in an effort to insure maximum readiness for a C-Day Conversion.

(2) Payment of Incoming Personnel

(a) During the period 15 October through 20 December those personnel who arrived in this command and who elected the Net Pay Check option were paid up to date (through the end of the month preceding their arrival date) by this office before a CAMFS pay account was established. Checks were issued in each case for the pay due and the checks were mailed to the designated Net Pay Check addressee by this office.

(b) This procedure insured personnel would be paid in full and that there would be no delay in receipt of monies because use of rejected transfers in and failure to establish a pay account at the Finance Center. Receipt of money by dependents prior to Christmas is a particularly sensitive matter. This procedure provided the best possible service to incoming personnel.

(c) Through a combination of this procedure and the CAMFS Net Pay Check, we have improved the finance service to the troops.

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i. Chaplain Activities:

DENOMINATION ...	<u>NUMBER OF SERVICES</u>	<u>ATTENDANCE</u>
Catholic	711	20,487
Protestant	1,427	33,864
Jewish	9	132
Memorial	11	1,049
TOTALS	2,158	55,532

j. Maintenance of Discipline, Law and Order.

(1) A total of 801 incidents were reported to the Provost Marshal's Office during the reporting period.

(2) Military Justice:

(a) General Courts Martial	13
(b) Special Courts Martial	72
(c) Summary Courts Martial	44

k. Inspector General Activities. No significant trends in complaints and/or requests were revealed.

l. Medical:

(1) Disease and injury statistical data:

(a) Injured as a result of hostile action (IRMA)	779
(b) Non-battle injuries	545
(c) Diseases	1852
<u>1.</u> Malaria	347
Vivax	81
Falciparum	266
<u>2.</u> Scrub Typhus	5
<u>3.</u> Hook worm	13
<u>4.</u> Psychiatric cases	187
(d) Killed in Action	(228)
(e) Remaining in Hospital (In Country)	410

(2) Discussion of diseases

(a) Malaria Cases: A total of 347 cases of malaria occurred in personnel of this division from 1 November 66 to 31 January 67 inclusive. Of these 81 cases were due to plasmodian vivax and were caused in most U.S. Forces by failure to take weekly chloroquine-primaquine pill.

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The malaria incidence is as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>NOVEMBER</u>	<u>DECEMBER</u>	<u>JANUARY</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
1st Bde				
HHC	0	0	0	0
1/12	16	8	7	31
1/8	12	7	16	35
2/8	14	3	7	24
2d Bde				
HHC	4	7	1	12
1/5	22	27	2	51
2/5	12	20	6	38
2/12	7	21	9	37
3d Bde				
HHC	0	0	0	0
1/7	15	17	10	42
2/7	6	4	6	16
5/7	7	9	2	18
Div Arty	8	5	3	16
1/9	0	2	2	4
Avn Gp	2	2	2	6
Spt Cmd	5	0	1	6
Sig Bn	0	0	0	0
Engr Bn	4	3	1	8
HHC Div	0	0	0	0
Others	2	1	0	3
GRAND TOTAL	136	136	76	347

(1) Experience gained from the previous quarters indicate that the malaria season in the Central Highlands ranges from March through November with a peak expected during the period of April through July.

(2) The total malaria incidence is 347 cases as opposed to 495 cases for the previous quarters.

(b) Other selected diseases of importance are as follows:

Scrub Typhus	4
Immersion Foot	112
Heat Exhaustion	5
Poisoning	0
Animal Bites	65
Hepatitis	13
Dengue Fever	0
Infectious Meningitis	0

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(3) Discussion of IRHA, WIA and NBI.

(a) KIA/IRHA ratio 228/779 or 14.70 was considerably different from the ratio of 14.07 observed in Korea.

(b) Types of IRHA's. During the reporting period 97 punji stake wounds occurred compared to 124 for last reporting period.

(c) NBI: The total number of Non-Battle injuries this quarter is 545 which is considerably low compared to last reporting period.

m. Information Officer Activities:

(1) During this period the Information Office and the Office of the Staff Historian were merged into the Office of Information and History. Information activities will be discussed in Paragraph (2) followed by Historical activities in Paragraph (3).

(2) The Information Section continued to increase its services to the world's press and division troops during the reported period. Following is an analytical breakdown by function:

(a) There were 4,231 Hometown news releases sent, an increase of 2,691 over the number released during the preceding quarter. There were also 295 taped Hometowners, an increase of 106 over the preceding quarters.

	Hometowners	Taped Hometowners
Nov.	1,778	129
Dec.	1,255	80
Jan.	1,208	86
Total:	4,231	295

(b) On 1 Jan 67 OIAH took over operational control of the Photo Section of the 13th Signal Battalion, with one officer and 18 enlisted men.

(c) On 7 Nov 66 this office began publishing a weekly news roundup called Troop Topics, reviewing the week's activities of the division. Several special Troop Topics also were published, including:

1. Manila Conference
2. US and ARVN Soldiers
3. Piaster Spending
4. President Johnson's Visit at Cam Ranh Bay

(d) On 27 Dec this office opened a forward press center at Landing Zone HAMMOND. The forward camp provides a convenient center for newsmen reporting and photographing the division's military effort.

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(e) There were 153 newsmen who visited the division during the quarter, 37, 56, and 60 per month, respectively. They represented the following agencies:

Agence France Presse
American Broadcasting Co.
Army Pictorial Center
Associated Press
Black Star
British Broadcasting Co.
California Broadcasting Bureau
Channel 5, Mexico City
Columbia Broadcasting System
Cross, Hinshaw and Linderg, Inc., New York
Daily Telegraph (London)
Detroit News
Fortune Magazine
Free Curvelle
French TV
Globe Photos
Hearst Newspapers
Holmes Label
Hometown Features
Honolulu Advertiser
Italian TV
Japan Broadcasting Corp.
JUFO
KPRC (radio and TV - Texas)
KGMC-TV (Amarillo, Texas)
Life
Los Angeles Times
MACV - IO
Minneapolis TV
NAAA
National Broadcasting Co.
Newsweek
New York Times
Nishinippon Japan Press
Nouvel Observateur
Nouvelles Du Dimanche
Overseas Weekly
Pix Inc.
Reuters
Stars and Stripes
Time-Life News Service
United Press International (radio, TV and news)
USARFAC
UCARC - IO
Vietnamese TV advisor
Washington Post
WHC-TV
WIBW (Topeka, Kansas)

(f) 1. The radio section produced the following news stories and interviews:

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	News Stories	Interviews
Nov.	501	72
Dec.	540	100
Jan.	665	107
Total	1,706	279

2. The radio section, in addition to gathering the taped Hometowners and producing news programs and Hospital news tapes, produced for broadcast the following special programs:

Nov: Roy Rogers Show, Martha Raye Show, both live.

Dec: Billy Graham and Cardinal Spellman, both live, and The Bob Hope Show, taped replay, Commanders Christmas Greeting Show, Chris Noel Show, and Newspots.

(g) This office continued to produce a morning and evening News letter for distribution within the division.

(3) During the reported period the Office of the Staff Historian worked with retired General S.L.A. Marshall, military historian; with Edward Hymoff, writer of a division pictorial history, and became augmented with two field historical teams.

(a) General Marshall visited the 1st Air Cavalry between 2 Dec 66 - 4 Feb 67 to pursue his historical documentation of the Vietnam war. As a representative of the Army's Chief of Staff, he had the additional mission to improve unit level historical coverage. Therefore, the division's Staff Historian was assigned to work closely with him to benefit from his experienced technique. Together they researched the following significant Cavalry actions:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>PLACE</u>	<u>OPERATION</u>
B/1/8 Cav	22-24 June 66	Pen Eagle LZ APPLE	Nathan Hale
1st and 2d Bde	13 Sep - 1 Oct 66	Khu Son Valley Soui Ca Valley	Thayer I
2/8 Cav	19 September 66	506 Valley	Thayer I
1/12 Cav	2 October 66	Hoa Hoi	Irving
A/1/9 Cav	2 October 66	Hoa Hoi	Irving
C/1/5	27 November 66	Cambodian Border	Paul Revere IV
B/5/7	1 December 66	Phu Huu (2)	Thayer II
C/1/9	1 December 66	Phu Huu (2)	Thayer II
C/1/12 Arty (105)			
C/6/16 Arty (155)			

(b) The emphasis to improve the 1st Air Cavalry's historical program led to the formation of two field historical teams each consisting of a combat arms lieutenant and a stenographer. The purpose of these teams is to continue in-depth coverage of Cavalry actions. From the prepared reports, one will be able to analyze history in terms of lessons learned each commander will also have pertinent facts to enhance afteraction critiques. These teams worked to complete reports from material collected by the Staff Historian in conjunction with General Marshall. This material will be afforded the widest dissemination.

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(c) Edward Hymoff came to the division in late October for a period of one month to prepare a pictorial history of the 1st Air Cavalry in Vietnam. The project was a commercial one and the hard-covered book will be sold to individual Cavalrymen and officers through order blanks provided by the New York printer. Although Hymoff wrote the text himself, division facilities provided extensive support. Primary assistance was rendered by the Staff Historian, the 13th Signal photo labk, ACofS: G-3 Training and Operations, the 14th Military History Detachment, and the Information Office.

(d) The Office of the Staff Historian in conjunction with the 14th Mil Hist Det wrote the operational summaries for the six months History and Briefing data (April-Oct 66), prepared a report on Operation IRVING (2-24 Oct), and began writing an 18-month history to cover the period since the Airmobile Division's activation on 1 July 1965.

3. (C) Intelligence.

a. G2 Organization - No change

b. Operations

(1) Operation Paul Revere IV was conducted in western Pleiku Province by elements of the 4th Inf Div, 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div and 2d Bde, 1st Cav Div during the period 1 Nov to 27 Dec 1966. Prior to the end of October, agent reports, contacts and sightings confirmed a large scale NVA build up along the Cambodian border and in the Plei-Djereng Duc Co area. The 2d Bde, consisting of the 1st and 2d Bns 5th Cav and the 2d Bn 12th Cav, supported by B Trp 1/9th Cav and 1/77th Arty was committed in late October.

One significant contact occurred on 21 November between elements of 1/5th Cav and one Bn of the 101C Regiment of the 10th NVA Division. The 101C Regt had not been encountered in this area before, and its presence indicated that the 10th NVA Division may have assumed part of the operational area formerly belonging to the 1st (AKA 630th) NVA Division.

(2) Operation Thayer II was conducted in eastern Binh Dinh Province, and was a natural continuation of Operation Irving. Significant contacts occurred on 1 Dec, 17 Dec, 27 Dec and 27 January. A large cave complex was discovered by the 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div along the Oregon and Santa Fe Trails it is believed that this was the advance military headquarters of Binh Dinh Province.

(3) Enemy casualties attributed to the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) during the reporting period:

	KIA	VCC	WEAPONS-Indiv/Crew Served
NOVEMBER	493	15	104/11
DECEMBER	545	28	119/18
JANUARY	<u>517</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>111/3</u>
TOTALS	1555	53	334/32

c. Order of Battle Section

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(1) The Order of Battle Section, with 2 Officers and 9 Enlisted Men assigned, continued operations at both the Combat Intelligence Center in the Division Forward CP, and at Camp Radcliff. Order of Battle information continued to be collected on all enemy units in the 12 Provinces of II Corps, and on Quang Ngai Province, I Corps. Efforts were made to expand Order of Battle intelligence of Binh Dinh Province Local Force units with good results.

(2) Operation Thayer II continues, with new and reliable Order of Battle intelligence being gained from prisoners and documents. Of the more important items was the capture of all Letter Box Numbers for the 18th NVA Regiment and current rosters which revealed strengths, weapons and ammunition loads, and numbers of sick and wounded.

(3) Valuable, and exploitable prisoners from the 22d NVA Regt, including one Sr Cpt, were captured (as were many documents) which greatly assisted in updating intelligence on this unit.

(4) Other information received provided complete data on the Binh Dinh VC Provincial Headquarters, its subordinate units, arms and ammunition, and status of personnel and equipment, thus much improving the intelligence available to 1st Air Cav Div units.

d. G2 Air

(1) Missions flown during the reporting period:

IR	145
SLAR	53
Photo	209
Visual-AO	91
Visual-TAOR	141

(2) ASTA

(a) SLAR. The SLAR surveillance program has produced no significant information. During the Christmas and New Year's truce period, and for sixteen days thereafter, nightly SLAR missions were conducted along the Cambodian border and along the sea coast in the 1st Cav's area of interest. The only targets detected by SLAR consisted of traffic on Highways 1 and 19.

(b) Visual. During the truce periods, visual sightings in the An Lao Valley of large numbers of enemy troops provided significant information. However, at the same time, their low-level missions resulted in extensive small arms damage to the OV-1's, and at one point, the ASTA Platoon had only one aircraft in flyable status. Visual surveillance has subsequently been restricted to a minimum altitude of 1500 feet above the ground.

(c) Photographic.

1. Weather restricted coverage to spot targets or very small areas, generally in the lowlands. Prior coverage (October 66) of the An Lao Valley and the Bong Son Plain was valuable in providing units with map supplement photography for operational planning. Further, it was shown that advantage should be taken of good weather in areas of possible future interest by obtaining the coverage, and thus having negatives on file for use when necessary.

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2. Aerial photography did not provide any intelligence information beyond fortifications and trails.

3. A program to obtain both pre-and post-strike coverage of Arclight areas was initiated. The majority of such missions were unsuccessful because of cloud cover in subject areas. Successful pre-strike missions have thus far provided no information which would confirm or deny the area as suitable for an Arclight, primarily because of forests and vegetation in the target areas.

(d) Infra Red

1. Weather during the reporting period was an important factor in the employment of IR. With colder weather, it was hoped that the sensor might prove more effective in detecting enemy locations, however, constant cloud cover over the areas of interest was coincident with the lower temperatures.

2. The intelligence value of IR is still open to much question. There is no confirmation at present that any IR return was actually an enemy cook or camp fire. Interrogation reports indicate that the enemy employs strict and extensive smoke and fire discipline.

e. Maps: No difficulty in procurement or distribution of tactical maps was experienced during the reporting period. Re-supply of 1:50,000 scale maps from the Nha Trang Map depot was accomplished rapidly in every case. Map cases constructed by the Camp Radcliff RRU Section have greatly solved the map shortage problem which was acute in September and October 1966.

f. Det 24, 5th Weather Squadron: Service furnished the 1st Cavalry Division.

(1) Forecast service (12 and 24 hour forecast, weather warnings, net watch advisories, climatic briefs, safety and orientation briefings and flight briefings) were provided to operating brigades and the division.

g. 371st RRC. The unit participated in all combat operations during the reporting period. Special intelligence items were produced which were directly related to enemy activity.

h. 191st MI Det:

(1) The IPW Section interrogated 1941 detainees and 224 NVA/VC 995 linear inches of captured enemy documents were translated. Items not translated at this headquarters, were forwarded to I Field Forces, Vietnam, for further exploitation and/or translations. Considerable intelligence was obtained from the sources to include identification of units, unit designations, locations, strength and activities.

(2) CI Teams supported brigades and division forward operations by manning forward clearing/screening points, which were established and operated so long as required by operational necessity. These teams consisted of 1 or 2 CI agents with interpreters, and the last outpost maintained and manned by CI personnel was in the vicinity of MY THO Village (CR 025720), which was closed about 23 December 1966.

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The mission performed by these teams consisted of screening documents and refugees, conducting liaison with local RVN government and US agency representatives, in order to obtain Order of Battle and counter-intelligence information. These CI Teams operate quite often accompanied by local knowledgeable RVN National Police and/or village and hamlet personnel in order to more effectively screen/interrogate large numbers of refugees and other detainees. This joint effort is highly recommended for productive results.

(3) There are no known threats to the internal security of the division, although, during this time of the year, the threat of sudden attack upon any US installation is within the realm of possibility. Constant vigil is maintained to prevent surprise.

(4) The Personnel Security Program is improving and the latest administrative requirements of US Army, Vietnam have been implemented. A visit by a CI Team from the Liaison Office of the MACV-224 indicated that these requirement implementations are adequate.

(5) Special areas showing considerable improvement:

(a) The number of incidents of improper destruction of classified documents is constantly being reduced.

(b) Continued emphasis is being placed on security of information about future plans and/or operations to be conducted by the division. Also, security consciousness is increasing among division personnel as to disclosure of classified information to unauthorized personnel. This is accomplished by frequent topics being printed in the Daily Bulletin, and security lectures.

(c) The accountability and destruction of classified defense information, as well as the destruction of non-classified information, is improving. This is enhanced by frequent inspections of storage facilities, document registers, etc, of units and offices located at Camp Radcliff. CI S/A personnel conduct these security inspections and present security lectures as required.

(d) The assignment of IPW personnel trained in the Vietnamese language has resulted in greater flexibility in the utilization of these personnel with the brigades and at the division cage in the field. At present, the IPW section has received most of its replacement personnel during the months of December and January.

(e) The An Khe field office has become quite an asset to the division in that it provides a local point for contact between this unit and local RVN/US agencies for the collection of intelligence information. Personnel to staff this Day/Night Office are provided by the 191st MI Detachment. It operates on a 24-hour basis and receives information from an augmentation team operating in the area.

1. 54th Infantry Detachment: The 54th Infantry Detachment, Ground surveillance supported 1st Cav units at Camp Radcliff and in forward LZ's in Floiku and Binh Dinh Provinces during the reporting period.

At the present time four of the older F13-4's (Short Range Radars) have been turned in and the detachment is awaiting issue of four re-built sets. A re-built T13-33 (Medium Range Radar) was issued to the Detachment in January, giving a total of 6 operational F13-4's out of the 10 authorized and 2 operational T13-33's out of the 2 authorized.

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One additional radar tower, built specifically to house a TT6-33 was constructed on the west side of the barrier between towers 7 & 8. Installation of a TT6-33 at this location provides excellent radar cover along the critical EW portion of the barrier.

4. (C) Operations and Training.

a. Organization. MTOE for the entire division was submitted in December 1966. Thus far, no word from higher headquarters has been received as to approval or disapproval.

b. Questions. Commitment of battalions during the reporting period is show below.

	<u>Bn Days</u>	<u>Days on Operations</u>	<u>% of available Time on Operation</u>
Infantry	820	715	86%
Artillery	552	307	56%
Cavalry Squadron 92		92	100%

(1) Defense of the base camp was conducted by one infantry battalion, with supporting artillery, and up to 350 reinforcing personnel from support and target units. The defense mission includes perimeter defense of Camp Radcliff limited offensive operations within the division tactical area of responsibility under the continuous code designation of operation . Operations under this included patrolling and ambushing, show of force operations support of local CITG operations, as well as pacification and civic action projects.

c. Discussion and Analysis of Major Operations. During the reporting period the division conducted operations in western II Corp and in the extreme southern portion of the corps area. The major effort was in eastern region in Bin Dinh (SIC) province, however, where the division conducted the pacification campaign which has been continuous from 13 September 1966. In addition various divisions elements conducted battalion operations in the TAOR; provided escort forces for convoys; flew aerial rocket artillery interdiction mission and provided security for downed aircraft and provided the IF FORCE V reserve/action force. Figures used in the following discussions of operations have been taken from division daily CIT reports. Discrepancies between the figures and those presented in inter action reports should be resolved in favor of the after action reports, which contain data to be developed after the operation ended. (SIC).

(a) Operation Paul Revere IV 31 October - 27 December 1966 in Pleiku Province. The 2d Brigade (1/5, 2/5, 2/12 Cav) conducted extensive search and destroy operations in the areas of the Chu Long Mountain, the adjoining river valley and along the Cambodian Border to gain contact with major enemy units. The 2d Brigade unit had a light contact with elements of several VC regiments, some of which were terminated when the VC fled west across the Cambodian border. Contact was reported 21 November when a platoon from 1/5 Cav encountered a VC element estimated at 150-200 men while searching the area near the

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Cambodian border. The platoon was overrun by the NVA despite heavy fire support from artillery and TAC air. The NVA managed to shoot most of the wounded members of the platoon before fleeing the area. The brigade reaction force was committed to block the escape of the remnants of the NVA unit, but the enemy crossed into Cambodia shortly after leaving the scent of heavy contact. Enemy losses from the engagement included 147 NVA KIA (BC); Light contact was reported during the remainder of the operation, as 1/5 Cav departed the AO on 6 December, and 2/5 Cav was withdrawn from the AO on 22 December. 2d Brigade headquarters, supporting forces, and 2/12 Cav terminated operation PAUL REVERE IV at 271030 December when last element closed into the THAYER II AO.

Company B, 8th Engineer Battalion, augmented with engineer equipment from the battalion, moved by air and road to OASIS (ZAI70330) with all elements closing on 1 November. Using a general support concept of operations, Company B cleared numerous LZ's, destroyed many enemy defensive bunkers, swept and cleared roads and other areas of enemy mines and booby traps. One LZ constructed was large enough to accommodate an infantry battalion CP, one infantry company, two artillery batteries, and six UH-1H helicopters. The company (-) was committed to the task and accomplished the mission in one day. Other tasks included completely renovating the southern end of the OASIS Airstrip, improving the parking apron so as to accommodate three C-130 aircraft, constructing revetments of 55 gallon drums and earth for 8 CH-47 helicopters, damming a stream to provide a swimming facility at OASIS, and building a brigade operations bunker. In addition, a RF/PF camp site was cleared and a defensive berm constructed on Hill 400 (YA981285). The company repeatedly penetrated helicopter refueling, laager, and sling out areas in order to suppress dust. On 16 December, the 2nd platoon returned to An Khe to support operations of the 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry in the division tactical area of responsibility. On 27 December the company (-) began movement by air from OASIS to HAMMOND to participate in Operation THAYER II.

RESULTS

KIA VC 12	<u>ENEMY</u>	<u>1st Cav Div</u>
NVA 172	184	KIA 40
VCC	5	WIA 44
NVAC	7	MIA 0
Returns	0	
<u>WEAPONS</u>		
Individual	50	
Crew Served	4	

(c) Operation BYRD (25 August, continuing in BINH THUAN Province). TF 2/7 Cavalry continued operations in support of GVN Revolutionary Development activities. During this entire period the 2nd platoon, 8th Engineer Battalion, was attached to the 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry at PHAN THIEP where they provided general and special engineer support to TF 2/7 in Operation BYRD. As of 31 January, the following results had been reported:

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	<u>ENEMY</u>	<u>1st Cav</u>
KIA	351 VC (BC)	KIA 8
VOC	151	WIA 85
Returnees	5	MIA 0
Foodstuff		
Rice (tons)	375.6	
Salt (tons)	3.68	
Grain (tons)	7.4	
Indiv wps	85	

(d) Operation THAYUR II (25 October, continuing in BINH DINH Province). Operation THAYUR II continued the success realized during the first phases of the Binh Dinh Pacification Campaign, which began on 13 September with THAYUR I. Forces committed in the THAYUR II AO ranged from a brigade with two maneuver battalions to three brigades with a total of eight maneuver battalions. Emphasis throughout this phase of the campaign has been on locating and destroying elements of the NVA 18th Regiment, believed fragmented and attempting to avoid contact in the KIM SON/SUCI CA Valley complex. The operation has been characterized by long periods of light and scattered contact punctuated by sharp engagements with enemy units up to battalion size.

1. The following brigade headquarters took part in THAYUR II during the reporting period.

25 Oct - 15 Dec	3d Bde
15 Dec - 27 Dec	1st Bde
27 Dec - 3 Jan	1st Bde, 2d Bde
3 Jan - 31 Jan	1st Bde, 2d Bde, 3/25 Inf Div

2. On 1 November, elements of 1/9 Cav and 5/7 Cav established contact with the 93d Battalion of the 2d VC Regiment in the area between National Route 1 and the Dam Tra O Lake, south of the CAY GIEP Mountains. The fight lasted over nine hours and was broken off by the enemy, who lost at least 35 KIA (BC).

3. On 7 November, elements of 1/9 Cav and 5/7 Cav again made contact with the enemy, this time believed to be a reinforced company, near the northern flank of the CAY GIEP Mountains. Forces in contact were supported by 1/9 Cav gunships and ARA and 34 VC were KIA (BC). The enemy broke contact overnight.

4. Heavy contact was reported on 17 December as C 1/8 Cav pursued a VC squad to the southeast in the Highway 506 Valley. The infantry platoon from A Troop, 1/9 Cav air assaulted to exploit the ground contact and encountered heavy resistance. Other units were committed in an attempt to encircle the enemy unit, estimated to be at least a battalion, until a total of five infantry companies and two platoons from 1/9 Cav were engaged. The encirclement fell short and the enemy managed to break contact and exfiltrate after dark. Final sweep of the battle area on 19 December revealed a total of 95 VC KIA (BC).

5. At 270105 December elements of the 22d NVA Regiment attacked 1st Brigade units and supporting artillery located at LZ BIRD (vic BR 743817) in the KIM SON Valley. The enemy took advantage of the terrain to crawl to within grenade range of the perimeter, neutralizing mines and flares in his path. As his mortars opened fire on the LZ, he rose up from his positions and

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overran the infantry on the northern and eastern sections of the LZ. The charge carried the enemy into some of the howitzer positions of our 105 and 155mm batteries. The infantry withdrew to the remaining howitzer positions as planned, where a final defensive position was established. Fire from the infantry weapons, direct fire from the remaining howitzers, ARA fires, and indirect fire from other artillery drove the enemy from the position. Reinforcements (C 1/5 Cav and one platoon from D 1/9 Cav) were air assaulted into the position, while artillery and ARA interdicted likely routes of withdrawal from the LZ. Over 200 enemy KIA were reported in the position and in the area around the LZ the following two days.

6. Upon arrival of TF 3/25 Inf Div on 3 January 1967, the following areas of operations were assigned the brigades.

1st Brigade - Central and Southern KIM SON Valley

2d Brigade - Northern KIM SON Valley, CRESCENT area, NUI MIEU and CAY GIEN Mountains

TF 3/25 Inf Div - SUOI CA and VINH THANH Valleys and the mountains between these valleys which contained the trail complexes dubbed the Oregon and Santa Fe Trails.

7. All units in the AO began extensive search and surveillance operations, using up to 15 Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols in each brigade AO. On 19 January elements of 1/14 Inf discovered a huge tunnel and cavern complex in the mountains between the SUOI CA and VINH THANH Valleys (vic BR 740748). These caverns are believed to have been used as the VC Province Headquarters, and at the end of the reporting period operations were still under way to destroy them.

8. Heavy contact was made with the 8th Battalion, 22d NVA Regiment on 27 January by elements of 2/12 Cav conducting a reconnaissance in force in the area NE of BONG SON (vic B3910055). Initial forces came under fire as soon as they air assaulted, and were quickly reinforced as the 2d Brigade attempted to encircle the enemy. By dark four US infantry companies and two platoons of 1/9 Cav, were on the ground, while elements of 40th ARVN Regiment and a VN Marine TF had been lifted into LZs to complete the encirclement. Although heavy fires were delivered into the kill zone created by the encirclement, the enemy managed to exfiltrate from the area before dawn. A final sweep through the area on 28 Jan revealed 72 NVA KIA (BC) and 11 POW.

9. At the end of the reporting period all units were conducting search operations in assigned AOs to locate and destroy remnants of the 18th NVA Regiment and to locate other major enemy formations in the area. During THAYER II the division has begun to capitalize on the extensive search and destroy operations of THAYER I and IRVING, during which enemy base areas in the KIM SON Valley and the SUOI CA were uncovered and destroyed. Loss of huge amounts of rice, weapons and munitions during the earlier phases of the campaign had placed the 18th Regiment and other units operating in the area at a serious disadvantage, forcing them to expend considerable time and resources merely to sustain themselves. The longer the division remains in the area the more difficult it will be for the enemy to organize and conduct offensive operations in eastern BINH DINH Province.

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10. The task organization for the 8th Engineer Battalion during Operation THAYER II changed several times to maintain continuity of support to the division's brigades and to allow each unit to participate in the various tasks involved. All major elements of the 8th Engineer Battalion are now committed in support of Operation THAYER II.

a. Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC) remained at HAMMOND Airfield (BR883570) until 24 January when the company moved to ENGLISH Airfield (BS879000). During the entire period, HHC provided equipment and operators to battalion elements in forward areas. Extensive use was made of the division's organic airlift capability to transport construction equipment to remote areas. With the exception of the 5 ton dump truck, all major items of equipment within HHC were moved from place to place by helicopter. The heavy rainfall experienced during the latter part of November and the entire month of December placed an almost overwhelming burden on the battalion. The renovation of HAMMOND Airfield was completed by 10 November. The multiple layers of penepriime placed on the strip effectively waterproofed it during this critical period. The airstrip was never closed to traffic. As many as 30 C-130 sorties a day utilized the strip for over a week's period when Route QL1 washed out in November and then again in December. The monsoon rains and heavy vehicle traffic in the HAMMOND complex necessitated continual maintenance of the interior road net. A total of 28,250 cubic yards of fill was hauled to upgrade and maintain these roads. Some 500 yards of crushed rock were utilized to repair the airstrip and select portions of the road net. During prolonged dry spells, dust palliation became a requirement with an extremely high priority. Penepriime, mixed on occasions with diesel fuel, was applied to helicopter sling out areas, refueling areas, and laeger areas. Approximately 500,000 gallons of penepriime was distributed to suppress dust at HAMMOND and OASIS Airfield and to waterproof the HAMMOND strip. The bulk of the effort to accomplish the forgoing tasks was provided by HHC.

Following the torrential rains of 25-28 November and 24 December 1966, the battalion voluntarily augmented the 45th Group's 35th Engineer Battalion and the 6th ARVN Engineer Group in order to hasten the repair of Route QL1. The equipment platoons of HHC, assisted by line elements as required, performed this essential mission.

d. Company C (-) attached to the 3rd Brigade provided general and special engineer support for the brigade's operation until 16 December when the company (-) reverted to a general support role under 8th Engineer Battalion control. During the period of attachment to the 3rd Brigade, Company C constructed 15 LZ's, destroyed 490 tactical bunkers, 29 tunnel complexes, and one cave. A total of 4730 pounds of explosives were expended during demolitions missions; one tunnel required 1600 pounds of explosives in addition to the explosive effect of an acetylene generator to destroy it. On 29 November, the company was alerted for the mission of opening Route 506 from its junction with Route QL1 to LZ PCNY (BR801832) for 175mm and 8 inch self propelled artillery movement. Two platoons, a D6B bulldozer, a 3414 front loader, a 2 1/2 ton dump truck with 12 ton tilt bed trailer, and a Cat 112 grader with bowl were committed to the task. Countless pot holes and washouts were filled, numerous bridges and culverts repaired or replaced, and several untrafficable areas made passable by constructing a corduroy stretch

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of road with coconut logs. By 9 December, the road to LZ FONY was opened, but another major problem remained. Two hundred meters of rice paddy stretched between the road and the high ground of LZ FONY itself. Immediately, the platoons began cutting coconut logs in the surrounding area to construct a corduroy causeway. 36 CH-54 and 14 CH-47 sorties were utilized to lift over 600 logs to the construction site and the causeway was completed on 16 December. Heavy rains weakened the road bed of Route 506, and an attempt to move the artillery to LZ FONY on 12 December was abandoned. On 20 December the artillery moved to LZ FONY via Routes QLL, TL3A, and the "Beaver Causeway". On 20 December, Company C (-) assumed the general support mission at HAMMOND and until 25 January when the company (-) moved to ENGLISH, remained actively engaged in maintenance and improvement of the HAMMOND airfield and road net. After establishing a bivouac area and defensive positions at ENGLISH, the 1st platoon began the installation of tactical wire along the eastern perimeters at ENGLISH. The 3rd platoon was attached to the 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry on 27 January and was airlifted to the 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division area of operations, west of HAMMOND, where the unit became engaged in tunnel destruction as well as in general and special engineer support.

11. Significant Artillery Activities.

a. Increased use of the artillery raid technique. The artillery raid, first employed by the 2/19th Artillery during Operation Irving, was used during the reporting period by units of Division Artillery in all three areas of operations. The artillery raid materially increased the range and flexibility of artillery support. It has proven to be an extremely effective means of attacking targets developed by intelligence sources beyond the range of artillery already in position.

b. Interdiction Program. Operation Thayer II was characterized by a heavy interdiction program based on all available information. In Thayer II there has been more intelligence for use in target prediction than ever before because 1st Cavalry units have been operating in the area since 13 September. IFW reports indicated that this interdiction program was highly effective in that it caused many casualties, lowered VC morale and at one point stopped night movement of units larger than a platoon.

c. SS-11. The SS-11 missile was used extensively during Operation Thayer II against bunkers and caves. It was very effective resulting in many bunkers and caves destroyed. The accuracy of this missile was demonstrated when it destroyed two bunkers with apertures less than 1 x 6 feet.

d. Reconnaissance by CS and fire. A technique that proved to be very successful during the period was the reconnaissance of suspect locations by aurally delivered CS and exploitation by the combined fire power of Aerial Rocket Artillery, ACH-47A (GO-GO) and tube artillery. Of the 19 RCA missions conducted during the reporting period, 17 could be classified as reconnaissance by CS and fire.

e. Defense of LZ Bird. On 27 December 1966, the 22d NVA Regiment conducted a coordinated attack by two battalions on LZ Bird. Batteries B, 2d Battalion, 19th Artillery (105) and Battery C, 6th Battalion, 16th Artillery (155) distinguished themselves in the close combat which was necessary to defend the

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position. Two rounds of XM543 "Beehive" ammunition fired by B Battery broke the back of the attack. Supporting fires executed by a 105mm battery and composite 8"/175mm battery 6000 meters distant caused a large number of NVA casualties. At daybreak 44 dead NVA soldiers were found within the perimeter and 167 more found along the routes of withdrawal.

12. Battalion Days Out of Base Camp in support of tactical operations:

- a. C/6/16 Artillery = 92
- b. 2/19th Artillery = 82
- c. 2/20th Artillery = 53
- d. 1/21st Artillery = 47
- e. 1/77th Artillery = 91

13. Ammunition Expenditures.

a. 105mm

<u>HE</u>	<u>WF</u>	<u>ILL</u>	<u>SMCKE</u>	<u>FRFCGANDA</u>	<u>BEEHIVE</u>
58,213	49,111	1,154	3,073	74	2

b. 155mm

<u>HF</u>	<u>WP</u>	<u>ILL</u>	<u>SMK</u>
33,930	7,904	729	135

c. 8"

HE
9,105

d. 175mm

HE
4,258

- e. 2.75" rockets = 38,004
- f. S3-11 missiles = 22
- g. C3 Grenades = 7,728

RESULTS

	<u>ENEMY</u>	<u>1st Cav Div</u>
KIA VC 916	1529	KIA 184
NVA 613		WIA 747
		MIA 2
PCW VCC 45	102	
NVA/C 57		
Returnees		
VC 109	122	
NVA 13		
Civil Defendants	400	

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	<u>ENEMY</u>	<u>1st Cav Div</u>
Weapons		
Individual	331	
Cr. w served	28	
Rice (tons)	445.0	
Salt (tons)	430	

d. Psychological Operations.

(c) During the period approximately 135 hours of psyops broadcasts, 36,000,000 leaflets and 117 ralliers were recorded. Psychological operations from November through January were characterized by increasing psyops vulnerabilities within the ranks of the enemy, and reduction or limitation of psyops support by the 5th Air Commando Squadron, 245th Psyops Co, and JUSPAC. When combined with inclement weather caused by the northeast monsoon these factors restricted psyops operations.

(b) To offset the support limits and to develop greater psyops capabilities within the division, the psyops section in the G3 was filled and subordinate commanders urged to develop similar staff sections and increase their activities.

(c) Sudden departure of the Division's JUSPAO representative was a setback to the planned increases in psychological warfare activities. The long-run effects of JUSPAO withdrawal have not been determined. Several projects have been cancelled however, and our ability to obtain quick policy guidance from the JUSPAC representatives has of course been eliminated.

(d) The capabilities of U-10 pilots was demonstrated forcefully by CPT Jack Lavelle, a pilot from the 5th Air Commando Squadron. During a two-day period in November, he dispersed two million leaflets and broadcast 15 hours of propaganda messages over selected targets.

(e) Noteworthy activities included a special CHILU HOI day for remnants of the 18th NVA Regiment. Six ralliers were recorded by adjacent units on that day. Final analysis of targeting effectiveness prior to the 19th and of enemy countermeasures depends on future interrogations of POWs.

(f) After Operation IRVING, the division made a special attempt, with C Company 2/8 Cavalry, to consolidate the gains we made in one part of the AC. The operation was conducted assuming the ARVN would eventually take control of the area. C Company secured and virtually pacified a large area west of the NUI MIEU Mountains. In the process, they developed an intimate knowledge of the people and established effective rapport with the village and hamlet chiefs. Over 100 ralliers were persuaded to return to the GVN, and in one three-day period, a loudspeaker team from the 245th Psyops Company talked 26 into rallying. Each platoon area featured a daily sick call and constant face to face conversations with the people.

(g) Problem areas included the following:

1. Limitations were placed on standard and special leaflets by higher headquarters, in order to align demands with leaflet production capabilities. Quotas established on a brigade basis restricted planning and reaction capabilities.

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2. Leaflet quality varies greatly. Reproduction of pictures is generally poor, and artist sketches have been used extensively in lieu of pictures. These sketches have little to offer in the way of attractiveness, interest, or authenticity.

3. The brigade in the T&OR does not have a field team to support their combat operations, security actions, and civic affair/RD activities.

4. The teams with the brigades are limited to a maximum of three persons, generally a lieutenant team leader; a junior NCO or PFC loudspeaker operator; and an interpreter. These teams are expected to perform jobs which actually require loudspeaker, intelligence, and command and control teams. It is significant that these field-expedient teams are often understrength and do not have capability of any of the above mentioned TO&E psyops teams.

5. One psyops intelligence team of the 245th Psyops Company supports the entire II Corps area. It provides occasional resumes of a general nature, which have been of little value.

6. Aircor it loudspeaker support during the period, with the exception in paragraph 4 b (2) (d) above, was carried out largely by organic helicopters. The modified M&C PD loudspeaker sets have been plagued by maintenance problems, and the additional loudspeaker sets promised for delivery prior to 1 January had not been received by the end of January.

7. U-10 and C-47 support was generally below that required during the period from early November through 17 January. Some improvement in U-10 support was noted in late January.

8. Night loudspeaker missions were not flown in the THAYER AC during the entire three months. Single engine reliability is given as the reason for not flying the fully instrumented U-10s at night, and inclement weather and higher priority missions restricted C-47 support.

(h) Increasing psyops opportunities will be forfeited until massive psyops reinforcements are made available from CONUS. The type facilities required includes mobile and fixed printing facilities; radio stations; more effective loudspeaker systems; increased graphic arts and photography capabilities; and intelligence teams and interpreters.

(4) OPERATIONAL OPERATIONS:

(a) During the reporting period numerous Riot Control Agent missions were conducted in support of combat operations. During Operations THAYER II, PAUL REVUE IV, and DAZZLEM, the AM3 (modified) grenade dispenser was used on numerous occasions to reduce enemy fires and also in reconnaissance role to induce movement or fires from the enemy. The technique used in CS reconnaissance missions by this division has proven useful in finding the enemy. A large target area is selected i.e. 2-4 grids per RCA dispenser ship. The pilots select possible enemy locations within the target area, then dispense approximately 50 grenades in each location and observe for enemy movement. The RCA dispenser ships are always accompanied by ARA or armed gun ships. On the evening of 16 December, this CS

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reconnaissance technique was successful in finding and routing an enemy force approximately eight kilometers northwest of Camp Radcliff. During the period November through January, CS grenades delivered by the XM3 (modified) grenade dispenser were used on 27 separate missions dropping a total of 12,096 grenades.

1. Contamination of terrain using CS-1 powder was accomplished during Operations FAUL REVERSE IV, BYRD, and THAYER II. Over 2,200 pounds of CS-1 was disseminated using two M5 RCA dispensers during Operations FAUL REVERSE IV and BYRD. Targets consisted primarily of trails and river lines, but also included a known VC market place. During Operation THAYER II, drums of CS-1 were rigged for aerial drop from a CH-47. A total of 30 drums containing 2,400 pounds of CS-1 was dropped on well traveled trail networks. Rigging was accomplished through use of M10 universal destructors and eight second delay initiators. Parachute cord was attached to the initiator pull-pin and anchored to a D-ring in the aircraft. The result is a static line drop which allows arming after the drum has fallen from the aircraft.

2. In Operation THAYER II numerous caves and tunnels were discovered. The initial clearing was normally accomplished with CS grenades. On a few occasions when tunnels were found to be fairly extensive, the M106 Mity Mity blower was brought in to flush the tunnels with CS and smoke grenades. All tunnel and cave complexes were destroyed by the Engineers when the mission permitted. On occasion, tunnels were contaminated with CS-1 powder and the entrances blown to seal in the CS agent.

(b) Defoliation of the Camp Radcliff barrier continued through the period. With two minor exceptions, all defoliation was accomplished using a CH-47 spray rig developed locally in the preceding quarter. A total of 1,650 gallons of agent ORANGE was disseminated over 150 hectares. Experience has shown that aerial dissemination is the only practical way to defoliate. Ground base operations cause a large waste of agent which is in short supply.

(c) Flame and flame field expedients have developed some interest over the past quarter, but still are not used widely. Flame fougasses (55 gallon) were placed in several locations within the Camp Radcliff defensive barrier. The same type fougasses were used extensively in a brigade defensive barrier during Operation FAUL REVERSE IV. The small M9-7 modified flamethrowers were employed on one tunnel operation. Although a psychological advantage accrues from the use of flame, there are very few instances when flamethrowers are satisfactory for tunnel clearing, primarily due to a short firing time.

e. Training. (1) Training activities continued under the provisions of Division Circular 350-50. The division training program was evaluated by members of the USARV IG team in December, 1966, and found to be satisfactory. Particular items of interest during the inspection were:

Replacement training program.
Driver training
Training records procedures.

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(2) The Division Training Center continued to provide valuable training support to all elements of the division. A total of 4443 replacements received the three-day orientation during the reporting period. In addition two other courses of instruction were initiated at the center.

(a) The Combat Leader Course is designed to provide training to enlisted personnel serving as fire team/squad leaders, or other combat arms personnel selected by commanders for leadership training. The 12-day course provides review and advanced training in tactics, leadership, communications, map reading, and medical subjects, while extensive training is conducted in the use of demolitions; adjustment of supporting fires and conduct of patrols. Students conduct a 36-hour patrol in the division TACR at the end of the course. There were 32 graduates of the first course conducted in December and 33 graduates from the January course.

(b) Training Center cadre established a two-day map reading refresher course for division personnel nominated for the MACV Reconno School. The course is designed to provide a review of fundamentals and as of the end of the reporting period, 17 personnel had attended the course.

(3) Training support from non-divisional sources.

(a) One-hundred nine division personnel attended aircraft maintenance training courses on the UH-1 and CH-47 aircraft under the Army Aviation Mobile Training Assistance Program (AAMTAP). The courses varied from two to four weeks in length and were coordinated through the 34th GS Group at Vung Tau, RVN.

(b) Four officers attended the one-week civil affairs course conducted in Saigon for MACV/USAID/JUSPAO personnel.

(c) Division continued to fill quotas to the MACV Reconno school at Nha Trong, RVN. Thirteen members of the division graduated from the school during the reporting period.

(d) Three officers attended a 5-day course of instruction at the FACAF Jungle Survival School, Clark AFB, Republic of Philippines. Purpose of the course is to provide advanced training in jungle escape and evasion techniques for aviators.

(4) Other training programs which received emphasis were aerial suppressive fire training for crew chiefs and door gunners, and DECCA aircraft navigation training, which was completed in December 1966.

f. Combat Developments: During this reporting period the following significant activities took place:

(1) Items received for evaluation:

(a) Australian Shower Buckets - An initial issue of 20 buckets was enthusiastically received by the division. 700 were made available for issue.

(b) Man Pack Personnel Detector - This device is currently being evaluated in the division.

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(c) 50 gallon collapsible water container - This new item is very conveniently carried by the UH-1D. It will be requested in operational quantities.]*

(d) 3 gallon free fall water containers - Operational quantities were provided to the division and are being successfully used.

(e) Night Observation Device - Div Arty and 1/9 Cav completed evaluation questionnaires for ACTIV report. The responses were highly favorable.

(f) Grenade carriers - Twenty-five M 26 grenade carriers are being evaluated in the division. The carrier has pockets for 3 frag and 3 cannister grenades.

(g) Light weight flak vests - one hundred new flak vests weighing five pounds each will be evaluated for troop acceptability. They are the new standard vest and are available in quantity in the supply system.

(h) Ceramic chest and back protectors - Twenty pound ceramic chest and back protectors for infantrymen in static positions (Barrier) are available for evaluation. Only the 545th MPs have expressed interest (convoy escort).

(i) Leg and groin protectors - Three hundred groin protectors and 20 sets of leg protectors are available for evaluation (to determine comfort and acceptability).

(j) JANLIA device - This is a radio controlled anti-intrusion device which was evaluated by the 1st & 2d Bdes, and 1/9 Cav. Operational quantities have been requested.

(k) 2.75 inch flechette. Folding Fin Aerial Rocket-renewed interest in the WDU-4/A flechette warhead resulted in further evaluation by 2/20 Arty.

(l) Star Clusters - New 40mm star clusters have arrived for evaluation by 1/9 Cav.

(m) Safari lights - Five fluorescent lanterns each powered by two 60 volt batteries or 100 volts AC are under evaluation. Initial reaction has been highly favorable.]*

(n) Citizens Band two way radio - Ten light weight radios are being evaluated by the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol and Div Arty.

(2) New equipment due within the next three months:

(a) Battlefield Illuminator -- An expendable system weighing 13 lbs and is 18"x6"x6". It provides .4 foot candles of illumination over a 400 meter diameter area. Automatically maintains six minutes of continuous illumination out to 600 meters.

(b) XM-21 System - A new equipment team introduced the system which consists of 7.62 minigun and 2.75 inch rocket combinations to replace the XM-16. Replacement systems will begin arriving in Feb - Mar 67.

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(c) New 2.75 warhead - A larger (16.9 pound) warhead for the 2.75 inch rockets will be evaluated by 2/20 arty in Apr - May 67.

(d) Flamethrowers - Twenty-five single shot hand held flamethrowers (about 5 pounds each) capable of projecting flames over a 90 foot path 30 feet wide for 3 seconds will be available for evaluation in the near future. This program has slipped pending safety certification.

(e) Trade Metal Detector - a device that will indicate whether personnel had recently been in contact with metal has been introduced by a new equipment team. The devices are programmed for the division in Feb 67.

(f) XM 47 Subsystem - This device which dispenses the XM 27 mine is due for employment within a few weeks. A new equipment team presented instruction and certified instructors.

(g) 40mm Launcher - Two hand-cranked, crew served 40mm systems are due in Feb 67. It is planned to present one week of instruction to the barrier battalion personnel selected as grenadiers. The launcher, tripod and 24 rds of boxed ammunition weigh 61 pounds. The launcher is 27 pounds. The rate of fire is variable from 1 to 250 per minute.

(h) PSR-1 - Ninety PSR-1 anti-intrusion systems have arrived in RVN. Some of the systems will be released to the division in February concurrent with instruction from a new equipment team. Each system has four devices that will detect movement within 30 meters radius and can transmit the detection WD-1 wire to a control box up to a mile away.

(i) Lightweight Jungle Rucksack - Although operational quantities have been requested, USARV insists on an evaluation of a limited number of rucksacks in the division before forwarding the requirement.

(j) Sniper telescopes - 50 telescopes for the M-16 rifle were due in December 1966.

(k) AABC Survey System - An electronic Airborne Control Survey System for Div. arty is due in April 67.

(l) 23 inch XENON searchlights - Twelve new searchlights mounted on 4 ton trucks will replace the six 30 inch carbon arc light of B/29 arty which support the division.

(m) Demolitions - New explosives for tree-cutting, tunnel destruction, intrusion warning, and ambush use were due in December 67.

(n) New 5.56 magazines - Expendable magazines sealed in expendable plastic bandoleers will be demonstrated early this year.

(o) Experimental anti-personnel warhead - 50 anti-personnel BS-11 missiles will be evaluated by 2/20 arty early in 1967.

(3) New Requirements:

(a) Camouflaged uniforms.

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- (b) Rome Flow support in the TAOR.
- (c) Water proof detainee and equipment tags.
- (d) Lightweight, fungus resistant pistol holster.
- (e) Jungle H ts.
- (f) Engine inlet screens and covers for CH-47.

(4) Miscellaneous Actions.

(a) A qualitative Material Requirement (QMRC) for a lightweight (36 lbs) 81mm mortar and light weight (5 lbs) 81mm mortar ammunition was concurred in by the division.

(b) A Small Development Requirement (SDR) for a Platoon Early Warning Device was concurred by the division. The description resembles the SANDIA device.

(c) A request for the basis of issue for a lightweight water purification unit was rejected because it did not offer advantages over current equipment.

(d) USARV solicited and received information for operational analysis of automatic weapons unit requirements.

(e) Requirements for monthly consumption of the developmental Long Range Patrol Ration were submitted.

(f) Qualitative Material Development Objective (QMDO) for a Ground Effects Machine (GEM) to replace 3/4 - 1 1/2 T trucks was concurred in.

(g) A Medium Assault Weapon (MAW) basis of issue (namely to replace the 90mm RR) was not concurred in because it does not have a beehive APERS capability.

(h) Limited War Laboratory (LWL) announced continuing success in the development of:

- 1. New rugged electro-luminescent runway markers.
- 2. Portable (10 pound) position locators.
- 3. Off leash dog teams (dogs detect personnel, trip wires, explosives and give "alerts" not unlike bird dogs).

(i) Interest has been shown in the Canadian Dynatrac, Picsecki "Paddy Pony", and the M-114 Armored Personnel Carrier.

(j) Final Evaluation reports have been received from ACTIV bn:

- 1. Throat microphones - Unsatisfactory.
- 2. Chemiluminescent Marking Grenade - Unsatisfactory.
- 3. Forest Penetrator Device - Satisfactory.

(5) Problem Areas:

(a) Experimental APERS ammunition (Beehive) is not available in large enough quantities to experiment in indirect fire or to conduct extensive training with 105mm How, 106mm RR, and 90mm RR crews. As a result ammunition is not "turning over", and is subject to unserviceability due to constant handling and exposure to the tropical climate. After 8 months in RVN, the ammunition was

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officially credited for the first operational use in 27 Dec 66 at LZ BIRD. Two rounds contributed significantly to repulsing a regimental size attack on a friendly force of two howitzer batteries secured by two platoons of infantry.

(b) A Rice Contaminant (CONFIDENTIAL) was requested by this division late 1966. It has been developed but not released for operational use. Recent follow-up request has been submitted. The contaminant is ideal for denying the enemy caches of rice which cannot be redistributed.

(c) Chain saw blades for hardwood continue posing a serious problem. Carbide tipped blades and more rugged saws have been requested.

5. (C) Logistics.

a. General:

(1) During the period 1 November 1966 through 31 January 1967, support was provided for three major operations: PAUL REVERE IV; BYRD and THAYER II.

(a) Operation PAUL REVERE IV had started 28 October 1966. On 1 November there were three Bns of the division's 2d Bde plus normal combat and combat service support elements being supported by DISCOM's 2d FSE and a collocated Qui Nhon Support activity located at Oasis. Resupply was by a land LOC out of Pleiku. On 10 November, one battalion was deployed to Hammond, reducing the force in PAUL REVERE IV to a two Bn Bde. On 6 December the Bn was returned to Oasis; but another Bn was deployed to An Khe and the operation remained at the 2 Bn level. On 22 Dec a second Bn returned to An Khe. The operation continued with one Bn until 27 Dec. On 27 and 28 Dec the Pde Hqs, the remaining Bn and the 2d FSE closed out of Oasis and the operation terminated.

(b) Operation BYRD, a battalion operation in progress at the beginning of the period, continued to be supported by DISCOM's 3rd FSE collocated with a Forward Support activity from Cam Ranh Bay Support Command at Phan Thiet and supplied via sea LOC from Cam Ranh Bay. The operation continues.

(c) Operation THAYER II, was in process as a one Bde operation at the beginning of the period. The operation was being supported by the 1st FSE at Hammond. Qui Nhon Support Command's FSA remained located at Hammond and primary resupply was by daily land convoys from Qui Nhon. On 25 Dec an additional battalion was moved from An Khe to Hammond; and on 28 Dec the 2d Bde Task Force (2de Hqs, one Bn and supporting artillery) deployed from Oasis to English and Hammond. After that, Thayer II remained a two Brigade operation, until 4 Jan 67, when the 3rd Bde, 2d Infantry was placed Opcon to the division and deployed to Hammond. On 29 Dec 66 a limited resupply point was established by the 2d FSE hqs at English. On 15 and 24 January, 1967 the medical clearing company and the maintenance detachment, respectively, joined the 2d FSE making it complete. On 4 Jan 1967 a QNSC forward support activity completed collocating with the 2d FSE at English. Heavy rains interrupted the land LOC from Qui Nhon to Hammond from 25 November to 5 December and from 24 to 31 December; and from Hammond to English from 24 December until 10 January. During these times resupply to the logistical bases was by air LOC from Qui Nhon. From 27 Nov to 9 Dec the ALOC to Hammond consisted of 53 x C123 and 95 x C130 sorties for a total of 1275 tons of supplies. From

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35 24 to 31 Dec 45 x C130 and 13 x C123 sorties delivered 435.5 tons of supplies. The air LOC was maintained to English until 20 January and a total of 2647 tons were delivered by 223 C-130 and 3 C123 sorties. On 27 January the division MSR, route QL-1 was reclassified class 30 from Qui Nhon to English. The operation continues.

(d) One problem encountered during Thayer II was the heavy work load placed on helicopters due to the necessity to deliver supplies to many widely dispersed locations. Efforts to alleviate this included: refuel points at English (prior to the establishment of the FSE there), in the Vinh Thanh Valley and at LZ's Pony and Uplift; use of airdrop of supplies (see para. 1e below); and changing the composition of the daily allocation of logistical support helicopters to the Bns. These efforts have only partially reduced the high flying hours required to support the operation. At the close of the period, refuel points were located at Uplift and Pony.

(e) An airdrop of heavy artillery ammunition from C130 aircraft, was conducted on 31 Dec at LZ Pony. The drop was a partial success in that no supplies were damaged and all were received. The bundles were, however, dispersed by as much as a kilometer and recovery required an excessive number of man and CH-47 hours. Five highly successful smaller airdrops from C7A aircraft were conducted by the division, demonstrating the usefulness of properly planned airdrop.

(f) Generally, the logistical support provided by the Qui Nhon Support Command continued to be outstanding and highly responsive. The only unsatisfactory periods were during the times that the division's main forward logistical base at Hammond was dependent upon ALOC alone. During the first such period the ALOC was able to bring in less than $\frac{1}{2}$ the desired tonnage for the Bde task force operating in Thayer II. This was primarily due to a combination of the continued bad weather and the scheduling of an inadequate number of aircraft. The second period of ALOC to Hammond and the ALOC to English were more successful; but it was clearly demonstrated that the division cannot rely on ALOC alone for operations larger than a two Bn Task Force.

b. Supply and Services:

(a) Class I. The major development during this reporting period was the completion of the An Khe sub area Ice Plant which has the capacity for producing 60 tons of ice per day. All local contracts for ice have been cancelled and the An Khe Sub Area is now self-sufficient. The collocation of the Division's 15th & 3 Battalion Class I facility with that of the 34th & 3 Bn continues to work effectively. Spoilage of produce received has been maintained at an acceptable level, however, with the advent of warmer weather this could pose future problems. Feeding of A component rations continues to increase and this is the first quarterly reporting period that more A components have been issued than B components. Class I support has been and continues to be excellent.

(b) Class II & IV: During this reporting period the supply situation in the Class II & IV area has improved tremendously. Critical high usage items were received in greater quantities as a more aggressive followup system has been implemented by this headquarters and 1st Logistical Command. 1st Logistical Command has been providing Class II & IV support in forward areas in accordance with their new policy of providing total support to the 1st Air Cav Div during field operations. This policy has minimized requirements for sending

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back to base camp for Class II & IV items and has resulted in a considerable saving of organic transportation. The huge tonnages of Class II & IV supplies consumed during this period is a direct reflection of the outstanding support received. It would appear that during this quarter supply has started to catch up with demand and it is expected that improvement will continue in the future.

(c) Class III: Operations have continued to function smoothly throughout the present reporting period. No problems were encountered nor are anticipated.

(d) Class V: During the period, bulk ASR allocations were received from IFFORCE V in 15 day periods thereby reducing administrative requirements and allowing units to manage their own allocations to fulfill their mission. In the few instances where additional allocations were required, they were provided with a minimum of delay. Other ammunition items were also provided in adequate quantities. The consolidation of the division ASP and that of the supporting 1st Logistical Command at An Khe was initiated. This consolidation should increase efficiency and provide valuable savings to the government. The Class V sling out area will continue to be manned by division personnel with 1st Logistical Command assuming all other supporting Class V functions at An Khe. At the end of this period the consolidation was approximately 90% complete. No major problem areas have arisen during the period and ammunition support has been excellent in all aspects.

(e) The following amounts of supplies were used by the division during this reporting period:

- 1. Class I (Short Tons)
 - a. "A" Rations: 3776.9
 - b. "B" Rations: 2764.0
 - c. "C" Rations: 1119.8
- 2. Class II & IV (Short Tons)
 - a. Clothing & Equipment: 818
 - b. Fortification Materials: 675.8
- 3. Class III (Gallons)
 - a. AVGAS: 799,510
 - b. JI-4: 6,922,960
 - c. MOGAS: 1,935,535
 - d. DIESEL: 1,142,300
- 4. Class V (Short Tons): 15,654.5

c. Transportation:

(a) Significant movements during the period 1 November through 31 January were as follows:

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1. 10 November. A combat essential airlift mission was conducted to move the 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry from Oasis to Hammond. Airlift for this move totaled 10 -C-130 and 5 - C-123 sorties.

2. 6 December. The 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry was deployed from Hammond to Oasis by air. The 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry moved from Oasis to An Khe by surface. Transport used totaled 30 - C -123 sorties, 38 - 2½ Ton Trucks and 20 - 1½ Ton Trailers.

3. 12 December. 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry moved by air and surface from An Khe to Hammond. 4C-130 sorties and 22 2½ ton trucks were required. A company of 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry deployed from Hammond to Phan Thiet and one company of the 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry deployed from Phan Thiet to An Khe. 4 C-130 sorties were required.

4. 22 December. The 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry deployed from Oasis to An Khe by air and surface. 14 CV2B sorties and 20 - 21½ ton trucks were required.

5. 25 December. A tactical emergency was declared to move the 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry from An Khe to Hammond. 5 - C -130, 16 CV2B, and 24 UH1D sorties were required.

6. 27-28 December. The 2d Brigade Task Force consisting of the Brigade Headquarters, the 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry and supporting artillery redeployed from Oasis to English and Hammond. The 2d FSE moved from Oasis to English and Hammond. The 2d FSE moved from Oasis to An Khe. 4 - C130 sorties, 6 - C-123 sorties and 50 - 2½ ton trucks were required.

7. 28 December. The 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry deployed from An Khe to English and Hammond. Thirteen C-130 sorties were used.

8. 20 January. The 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry redeployed from Hammond to An Khe by C7A aircraft and surface 26 - C7A sorties and 15 - 2½ ton trucks were required.

(b) Eight C-130 passenger flights and four C-130 cargo flights were scheduled to An Khe on a daily basis during the period. From 1-31 January, a C-130 medical evacuation service was provided between An Khe, Cam Rhan Bay, Nha Trang and Tan Son Nhut on Tuesday and Saturday. A daily courier service between An Khe and forward division airfields was maintained throughout the period with CV2B/C-7A aircraft. At the close of the period daily courier service was in operation between An Khe and Hammond, English, PhanThiet and Qui Nohn.

d. Maintenance:

(a) Ground Maintenance

1. All 1st Air Cavalry Division battalions and separate companies reported completion of the following requirements during the month of November 1966.

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- a. Equipment density report.
- b. Training and licensing of generacor
- c. Prescribed load list audit.
- d. Written maintenance SOP

2. Inspections

a. Roadside spot check vehicle inspections have been conducted weekly. Twenty vehicles were inspected each week; inspection reports were forwarded thru command channels and units notified this headquarters of action taken to correct noted deficiencies.

b. Three Command Maintenance Management Inspections were conducted on dates indicated below.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>RATING</u>
4 Jan 67	5th Bn, 7th Cav	Satisfactory
11 Jan 67	228th ASH Bn	Satisfactory
18 Jan 67	1st Bn, 21st Arty	Satisfactory

3. Maintenance Training (Repair Parts Management).

During the period 23-28 January 1967, division prescribed load list (PLL) clerks were given an eight hour block of instruction in PLL procedures. The POI included: Preparing a PLL, title insert, record of demands card, document register and due-in file, revising the PLL (5 hours) and a practical exercise (3 hours). All companies batteries and battalions were represented. 194 personnel attended the instruction.

4. The 2d quarter, FY 67 Materiel Readiness Report (DA Form 2406) was submitted to USARV on 3 January 1967.

(b) Aircraft Maintenance

1. Following number of Aircraft by type have been dropped from Property Accountability during the reporting period.

OH-13S	14
UH-1B	12
UH-1D	17
CH-47	3

2. The following number of Aircraft by type have been issued (From Depot Stock) during the reporting period.

OH-13S	12
UH-1B	3
UH-1D	20

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3. Safety of flight inspections

a. Inspection of oil cooler hose assemblies
01-A. All 01-A aircraft were inspected to determine the serviceability of oil cooler hose assembly P/N 4720EG003-800180. Inspection results indicated that all hoses were serviceable. Results of inspection were forwarded to 34th General Support Group (AM&S).

b. Inspection of AFT synchronization
shaft P/N.114D3072-1 CH-47A Aircraft. All CH-47 aircraft were inspected for discrepant AFT Shaft installations. A total of Eighteen (18) aircraft had shafts or adapters in-tailed without index number identification. Discrepant shafts were reported to 34th General Support Group and serviceable shafts installed.

c. Inspection of Cyclic trim actuator
attachment nuts CH-47A. Ref: TV 55-1520-209-20/19. All CH-47 aircraft were inspected to determine that correct nut was installed on cyclic trim actuator attachment bolts. Inspection revealed fifteen (15) aircraft had installations that did not conform to the Technical Bulletin Criteria. A daily inspection requirement was imposed on Subject aircraft and USAAVCOM was contacted for clarification. Pending receipt of further information from USAAVCOM the Daily Inspection requirement will be adhered to.

d. Residual Stress Inspection of AFT
rotor Blades CH-47 Aircraft. This inspection program went into operation in August and was completed on 14 November 1966. A total number of One Hundred Seven (107) blades were inspected with a total of Eighteen (18) blades determined unserviceable. During the course of the inspection a weekly progress report was submitted to 34th General Support Group.

e. Inspection of UH-1C Main Rotor Blades.
All UH-1C (UH-1B/540) aircraft were inspected for cracked main rotor blades. (Reference: Message AVGF-MM GS-12-123 DTG 230045Z Dec 66). To date there have been no failures noted. This is a continuing inspection and all failure data will be forwarded by this office to 34th General Spt Group and U.S. Army Aviation Materiel Command.

f. Inspection of upper transmission case
bolts, OH-13S. As a result of three transmission failures experienced in four (4) months all OH-13S aircraft were inspected for defective upper Transmission Case Bolts. In conjunction with this program all OH-13 aircraft recently transferred into the 1st Cavalry Division were processed through 15th Trans. Bn for a special 100% Technical Inspection. Defective or suspect bolts and several damaged transmissions were replaced. All aircraft were returned to service. Failure data & other results of inspection were forwarded to 34th General Support Group.

g. Inspection of UH-1 Stabilizer Bar Tube
P/N 204-011-328-1. Ref: Msg AVGF-MM GS-12-136. All UH-1 Aircraft were inspected for evidence of cracking in weld area. To date there have been no failures reported. This is a continuing inspection and all failure data will be forwarded by this office to 34th General Support Group.

h. Inspection for chafing oil lines UH-1C
aircraft. Ref: Message 34th General Support Group AVGF-MM GS-12-78-78

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dtd 16 Dec 1966. All UH-1C aircraft of 1966 production series in 1st Cavalry Division were inspected for chafing oil lines in the area of the valve & accumulator assembly. No defective installations noted.

1. Inspection of lift beams UH-1 aircraft. All UH-1 aircraft in Division were inspected for cracks in lift beams assemblies P/N 204-030-845 and P/N 205-030-845. Results of inspection revealed two (2) aircraft with cracked beams. Subject aircraft were routed to Support Maintenance and 34th Gen. Spt Gp (AM&S) was notified. EIR action was initiated. This is a continuing inspection and 34th General Support Group will be advised of any future failures.

4. Configuration Control

a. Compliance with MWC 55-1520-211-20/33 Cargo Door Support Bracket Installation (UH-1B aircraft). All UH-1B aircraft in 1st Cavalry Division were screened for compliance with subject MWC. Results of survey indicated compliance accomplished on one hundred two (102) aircraft out of one hundred thirteen (113) Total Strength. This information was furnished to 15th Trans Bn configuration Control and Division Aviation Safety Officer.

b. Compliance with MWC 55-1510-2-2-30/1 modification to install self-service fuel tanks (O-1 aircraft). Dated 23 Jun 66. In accordance with 58th Trans Bn Message Unclas AVGS-F-MN 7004-32 dtd 04-01002 Jan 67, all O-1 aircraft in 1st Cavalry Division were screened for compliance with Subject MWC. Results of survey indicated compliance accomplished on four (4) aircraft and one (1) not modified.

c. Compliance with MWC 55-1520-210-30/10 installation of Gravity Type Hydraulic System. All UH-1B aircraft in 1st Cavalry Division were screened for compliance with subject MWC. Results of survey indicated compliance accomplished on five (5) aircraft with one hundred twenty nine (129) kits on requisition for balance of the fleet. Requisitions were reconciled with 58th Transportation Bn.

d. Compliance with MWC 55-1520-211-20/10 modification of bleed air line, MWC 55-1520-211-20/21 addition of oil hose to transmission, and MWC 55-1520-211-20/23 replacement of Battery Sump Jar with vent tube assy (UH-1B aircraft). All UH-1B aircraft were screened with Subject MWC's Ref: Msg 58th Trans Bn (AM&C) AVCS-F-MN 12-124-66 dtd 22 Dec 66. Results of survey indicated partial compliance within the fleet. A number of kits have been distributed to affected units and are being applied as the aircraft become available during Scheduled Maintenance. The balance of kit requirements are on requisition. Status of requirements and modification program was furnished to 58th Trans Bn.

5. Armament Inspection of M-5 Armament Subsystems. Ref: Message 34th General Support Group AVGF-M GS-11-152 dtd 29 Nov 1966. All M-5 armament subsystems in 1st Cavalry Division were inspected for damage (Cracks) in saddle P/N 11014644. Inspection revealed one (1) subsystem with cracked saddle. Data still being compiled on subject item and complete information will be forwarded to 34th General Support Group and US Army WECCM when study is completed.

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6. Tools & Equipment. Special Tools for UH-1B/540 Rotor System (UH-1C). Ref: Message 34th General Support Group (AM&S) AVCS-MI GS-10-61 dtd 10 Oct 66. All organizational and direct Support Units in 1st Cavalry Division were screened for special tools requirements relative to maintenance of UH-1B/540 Rotor Systems. All required tools not on hand were requisitioned. Status of special Tool Requirements was forwarded to 34th General Support Group (AM&S).

7. Publications

a. Due to change in criteria and policy relative to processing and evacuation of crash damaged aircraft within the 1st Air Cavalry Division updating of existing procedures was deemed necessary. As a result 1st Cav Circulars 750-2 and 750-3 were revised and combined into 1st Cav Circular 750-3. Draft Copy of the New Circular was distributed to interested Staff Sections for comment and recommendations. The Circular was published 6 January 1967 and distribution to the Field was effected.

b. Upon receipt of USARV Regulation 711-2, stockage of aircraft Repair Parts dated 18 Nov 1966, it was noted that criteria relative to stockage of mission essential parts had been changed. As a result of this it was necessary that current division policy regarding same had to be updated. Change 1 to 1st Cav Circular 725-6 was drafted, published 23 December 1966, and distributed to the Field.

c. This office is currently reviewing division circulars and Regulations pertaining to Aircraft Maintenance to determine the requirement for updating of existing criteria. Directives currently under study and in the process of change or revision are 1st Cav Regulation 750-25, Subject Aircraft Maintenance and Supply, 1st Cav Circular 750-4, Subject: Aircraft Recovery Procedures, and 1st Cav Circular 750-1, Subject: Daily Aircraft Status Report. These Directives should be published and distributed in the near future.

8. Oil Analysis Program: Information was received in November that the spectrometric Laboratory in USARYIS would absorb the reciprocating engine requirements for aircraft in Vietnam effective 30 November 1966. All affected units in the Division screened Maintenance Records (OH-13 and O-1) and related data and compiled listings necessary for entry into the program. This office consolidated the information and forwarded to USARYIS Laboratory. Units were notified by Field Message from this headquarters to submit Oil Samples to USARYIS Laboratory.

9. Technical Assistance Program. The Technical Assistance Requirements for fiscal year 1968 as pertaining to the 1st Cavalry Division Program were screened, consolidated, and forwarded to USARV as requested by USARV Message AVCS-MI GS-10-134 dtd 29 Oct 66.

10. End of Reporting Statistics

a. Aircraft MSL by DSU (% Fill)

	Co A	Co B	Co C	Co D
Aircraft	55	67	74	52
Aircraft	69	61	78	70
Aircraft	54	54	77	80

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b. Average EDP (%) (1 Nov 66 Thru 29 Jan 67.)

CH-13 15

UH-1B 12

UH-1D 12

CH-47 25

All Aircraft 15

c. Average EDM (%) (1 Nov 66 Thru 29 Jan 67)

CH-13 19

UH-1B 15

UH-1D 17

CH-47 25

All Aircraft 19

d. Average Mission Ready (%) (1 Nov Thru 29 Jan 67)

CH-13 65

UH-1B 64

UH-1D 70

CH-47 44

All Aircraft 66

c. Construction and Facilities:

() Construction materials. Cement has continued in adequate supply for the MCA funded self-help program and for the O&M funded RMU and minor construction program. Cement is in relatively short supply for division projects such as the revetment program. Crushed rock for both base course and aggregate uses is in critically short supply. This was caused by the large quantities hauled to Casis during PAUL REVERE II and down-time of the rock crushers. The situation is improving slowly. 2" RW lumber is also critical. On several occasions there has been none on hand causing a halt in the troop billet program. Electrical wire and fixtures remain critical. The 70th Engineer Bn has requested electrical materials necessary for all MCA constructed buildings; none has been received yet. Mess Halls, picked-up by Post Engineer as real property, are being wired by P&E. Republic Steel Ground Mat has been tested and found to be suitable for revetment purposes. This has resulted in release of PSP for fortification and other operational requirements.

(b) Base Development. Adverse weather has had a detrimental effect on overall base development because of the inability to do site preparation work. The Taxiway at the An Khe Airfield was completed with a 2" double surface treatment. The existing ramp had the same surface, however, this would not stand-up to traffic and PSP

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43 had to be laid on top. The airfield runway surface design has been changed to concrete and the 444th Engr Det (Concrete), with a batch plant and slip-form paver is located at An Khe to perform the work. The method of issue of troop billets was changed from a pure priority basis to a total issue which would give every unit a new building every 10 days to two weeks as ready. More than 240 buildings have been issued. The 10000 barrel POL bladder has been installed. RMK-BMJ has arrived, has mobilized, and is ready to begin construction of the Central Power System. Primary distribution poles have been set by D Co, 40th Signal Bn. The ice plant is currently operating at 30 tons per day capacity. This plant is supplied water from its own well. USAF facilities at AKAAC, to include an ALCE building and passenger and cargo buildings for the aerial port have been approved and are reflected on the Base Development Plan. An Area has been selected for the 610th TC Co (AM&S). Movement of the ASTA Plt to the Golf Course has been approved and planning is underway for this move. Sites for the Main PX and for the PX airshelter warehouses have been selected. The underground DTOC is in use and the completion of the Command Building, by addition of a quonset, is underway. Work has started on the G2 - G3 building and on the BWQ. The use of 84 quonsets has been determined and issued have started.

(c) Pacific Architects and Engineers. Production of shower latrine units has continued and standard two-hole latrines are being built at a rapid rate. PA&E is constructing rifle racks for the division and 475 have been issued to date out of requirement of 1250. The work force at PA&E has increased to meet larger requirements. Larger power mowers are on hand to maintain the airfield areas. PA&E has acquired a capability for much heavier work than in the past and is continuously striving to improve its service to the division. The 86th Engr Det (Utilities) has been employed on several division projects. They erected the Golf Course Radar Tower and are presently erecting kennels for the 34th Scout Dog Platoon.

(6) Publications from 1 Nov 66 to 31 Jan 67:

1. Regulations published:

<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>
700-6	Ammunition Malfunctions
700-7	Available Supply Rate, Basic Load Resupply
735-1	Control and disposition of Equipment collected from casualties
55-3	Transportation and Travel
750-8	Command Maintenance Management Inspection

2. Circulars published:

<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>
735-2	Periodic Property Book Reconciliation
750-3	Crash Damage, Combat Loss and Salvage Aircraft
725-6	C/I Supply procedures for Aircraft and Associated Equipment

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6. (C) Civil Affairs

a. General. Civil Affairs efforts during the period were directed toward support of combat operations and to civic action in the TACR. (A Division policy was established stating the manner in which the 1st Air Cavalry Division would support the GVN's Revolutionary Development Program).

b. Support of Combat Operations

(1) Operation THAYER II

(a) Refugees. Most operations were conducted in the thinly populated areas where THAYER I actions had taken place in September. (Operation RECOVER was the only phase of the operation that significantly dealt with refugees during THAYER II. Its objective was to completely evacuate the Kim Son Valley over a five day period in order to make it a free fire zone). On 7 December 1966, CA Team 11, 41st Civil Affairs Company, attached to 3rd Brigade, established a refugee collection and screening point in the vicinity of LZ FONY. Simultaneously pamphlets and loudspeakers were used to inform the occupants of the valley that they had five days to evacuate it and of the route to follow to the collection and screening point. With assistance from hamlet and village chiefs and other district officials, the civil affairs team operated the collection point daily through 13 December 1966. Military Police and MI personnel screened refugees at the collection point with the assistance of the district police. One day of grace was given to insure complete evacuation of the valley. The 1,100 refugees who were generated on this operation were resettled in the secure area in the vicinity of Hoi An District Headquarters. Support from USAID was sufficient to adequately shelter and feed the influx of refugees. No significant problems were encountered during this operation.

(b) Civic Action.

1. Civic action conducted during THAYER II was primarily of the short duration, high impact type. Daily sick calls and emergency medical treatment, the hiring of an average of 100 laborers daily at LZ's HAM OAD, FONY and/or ENGLISH, and the rescuing of some 350 Vietnamese stranded by the December floods in Phu My, Phu Cat and Hoi An Districts were among the many activities conducted. English classes have been held regularly starting in Phu Cat near LZ HAMMOND in December, and in Hoi An near LZ FONY in January. One hundred eighty five tons of captured rice was evacuated for distribution to district headquarters in the THAYER II area of operation.

2. Capitalizing on the gains of Operation IRVING, the 1st Cavalry Division positioned the 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry in My Tho Village, principally to interdict the enemy infiltration route south into southern Phu My District. From late October until mid-December, with three rifle companies securing to the north, west and south and with the ocean on the east, C Company, 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry conducted a small-scale RD type operation of its own in the village proper. Local government was re-installed complete with village and hamlet chiefs, an intelligence chief and a police chief. Population and resource controls were implemented. Four dispensaries were established throughout the area with a Vietnamese nurse and a health worker to help perform medical treatment. 37,000

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patients were treated at sick calls during the period. A vietnamese launder and barber shop was established by the district chief to support the battalion. Joint organizational meetings were held daily with the local officials and battalion officers to plan and coordinate the RD activities. A Popular Force Platoon from Phu My District helped secure bridges and other key installations, accompanied U. S. troops on operations, and provided inspiration to the villagers and confidence in their government. Laborers were hired daily and were paid a standard wage out of the Assistance In Kind Fund, thus contributing to the local economy. VC families were relocated to a central area where their activities could be controlled. At least 70 Hoi Chan's rallied and later became extremely helpful as guides and informants in combat operations. A school house was renovated and commissioned with a teacher.

In mid-December tactical requirements caused the 2/8th Cavalry to leave My Tho Village in the control of one company. A civil affairs team was attached to this company and Civic Action continues, however at a much reduced scale.

(2) Operation PAUL REVERE IV.

(a) Refugees. Since the area of operations was not densely populated, refugee operations were not significant.

(b) Operation HELPING HAND

1. The principal civil affairs activity of Operation PAUL REVERE IV was known as Operation HELPING HAND. This was a joint operation conducted by the brigade S2, S5 and Thanh 'An District. The purposes of the operations were to gain GVN support and control of the villages, and to gather intelligence information.

2. The procedure used in the 54 hamlets visited was to "prep" the villages with psy ops leaflets and loud-speakers informing the people of the trust and concern of the GVN for them. This was followed by a visit to the hamlet by the district chief, S5, S 2 representative, a medical team and security provided by the security squads. The hamlet would be searched while the people were told of how the GVN and the 1st Cavalry Division could help them if they would pledge their allegiance to them. This help would consist of the privilege of flying a GVN flag, receiving periodic medical aid and the protection of the 1st Cavalry Division. The team would then depart to return in several days for the decision of the hamlet chief. When the hamlet chief pledged his loyalty to the GVN a flag was presented. The flag was used first to show defiance of the enemy and second as a signal to U.S. Forces of the security status of the hamlet. A fully raised flag indicated no trouble. A flag at half mast meant the VC had been there within the last 24 hours. No flag flying meant VC were present in the hamlet. In the latter two cases the 1st Cavalry Division pledged to react within 24 hours by coming to the aid of the hamlet. Forty-two flags were issued to as many hamlets of the 54 villages visited.

(c) Civic Action Statistics on Operation PAUL REVERE IV.

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Captured Rice re-distributed	12,500 pounds
Clothing issued	250 pounds
Salt packs issued	345 cch
Food distributed	10,450 pounds
Sick Calls held	178
Patients treated	5,000 plus

c. Camp Radcliff Civic Action Activities.

(1) Nature of operations. Civic action projects in the An Tuc District surrounding Camp Radcliff continue in both long term and short term, high impact projects. The district chief and the village and hamlet chiefs are taking a larger role in the selection, planning and accomplishment of civic action projects, and Vietnamese participation in the actual project work has significantly increased.

(2) Long Range Projects.

(a) Two 1 room schools completed with desks, blackboards and books in An Dan/Tan Tao.

(b) One fish pond completed in Cuu An.

(c) One playground constructed in An Dan/Tan Tao.

(d) Renovation of the An Tuc Dispensary Maternity Ward and Pharmacy has been completed.

(e) Dispensaries were constructed in Cuu An and Son Tan Villages.

(f) 205 English classes were conducted for 7,733 students.

(g) The Engineer Battalions have repaired bridges and roads in the district in order to improve communications with outlying hamlets.

(h) Twenty dwellings housing a total of 25 families have been jointly constructed, and 10 additional dwellings are under construction.

(i) Units are assisting local PF units in a self-help family housing improvement program. The 27th Maintenance Bn, is assisting the district in a housing project for 26 PF families at the district headquarters. Latrine facilities and electric lighting are included in the project plans.

(j) The Mountain Road Resettlement Village continues to be sponsored by the 1st Brigade. Significant progress is being made in developing the village into a self sufficient economic unit.

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(3) Short Range, High Impact Projects

(a) Public Health.

1. 37,262 patients have been treated at sick calls conducted by division medics. Most of these patients were treated in the 10 villages around Camp Radcliff during daily or weekly sick calls.

2. The 15th Medical Bn, continues to provide support to the An Tuc Dispensary. Three PF soldiers and 4 district health trainees have been receiving on-the-job training as hospital corpsmen.

3. Public Welfare. 19,486 pounds of foodstuffs, 3,470 pounds of clothing, and over 10,000 bars of soap have been distributed to needy families and war victims.

4. Economic Support. The Division has hired 107,212 laborers for brush clearing and base development activities during this period.

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SECTION II (c): Commander's Observations and Recommendations
Part I, Observations (Lessons Learned)

ITEM: Method of search in village operations.

DISCUSSION: In built up areas it has been found that the most efficient method of searching built up areas for enemy personnel and material is a slow, methodical investigation of huts, tunnels and surrounding areas, using proven searching techniques such as probing, dismantling, and "tunnel rat" searching.

OBSERVATION: Time must be allowed for in planning and in the execution phase to permit this type search in tactical operations.

ITEM: Difficulty of evacuating FCW's and detainees to rear interrogation areas.

DISCUSSION: During operations especially in built up areas where large numbers of FCW's and detainees are apprehended, difficulty has been experienced in moving these individuals from these areas due to lack of aircraft.

OBSERVATION: Aircraft should be available on call for the prompt evacuation of prisoners to obtain maximum intelligence value from them and transport them out of the battle area.

ITEM: Maintenance of flank security by maneuver units.

DISCUSSION: Flank security is absolutely essential in offensive operations. Not only does it provide early warning as an anti-ambush procedure, but assists in flanking an enemy force when contact is made and preventing the enemy from flanking the friendly unit.

OBSERVATION: Flank security must be maintained by all maneuver elements even though it may require slowing the forward movement of the main body of the unit.

ITEM: Utilization of indirect fires to recon areas forward or on the flanks of the march route.

DISCUSSION: Recon by indirect fires, especially in thick undergrowth, is an effective procedure to reduce the occurrence of ambush and human wave type enemy assaults. Not only does this technique inflict immediate casualties, but provides readily available concentrations in the event contact is made. It has the disadvantage of alerting the enemy of your movement.

OBSERVATION: Reconnaissance by fire should be considered, and when required, utilized by all maneuver elements.

ITEM: Rapid reaction Operations.

DISCUSSION: On at least one occasion an operation was launched against enemy forces with very little notice. The squadron was assigned the mission to find and fix the enemy. Reconnaissance was begun at once but before the situation could be fully developed, forces were air assaulted in. In this case, one element was assaulted in on top of the enemy, the unit was pinned down and the operation was delayed for some time until the situation could be brought under control.

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OBSERVATION: While the desirability of reacting quickly is recognized, a more deliberate development of the enemy location might have resulted in a more successful operation.

ITEM: Five gallon Cans, water and gas.

DISCUSSION: The basic design of these containers, screw cap for gas and hinged cap for water, is not in itself a deterrent to the desired separation of the two liquids. Gas being stored in water cans can be a cause for needless destruction of equipment and injuries to personnel, particularly around unit mess areas.

OBSERVATION: In unit mess areas, maintaining gas cans in a service area a minimum of 50 feet away. Paint the gas cap (or the complete can) a distinctive color (Red). Insure mess personnel maintain continuous supervision over KFs. Mess personnel should check contents prior to using.

ITEM: Stockage of forward POL and ammunition points.

DISCUSSION: The fluid situation found throughout the AO has dictated the establishment of forward POL and ammunition points. These points are located in secure areas such as Special Forces/CIDG Camps and ARVN units. Within available means and material, these points are stocked at a two day level in assorted munitions. When a known requirement exists a one day supply of Class III is moved into the area one day prior to date of intended use.

OBSERVATION: Pre-stockage of POL and ammunition in secure areas within the AO has provided the combat helicopters with reduced turn around time and longer staying time over the target area due to the closeness of the points to the area of operation. In addition, it has reduced the workload on the Forward Support Elements from a "crash" project to a normal resupply mission. At times when the forward refuel/rearm points will be needed for extended periods of time it is advisable to up the stockage to a four day level to offset conditions of closed roads and poor flying conditions.

ITEM: Joint use of forward POL and ammunition points.

DISCUSSION: Uncoordinated use of forward points by two or more units causes several undue hardships on the host unit. Supplies are reduced to an unacceptably low level or are depleted completely thereby reducing the combat effectiveness of the unit for which the point was established. High density of helicopters utilizing the point causes longer periods for turn around. Since most forward points are operated with minimum personnel the extra workload reduces their proficiency proportionately.

OBSERVATION: When known requirements exist for use of forward points by two or more units coordination among the units is a must. Methods can be worked out for providing the required additional personnel and equipment, supplies can be pre-stocked to provide for the added requirements, and arrangements can be made for resupply of those items of munitions that are allocated by ASR.

ITEM: Dust Palliation Program for Laterite Soils.

DISCUSSION: Initially, difficulty was experienced in applying peneprime as a dust palliative to the lateritic soil of the CAIS area. When applied without a cutback, the peneprime formed a thin crust on the surface which was easily removed by helicopter prop wash. Through trial and error, a

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satisfactory solution was arrived at and dust suppression operations were continued successfully throughout Operation PAUL REVERE IV. The method of penepriime application utilized consisted of two phases, a preparation phase and an application phase. The preparation phase lasts approximately three weeks and requires continual application over those areas where treatment is desired. During this phase, the penepriime/diesel ratio was gradually increased from 1:7 to 1:3. The continual application of increasing ratio of penepriime/diesel gradually fills the clay soil pores. The application phase consisted of applying a penepriime/diesel mixture with the ratio of 1:3 to 1:2 periodically to prepared areas. The application was repeated every 10 days to two weeks to maintain the dust free surface. However, daily touch up applications were applied when necessary to prevent major rehabilitation.

OBSERVATION: Penepriime is an effective dust palliative. However the method of application is dependent upon the soil type. Experimentation may be necessary before obtaining satisfactory results in different soil types.

ITEM: Mobile minefield barrier.

DISCUSSION: During Operation PAUL REVERE IV, Company B developed a standard minefield kit sufficient to lay a minefield with a 50 meter front and capable of being carried by a squad. (The heaviest single load is about 20 pounds). The kit is designed to reinforce company or platoon size defensive positions, reinforce night ambushes, and augment blocking tactics in an effort to canalize enemy movements. The field can be laid or recovered in 45 minutes with trained personnel and requires the following materials:

- 150 M-14 (AP) Blast Mines
- 6 Claymore Mines
- 6 Trip Flares
- 1 DR-8 Spool of Commo Wire (For fence)
- 18 Ammo Box Rods
- 10 Minefield Markers
- 3 8# Sledge Hammers

From enemy side to friendly side, the field consists of three strips of M14 mines, 1 strip of trip flares, and 1 strip of claymores. The friendly side and flanks are marked with the improvised fence.

OBSERVATION: The mobile minefield barrier kit could easily be utilized by infantry units to augment both defensive and offensive operations. This type minefield can be readily installed by non-engineer personnel with a minimum of training.

ITEM: Bridge Bypasses.

DISCUSSION: The construction of bridge bypasses on Route QL1 from its junction with Route 19 to ENGLISH proved to be an unsatisfactory replacement for adequate bridging during the monsoon season. During heavy rains, the bypasses usually were inundated or washed out by high water. If a bypass did hold, it likely was too soft to pass traffic. In several instances where bypasses were constructed upstream of existing low class bridges, the bypasses failed in locations that caused the released water to severely damage or destroy the abutments of the existing bridge. Bypasses that proved marginally adequate were constructed on the downstream side and were very low. Flood waters pass over these bypasses without causing excessive damage.

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OBSERVATION: Planning requirements for tactical operations during the monsoon should include adequate bridging to preclude the use of bypasses on essential roads. If bypasses are required, they should be constructed down stream of existing bridges or gaps in the road and should be low enough to preclude excessive damming of water during high water. A rock base and wearing surface is essential to sustain traffic.

ITEM: Airmobile Engineer Equipment Reliability.

DISCUSSION: The reliability of airmobile engineer equipment, particularly the TD-340 bulldozer is deteriorating rapidly. All 3414 loader/back hoers in the battalion have either been salvaged or are on long term deadline. This decrease in reliability and availability is attributed to excessive equipment hours and a lack of repair parts. In addition to decreasing the amount of engineer support the battalion is able to render, the unreliability of airmobile equipment places an additional requirement on the division's CH-47 and CH-54 aircraft for frequent backhaul and replacement of these items of equipment at forward LZ's.

OBSERVATION: The number of equipment hours expended by airmobile engineer equipment during tactical operations cannot be lessened. The repair parts shortage might possibly be alleviated by the purchase of parts through appropriate equipment distributors located in the Republic of Vietnam. Primary emphasis should be placed on obtaining new equipment to replace operational losses and wornout parts.

ITEM: Captured Field Wire.

DISCUSSION: There have been additional G2 reports indicating that the enemy is continuing to pick up field wire left behind by units.

OBSERVATION: Field wire must be picked up by the using unit prior to departing an area. If this is not feasible, it must be cut into unusable lengths.

ITEM: Excessive outages caused by broken wire lines in the vicinity of engineer construction areas.

DISCUSSION: Engineers are continually rehabilitating roads in the forward CP areas. The constant traffic of heavy equipment on the roads causes outages on wire lines that are laid on the surface or buried beneath roads.

OBSERVATION: Whenever possible wire should be routed overhead and marked with engineer tape instead of burying in the vicinity of roads. The only departure from this policy is the vicinity of helicopter pads where all wire must be buried to preclude the wires becoming entangled in the skids of helicopters.

ITEM: Wire communications lag during move of logistical base.

DISCUSSION: When a logistical base moves into the field there is a period of time when there is little or no telephone communications within the logistical base. This can be avoided if wire teams are dispatched to the new area to lay field wire, establish cable heads, trouble shoot all lines, and install one major switchboard prior to the move of the logistical base. Subsequently, when the logistical base moves into the area, telephones or switchboards can be connected to previously installed lines and communications will be almost immediately available throughout the base.

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OBSERVATION: Pre-wiring a proposed logistical base eliminates the wire communication lag normally experienced with the move of a logistical base.

ITEM: Low flying aircraft cause interference in VHF systems.

DISCUSSION: When VHF antennas are situated so that their direction of transmission is oriented across the path of low flying aircraft, the telephone and teletype traffic carried over the VHF experiences interference or interruption.

OBSERVATION: Personnel responsible for the operation of VHF should familiarize themselves with the traffic pattern of aircraft and establish VHF shots so that aircraft interference is minimized.

ITEM: Casualty Evacuation by Helicopter.

DISCUSSION: Many casualties are being evacuated with grenades and other explosives still attached to their person. The dangers of this practice are obvious.

OBSERVATION: Grenades or other explosives should be removed from the casualty prior to loading aboard an aircraft.

ITEM: Utilizing CH47 aircraft in the assault.

DISCUSSION: CH47 aircraft have been utilized very successfully on a number of occasions for lift of infantry. The CH47 usually can carry 33 troops or the equivalent of 5 UH1D's.

OBSERVATION: CH47 aircraft may be used for infantry troop lift only to secured LZ's. When planning to use CH47 aircraft i.e. that their primary role is to lift artillery and resupply; consequently, first consideration should be given to logistic and artillery moves.

ITEM: Naming of LZ's.

DISCUSSION: This division has operated out of the same LZ's for a considerable period of time. Some LZ's, not used daily, have been assaulted many times. The name of the LZ's are transmitted in the clear over the radio and have undoubtedly been compromised by the enemy.

OBSERVATION: LZ's should be renamed periodically for security of future plans and operations.

ITEM: Control Frequency at LZ's.

DISCUSSION: Aviation units have experienced many instances where initial radio contact cannot be established between flight leaders and units to be supported. The initial contact must be established to insure security of the PZ/LZ and to finalize coordination. Supported units must provide an accurate contact frequency.

OBSERVATION: The initial contact is essential to the operation. Missions must be aborted if security of the LZ/PZ is questionable and contact cannot be established.

ITEM: Changing Allowable Cargo Loads.

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DISCUSSION: In various geographical areas of operation, the operating and density altitude computation combined with difficult landing or pickup zone may result in a reduction of allowable cargo load. (ACL).

OBSERVATION: The tactical plan should be coordinated with the aviation support commander for consideration of loads.

ITEM: Alternate Landing Zones.

DISCUSSION: On some occasions landing zones are not pre-selected for a combat assault. The mission may be of such a nature that time is not available for reconnaissance. The final selection on an LZ must still be done jointly by the flight leader and troop commander.

OBSERVATION: The tactical plan in this event should be flexible enough to assault an alternate LZ in the event a particular LZ cannot be used due to visibility restriction, anti-helicopter obstacles or hostile fire.

ITEM: Use of Trip Flares to Illuminate LZ's.

DISCUSSION: A small infantry element not equipped for lighting the LZ attempted to aid an approaching helicopter by setting off trip flares. The resulting bright light temporarily blinded the pilots.

OBSERVATION: Ground units should be cautioned against using other than approached lighting systems for night operations. All Units should carry the minimum required lights for a "T".

ITEM: "Lightning Bug."

DISCUSSION: The "Lightning Bug" (a cluster of landing lights) has been used for night surveillance missions. The aircraft must be flown low and slow (300'-500') for effective illumination of the ground. When a target is picked up it is difficult to keep the beam on target. The light shines in the eyes of the gunship pilots in turns, and the light ship is vulnerable to small arms fire.

OBSERVATION: The "Lightning Bug" is not practical for aerial surveillance. MK 24 Flares provide more light over a much larger area and can be dropped over the same point for continuous illumination.

ITEM: Enemy Electronic Warfare

DISCUSSION: While conducting a night mission on the Cambodian border, the Pleiku nondirectional frequency was tuned on the ADF receiver. A steady indication of the tracking needle pointed west.

OBSERVATION: The enemy is conducting EW operations and may have an elaborate program. Aviators should exercise caution and any obvious wrong direction information should be disregarded.

ITEM: MTOE, Aviation Group.

DISCUSSION: Aircraft in the aviation group cannot lift two infantry battalions simultaneously due to decreased allowable cargo load of the UH1D helicopter. High density altitudes, extra crew members, armament and armored protective equipment reduces ACL from 9 to 6 personnel.

OBSERVATION: An MTOE was submitted to correct the deficiency.

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AVDnCG
SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned

15 February 1967

ITEM: Assault of Infantry at Night.

DISCUSSION: A successful night combat assault was conducted on 16 Dec 66, by elements of the 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry, in the Suoi C. Valley. A Pathfinder team dropped by parachute to mark the LZ and set up the visual glide slope indicator. There were no preparatory fires in the LZ because maximum surprise was desired. Lift aircraft departed the FZ at 2055 hours and the entire lift was successfully completed at 2112 hours.

OBSERVATION: Successful night operations are feasible. Certain problems are inherent in night operation which can be overcome by thorough, detailed planning. Generally, higher weather minimums are required, navigation is more difficult, and aviators must be proficient in night and instrument flying. The keynote is planning.

ITEM: Dispensing CS from aircraft.

DISCUSSION: Dispensing of CS powder has become a common type mission for aviation units. On one mission a CS dispenser blew a gasket shooting CS powder throughout the aircraft. Fortunately, one of the aviators was wearing a protective mask and controlled the aircraft however, the aircraft was contaminated for up to 5 days.

OBSERVATION: On missions of this nature, one aviator must wear a protective mask in the event CS powder does inadvertently escape into the aircraft.

ITEM: Improved Weather Service.

DISCUSSION: Weather service to the division has significantly improved during the quarter. The division forward weather detachment is collocated with the 11th Aviation Group permitting the combining of resources. Weather data of the operational area is now provided by Pathfinders in addition to regular brigade observation teams, GCA units and pilot reports. An improved communication system has also been installed including air to ground communication of FM radio. Twenty-four hours service to LZ Hammond is now provided to all division units.

OBSERVATION: Microscopic weather data of the area of operations is a constant requirement for airmobile operations.

ITEM: Preparation of fast reaction leaflets.

DISCUSSION: Preparation of special leaflets within a limited time period to exploit a given set of circumstances is ordinarily hampered by certain uncontrolled and unpredictable variables. Some of these variables are photography, reproduction of leaflets, air and ground transportation of leaflets to the division, and subsequent dissemination of the leaflets in the target area. The problem is complicated by the distance between the requesting unit and the agency responsible for preparing the leaflets.

OBSERVATION: According to ralliers and POWs, fast reaction leaflets, which exploit contacts and current conditions, are one of the most effective propaganda devices at our disposal. Until support improves to give us a true fast reaction capability, our psyops program will fall short of its potential.

ITEM: Med Evac Support.

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15 February 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned

DISCUSSION: On several occasions med evac aircraft were requested at night or during times of poor visibility when no emergency existed.

OBSERVATION: A unit requiring medical evacuation support should first coordinate with its own medical personnel. Based on information describing the nature of the wound or illness, medical personnel should recommend when the evacuation should be made.

ITEM: Fire support during Engagements.

DISCUSSION: In situations of heavy contact, friendly casualties are lessened and enemy casualties are heaviest when artillery and mortar fires are employed in close coordination with the fire and maneuver of the infantry. Upon establishment of contact, indirect fire must be initiated to prevent the enemy from breaking contact. The infantry maneuver plan should be executed under the cover of indirect fire. This continuous fire support is necessary to prevent the VC neutralizing the fire support by getting in close proximity of friendly elements. Continuous fire support does not replace maneuver of the infantry, but makes successful maneuver possible.

OBSERVATION: Indirect firepower provides the decisive difference between the F.M.F and the VC.

ITEM: Simplified control of artillery fires during encirclement.

DISCUSSION: The following system provides a means of control for fire and maneuver during encirclement.

Through the point of contact draw a North-South and an East-West line establishing 4 control quadrants. Draw a circle with a radius of 1000 mil around the point of contact and label the quadrants A,B,C,D in a clockwise direction starting with the North-east quadrant.

OBSERVATION: This system provides the commander with a means of easily shifting his supporting fires and positioning his troops for maximum control and safety during encirclement and gives all elements a common reference system without extensive prior coordination.

ITEM: Safety in firing direct fire defensive targets of H&I fire.

DISCUSSION: In December while firing direct fire defensive concentrations one man was injured by a round that exploded before it entered the tree line a safe distance away. When sighting down the bore of the tube during the subsequent investigation, small twigs of brush and bamboo were visible. Although not proven conclusively, it is probable that these twigs triggered the fuze action.

OBSERVATION: Artillery in a direct fire roll must be fired clear of all obstructions.

ITEM: Harassment and Interdiction program can be supplemented with additional combat support.

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DISCUSSION: In order to maximize the surprise and effect of combined fire power a combined operation using 105, 155, ARA and RCA elements was conducted near the RVN/Cambodian border. A frequently used crossing site was developed by intelligence sources. This area and possible marshalling areas were plotted. After dark the area was pinpointed by artillery illumination and artillery was adjusted onto the crossing site and suspect marshalling areas. RCA was expended in other areas considered suspect and artillery was adjusted into these areas. ARA remained on station searching for targets of opportunity and to interdict routes of travel. The entire operation was completed in 40 minutes firing 380 artillery rounds and 74 ARA rockets.

OBSERVATION: Reconnaissance by CS and fire is effective for interdiction fires.

ITEM: Intelligence sources to be exploited for use in artillery H&I planning.

DISCUSSION: In an area of operations there are many sources of intelligence that can furnish information for planning H&I programs. By establishing liaison directly with the district headquarters and special forces camps, timely intelligence in the form of agent reports can be used in planning artillery fires.

OBSERVATION: It is to establish direct liaison with intelligence sources in an area of operations in order to have current data for fire planning purposes. This liaison should include, as a minimum, daily liaison visits and a communication procedure for each element to contact the other element.

ITEM: Throughout the period that units participated in Operation Thunder II, reconnaissance by fire was extensively used by both forward observers and battalion liaison officers. This manner of fire support was continually requested by the supported infantry and aggressively executed by the artillery.

DISCUSSION: The forward observer has a variety of uses for reconnaissance by fire. He uses it to search out areas which he will be unable to sweep through or search out. These areas may be very close to his position and are likely or suspect locations for enemy troops and installations. This method of fire is used to cover the sound of friendly troop movements through an area or to orient the forward observer in particularly dense jungle. One excellent use is to deceive the enemy as to the direction of friendly movement. The forward observer may employ it in the latter case as a creeping fire toward himself to give the indication that he is in another location. Reconnaissance by fire is often an effective way to deal with snipers in unknown locations. Such fire may be used as a point to shift from in order to obtain fast effective fire on a contact of undetermined size. During rest periods the forward observer can fire into likely avenues of approach in the vicinity of his location and establish an effective blocking wall.

The liaison officer uses reconnaissance by fire on suspect locations spotted within his area of operation while on aerial flights in the command ship. Quite often suspect targets are spotted during over flights of an area and the rapid employment of this type of fire support may help determine in the particular area is a lucrative one for employment of an airmobile force. It can also be used when an air assault into an area is impractical, yet reconnaissance is desired due to the nature of the suspect location. This type of

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fire can readily be used to mask or disguise an impending landing zone by firing several missions in close proximity of the selected area and then using the replot data of one mission to pin-point the landing zone and serve as a shifting point for subsequent bombardments.

OBSERVATION: Reconnaissance by fire is an extremely valuable means of fire support.

ITEM: Security of artillery position areas.

DISCUSSION: Artillery positions in low areas require additional security measures. One infantry company and at least one artillery battery within supporting range are the minimum security necessary. The artillery battery should take the following measures to improve their defensive capability:

- a. Assign each howitzer section a direct fire sector coordinated with the infantry defensive plan.
- b. Adjust defensive targets around the position area from all artillery batteries within range.
- c. Adjust indirect fire targets to include charge 1 time fuze targets.
- d. Construct bunkers for each section and communication trenches between each howitzer section.
- e. Have preplanned rallying points in case of loss of position.
- f. Have ammunition prepared with fuze and charges cut to provide immediate return fire.
- g. Have M453 Beehive ammunition prepared and insure all personnel are aware of its effects.

OBSERVATION: Analysis of the attack on LZ Bird on 27 December 1966 indicates that these measures are necessary to protect an artillery position area from determined attack.

ITEM: CH-47A Ground-handling.

DISCUSSION: At times it is impossible to back or push the CH-47A. This unit does not have a tow bar or a towing strap to pull the aircraft forward.

OBSERVATION: By utilizing five (5) eleven (11) foot nylon straps, two (2) large clevis and four (4) large link assemblies, a towing strap can be assembled. (See Inclosure 1)

ITEM: CH-47A Maintenance.

DISCUSSION: An increasing number of vertical pins on the rotor heads have been found frozen to the blade socket. Normal methods of pin removal are inadequate. The 3/4 inch breaker bars currently in use are being bent and broken. The three (3) to one (1) monkey wrenches, as outlined in Operational Report on Lessons Learned, 22 November 1966, has helped in most cases however, some pins remain frozen, resulting in tools being damaged or broken and time lost.

OBSERVATION: The pin can be extracted by applying pressure to the bottom of the pin and forcing it upward. A device consisting of an expended 105 mm round, a fifteen (15) pound brass drift, two (2) vertical pin nuts, and a brass rod 1/2-inch in diameter by one foot long (see Incls 2 & 3) can be used to apply the necessary pressure.

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By using this device and applying a steady pounding action, even the most difficult pins will become unseated and can be extracted with a minimum of time and effort.

ITEM: Issue of GVN Flags to loyal secure hamlets.

DISCUSSION: In order to build "national ego", a defiance of the enemy and to establish a means of communication, GVN Flags can be erected in secure hamlets or hamlets within secure areas.

OBSERVATION: The security of the hamlet selected to receive a GVN Flag should meet the MACV Six Point criteria in order that its people can conduct effective armed resistance to defend their flag. The flag also can be used as a distress signal by flying it at half mast if the enemy has visited the hamlet and lowering it completely when the enemy is in the hamlet. U. S. Forces operating in the vicinity of these hamlets should arrange to provide a plan to assist hamlets which signal a distress situation. Flags can be fabricated locally and presented to district officials who should be encouraged to present these flags in appropriate ceremonies. Flags should be presented with an agreement for the hamlet to support the GVN and defend the flag.

ITEM: Long Range Civic Action Projects in forward areas.

DISCUSSION: Long range civic action projects that are not completed due to the departure of the conducting unit is a hindrance to Civil Affairs goals and should be avoided.

OBSERVATION: Units operating outside their TACR's or in areas that they do not permanently occupy should embark only on civic action projects that they know can be completed prior to their departure.

ITEM: Acceptability of Non-indigenous foodstuffs.

DISCUSSION: Some difficulty has been experienced in the past in obtaining satisfactory usage of non-indigenous foodstuffs by refugees. Civil Affairs Team 6, working with 1st Brigade, reports that foodstuffs such as bulgur, concentrated soup, gravy mix and dehydrated milk are highly acceptable to refugees if someone will demonstrate how to prepare these items.

OBSERVATION: Demonstrating the proper preparation of non-indigenous foodstuffs will increase the acceptability of these items to refugees. If time is not available for demonstration, translation of the preparation instructions into practical Vietnamese may be a satisfactory alternative.

ITEM: Distribution of captured VC and NVA clothing and cooking equipment.

DISCUSSION: Some items of captured VC and NVA clothing and cooking utensils were distributed to newly resettled Montagnards who badly needed the items. It was later learned that they refused to keep any of these items for fear of future reprisals by the VC, and disposed of the items by selling and by tearing the clothing for use as rags.

OBSERVATION: Captured identifiable items should not be given to persons in outlying resettlement areas. They may be utilized for distribution to Hoi Chanh and displaced persons who are to be located in controlled internal secure areas.

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15 February 1967


SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned

PART II: Recommendations

NONE

Incls

1. Table of Contents
2. Brigade Combat Concept
3. Task Org
4. Avn Data
5. Spt Forces
6. Visitors
7. 1st Cav Div (AM) Org Structure
8. Psychological Operations


JOHN NORTON
for Major General, USA
Commanding

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AVFA-GC-OT (15 Feb 67) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 January 1967 (U)

HEADQUARTERS, I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM, APO 96350

17 MAR 1967

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, APO 96307

1. (U) Concur with the contents of the Operational Report of Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967 of 1st Cavalry Division (AM), with the following exceptions and comments.

2. (C) Reference Section I - Significant Unit Activities.

a. Reference paragraph 4d (a): Psychological operations in Binh Dinh Province accounted for 1972 returnees during the reporting period; the highest returnee rate in RVN to date. Air assets and the support of 245th Psyops Company were not reduced; on the contrary, better scheduling techniques increased aircraft availability. Weather was a significant factor from 19 December 1966 through 19 January 1967, inasmuch as 63 percent of scheduled missions were cancelled because of inclement weather.

b. Reference paragraph 4d (c): JUSPAO policy guidance is written and does not require a field representative to interpret it. Psychological operations conducted by tactical organizations are not dependent upon the support of agencies outside the military structure. It is inconceivable that the loss of a JUSPAO representative could hinder this effort or cause cancellation of any projects within the purview of a combat organization.

c. Reference paragraph 4d (g) 1: The allocation of leaflets to brigade size organizations enhanced rather than inhibited planning. In no way does it detract from a qualitative psyop program, but does provide all organizations in II CTZ equal psyop support.

d. Reference paragraph 4d (g) 2: Leaflet quality was hindered because of a shortage of developer, however, leaflets produced during the reporting period were of better quality than the previous quarter. Improved techniques were used to produce higher quality leaflets. The comment as to the quality of leaflets is apparently opinionated and is not supported by the response of PW's and returnees, who indicated that the sketches were meaningful.

e. Reference paragraph 4d (g) 3: 245th Psyop Company is authorized only four loudspeaker teams by TOE. The unit is presently supporting seven US units with loudspeaker teams, and will have an eighth team in the field by mid-March. The brigade in the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) TAGR has the lowest priority for a loudspeaker team, but will receive the eighth team when it becomes operational.

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AVFA-GC-OT (15 Feb 67)

17 MAR 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 31 January 1967 (U)

f. Reference paragraph 4d (g)4: Loudspeaker teams are composed of two members. The TOE does not authorize an officer for the team, but all teams from the 245th Psyop Company in order to provide better assistance to the supported brigade have an officer attached. In several instances the brigades do not have psyop officers designated. The speaker teams are not expected or required to function in intelligence or command and control roles. These functions are rightfully the responsibility of supported organizations.

g. Reference paragraph 4d (g)5: The best available psyop quick reaction intelligence is at division and brigade level, and should be the basis of a viable tactical psyop program. The resumes prepared by 245th Psyops Company are general in nature by design, since they are used throughout II CTZ and are structured to be informative.

h. Reference paragraph 4d (g)6: Maintenance of the three 1000w loudspeaker sets organic to the division is the responsibility of the units to which they are assigned. Three additional sets were programmed for issue in early 1967, but the sets have not yet arrived in-country.

i. Reference paragraph 4d (g)7: Weather aborts were high for psyop aircraft during the monsoon from November to mid-January.

j. Reference paragraph 4d (g)8: Requests for C-47 night aerial loudspeaker missions were not submitted during the reporting period in spite of recommendations from this headquarters to do so.

k. Reference paragraph 4d (h): While this statement is generally correct, maximum advantage is not being taken to existing assets.

3. (C) Reference Section II, Part I - Observations.

a. Reference page 47, Item #1: 1st Cavalry Division (AM) has been directed to forward a list of critical parts to 1st Logistical Command for appropriate action.

b. Reference page 53, Item #2: The organization was instructed to submit requisition for a towbar through appropriate supply channels on 7 March 1967.

c. Reference page 53, Item #3: The organization was advised to

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17 MAR 1967


AVFA-GC-OT (15 Feb 67)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 31 January 1967 (U)

submit an urgent action equipment improvement recommendation (EIR) to
USARVCOM citing problems experienced to date.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

8 Incls
nc


CHARLES L. JOHNSON
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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AVHGC-DST (25 Feb 67) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 January 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307 11 MAY 1967

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report--Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 January 1967 from Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) as indorsed.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

a. (C) Reference Paragraph 4f(5)(a), Page 29, concerning inadequate quantities of APERS ammunition (Beehive): This headquarters allocates Beehive ammunition to Field Forces, SOKAFV, and other specified units on a tube density basis. Because of limited production and the small quantities being received in-country, 1st Logistical Command maintains only a small amount in depot stocks, to replace expenditures. USARV is receiving over fifty percent of all Beehive ammunition produced. Information from the US Army Ammunition Procurement and Supply Agency indicates that, with the exception of 106mm, operational quantities of Beehive ammunition will not be available before CY 68. USARV will receive operational quantities of 106mm Beehive ammunition during 1st Quarter, FY 68.


b. (C) Reference Paragraph 4f(5)(b), Page 30, concerning Rice Contaminant (C): A requirement was established for the contaminant on 16 October 1965; however, employment has not been authorized by JCS.

c. (U) Reference Paragraph 4f(5)(c), Page 30, concerning heavy duty chain saws: An urgent evaluation requirement for 252 eighteen-inch and 114 thirty-inch heavy duty, carbide, rope start, self-oiling, chain power saws was established under ENSURE procedures on 11 April 1967.

d. (C) Reference Item on aviation group MTOE, Page 49: The MTOE was received at this headquarters on 11 December 1966. Because of the personnel strength increase reflected in the MTOE, OSD Program 4, and the DA moratorium on MTOE, the date when the MTOE will be forwarded to higher headquarters cannot be forecast at this time.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
nc


E. L. KENNEDY
CPT, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

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DOD ONLY

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GPOP-OT (25 Feb 67) 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 January 1967 (U) - Hq 1st Cav Div (AM)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 28 MAY 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in the basic report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


G. R. RCHLEY
CPT, AGC
Asst AG


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REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN
SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED
INCLOSURE(S) _____

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ATTACHED TO TOWING VEHICLE



ATTACH TO TIE DOWN RING ON FORWARD LANDING GEAR

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INCL #1

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
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CUT AWAY
VIEW
VERTICAL
PIN
SLAPPER

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INCL #2

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BRIGADE COMBAT CONCEPT

1. During past operations brigade elements searched assigned sectors by the air/ground movement of troops from one point to the next, attempting to find, fix, and destroy all enemy forces located therein. The current concept for search and destroy operations foregoes the direct search in favor of adopting a posture which will encourage the enemy "to come to us". In simplest terms, this is the basis for any claim that "new" tactics are now being employed. This shift in emphasis is a reflection, first, of our inability, demonstrated repeatedly in past operations, to seek out, pin down, and destroy enemy forces which were not already inclined to give battle for reasons of their own. Second, Brigade and supporting elements now have sufficient experience in the FIMB area of operations as to warrant some familiarity with both the terrain and the enemy's habits relative to that terrain. We cannot, of course, predict the enemy's exact response to our own initiatives, but at least we can, with some degree of confidence, focus on the options which history indicates will be most appealing to the enemy commander. It follows then that rather than committing the bulk of our forces to the chase of an elusive enemy through the jungle, a much more promising course of action is to preposition forces in proximity to known enemy haunts and locations and then to take actions likely to generate enemy movement toward these positions. This is the essence of the current concept of operations.

2. Implementation of this concept requires the distribution of a Brigade's total force to the accomplishment of four distinct but inter-related functions.

a. Battalion fire bases are sited to ensure 105mm Howitzer support throughout the most critical portions of a Brigade area of operations, i.e. those areas to which or through which the enemy is expected to move most frequently. In addition to the artillery battery(ies), usually a Battalion's CF, and invariably a rifle company minus not more than one of its platoons, will occupy these positions.

b. Ambushes, usually of platoon strength and positioned within supporting artillery range in accordance with the best intelligence available, normally receive a commitment of two of a battalion's four companies. Maximum deceptive measures are employed to cloak the positioning of these forces, and, once positioned, to supply and avert friendly contact with these ambushing units is limited to emergencies only.

c. Long-range patrols, fire-team in size, are dispersed to overwatch the principal enemy locations, directed to report all enemy activity, and to call for and adjust supporting artillery fires on suitable targets. These trail-watching teams are enjoined from initiating close combat except in the strong likelihood of obtaining a prisoner. Although the total number of personnel committed to this function varies according to the intelligence available, this figure will rarely exceed a platoon's strength per battalion.

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d. "Stirring Forces"--troops, aircraft, and artillery fires--are employed to generate the enemy movement which is essential to the success of this concept. As a norm, one rifle company per battalion has this as a primary mission, complementing it during the hours of darkness by occupying ambushes and/or by reinforcing the defenses of the battalion fire base. Conversely, elements with a primary commitment to fire base defense will develop from these positions during daylight in order to contribute to the "stirring" actions. A most important contributor to this same action is a brigade's support air cavalry troop. Its aerial fires and the successive air assaults of its rifle platoon are designed as much for the demonstration of force as for its application. Carefully planned artillery fires are delivered on a 24-hour basis, with concentrations plotted not merely to induce enemy movement but, hopefully, to encourage it in directions favorable to friendly ambushes.

3. Two other factors are also indispensable to the concept described above, neither of which has been as common to past operations as is hoped for the future. First is an aggressive combat posture during hours of darkness. Since enemy movement, particularly of major units, is most often undertaken at night, it is obvious that friendly dispositions and actions must respond accordingly. The second of these factors is patience. Critical to all operational concepts, it takes on added dimension with this one. A high proportion of a brigade's maneuver elements are committed to static trail-watching and ambush positions, with the very distinct possibility that they will not have enemy contact over an extended period. However, movement per se must not be equated with effective combat action, and it must be recognized that the lack of enemy sightings in particular areas can contribute significantly to the overall intelligence picture. Given time, and an imaginative application of the forces enumerated above, contact will occur if the enemy is in a Brigade's area of operations.

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INDEX 1

1. Two vertical pin retaining nuts welded together as shown.
2. A 105 MM shell casing (steel) cut as shown.
3. One (1) inch thick phenolic cut $2 \frac{3}{8}$ inch in diameter and a $1 \frac{1}{4}$ inch hole through the center.
4. 10-32 screws to hold the retainer nuts to the top of the shell casing, 4 each.
5. Center bar of the Vertical Pin Puller.
6. Lower centering device with the diameter ground down to fit through the retaining nuts.
7. Retaining nut for the pin puller.
8. Fitch bearing housing.
9. Vertical pin installed.
10. Hollow bronze (or brass) slapper, approx. 10 lbs.
11. Slapper handle.
12. Slots cut through 105 mm shell to allow up and down movement.
13. Additional metal welded on the shell casing to beef up the lower handle slots.
14. $1 \frac{1}{4}$ inches.
15. $2 \frac{3}{8}$ inches.

Incl 3

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TASK ORGANIZATION FOR MAJOR OPERATIONS

OPERATION:

BYRD (26 AUG 66 - CONTINUING)

TF 2/7

- 2/7
- C 1/9
- C (-) 8th Engr
- A 1/21 Arty
- C (-) 2/20 Arty (ARs)
- Det 228 Avn Bn
- Tm 3 (-) 13th Sig
- Tm 3 IIW/CI Det 191 MI
- 3d Bde CA Det
- 3d FSE

PAUL REVERE IV (29 OCT - 27 DEC 66)

2d BRIGADE

- 1/5
- 2/5
- 2/12
- B 1/9
- 1/77 Arty
- C 1/30 Arty
- C 3/8 Arty
- 227 Avn Bn
- B 8th Engr
- Plat (-) 545 MP
- Tm 2 13th Sig
- Tm 2 IIW/CI Det 191 MI
- Tm 2 371 RRC
- Tm 5th Weather Squadron
- Section 25th Scout Det, Flat
- 2d FSE
- Water Pt 8th Engr
- Tm 41 CA Co

THAYER II (25 OCT 66 - CONTINUING)

1st BRIGADE

- 1/8
- 1/12
- 5/7
- 2/19 Arty (-) DS
- D 2/17 Arty atch 2/19 Arty
- C 1/21 Arty atch 2/19 Arty
- A 3/18 Arty GJR 2/19 Arty
- C 8th Engr Bn
- Plat (-) 545 MP

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THAYIR II Continued

1st BRIGADE

- 25th Scout Dog Flat
- Tm 1 13th sig
- Tm 1 IFW/CI Det 191 MI
- Tm 5th Weather Squadron
- Tm 41st CA Co

2d BRIGADE

- 2/5
- 1/5 (-)
- 1/7 (-)
- 2/12
- 1/77 Arty (-) DS
- B 1/8 Arty
- A 1/21 Arty
- B (-) 8th Engr
- C 1/30 arty Reinf 1/77 arty
- B (-) 8th Engr
- Sqd Secty Dogs
- Tm 2 13th sig
- Tm 2 IFW/CI Det 191 MI
- Tm 5th Weather Squadron

3d BRIGADE

- 2/8
- C 1/5
- 1/21 arty (-) DS
- 2/17 arty Reinf
- C 6/16 Arty GSR
- C 2/19 Arty Reinf 1/21 arty
- C 8th Engr
- 229 Avn Bn
- Plat (-) 545 MP
- Sec 25th Scout Dog Flat
- Tm 3 13th sig
- Tm 3 IFW/CI Det 191 MI
- Tm 3 371 RRC Co
- Tm 5th Weather Squadron
- Tm 11 41st CA Co

3/25th INF DIV

- 1/14 Inf
- 1/35 Inf
- 2/9 Arty (-) DS
- A 1/77 arty atch
- 5 5/16 Arty atch 2/9 arty
- Plat C Trp 3/4 Cav

DIVISION ARTILLERY

- 2/20 Arty (-) GS
- 7/13 Arty (-) GS
- Flat B/29th Arty (3L)
- Btry E/82 Arty
- 3/18 Arty (-) GS

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THAYER II Continued)

DIVISION TROOPS

- 1/9 Cav
- 8th Engr (-)
- 4th Avn Gp (-)
- 13th Sig Bn (-)
- 191st MI Det (-)
- 371st RRC Co (-)
- Det 31 5th Weather Squadron

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QUARTERLY REPORT
AVIATION

AVIATION OPERATIONS: During the reporting period division aircraft flew 76,885 hours and 188,621 sorties, moving 26,731 tons of cargo and 276,802 troops. In performing these missions, 200 aircraft were hit by hostile fire, 12 being shot down. Of those shot down, 6 were repairable. During the entire period, 5 crew members were KIA and 39 WIA as a result of enemy action.

PART I

AIRCRAFT FLIGHT HOURS (MONTHLY)

November 1966	O-1	OV-1	CV-2	OH-13	UH-1B	UH-1D	CH-47	CH-54
11th Avn Gp	22	270	0	158	1,520	7,709	1,835	0
1/9th Cav Sqdn	0	0	0	2,075	2,517	1,105	0	0
Div Artillery	163	0	0	530	1,839	0	0	0
Sup Command	0	0	723	369	41	682	0	83
1st Brigade	0	0	0	418	0	341	0	0
2nd Brigade	0	0	0	693	0	348	0	0
3rd Brigade	0	0	0	447	0	528	0	0
DIVISION TOTALS	185	270	723	4,691	5,917	10,713	1,835	83

TOTAL FLYING HOURS - 24,417

CUMULATIVE - 24,417

December 1966	O-1	OV-1	CV-2	OH-13	UH-1B	UH-1D	CH-47	CH-54
11th Avn Gp	92	282	0	335	1,462	7,913	1,984	0
1/9th Cav Sqdn	0	0	0	2,518	2,869	1,022	0	0
Div Artillery	240	0	0	635	2,113	0	126	0
Sup Command	0	0	1,112	75	41	665	0	165
1st Brigade	0	0	0	581	0	424	0	0
2nd Brigade	0	0	0	662	0	539	0	0
3rd Brigade	0	0	0	454	0	330	0	0
DIVISION TOTALS	332	282	1,112	5,260	6,485	10,893	2,110	165

TOTAL FLYING HOURS - 26,639

CUMULATIVE - 51,056

January, 1967	O-1	OV-1	OH-13	UH-1B	UH-1D	CH-47	CH-54
11th Avn Gp	121	255	382	1,744	8,771	2,011	0
1/9th Cav Sqdn	0	0	1,974	2,856	1,103	0	0
Div Artillery	136	0	773	1,718	0	148	0
Sup Command	0	0	44	0	737	0	114
1st Brigade	0	0	551	0	435	0	0
2nd Brigade	0	0	649	0	321	0	0
3rd Brigade	0	0	519	0	377	0	0
DIVISION TOTALS	257	255	4,892	6,318	11,744	2,159	114

TOTAL FLYING HOURS - 25,829

CUMULATIVE - 76,886

PART II

MAJOR OPERATIONS
(NOV 1966 THRU JAN 1967)

OPERATION	DATES	HRS FLOWN	SORTIES FLOWN	TONS CARGO	PASSENGERS
Paul Revere IV	29 Oct- 27 Dec	16,780	46,875	4,519	54,239

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PART III

SUPPORT RENDERED
TO NON - US FORCES

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>UNIT SUPPORTED</u>	<u>CH-47 DAYS</u>	<u>UH-1 DAYS</u>	<u>CV-2 HOURS</u>	<u>CH-54 HOURS</u>
Nov 66	Support ARVN with 46 UH-1Ds	0	46	0	0.0
	Support ARVN 10 CH-47s	10	0	0	0.0
	Support CIDG 2 CH-47s	2	0	0	0.0
Dec 66	RCK DA Move	0	0	0	1.5
	ARVN	0	4	0	0.0
	RCK	1	1	0	0.0
	CIDG, 8 UH-1Ds	0	1	0	0.0
Jan 67	ARVN	2	132	0	0.0
	RCK	1	4	0	0.0
	CIDG	0	2	0	0.0
TOTALS		16	190	0	1.5

PART IV

SUPPORT RENDERED TO NON-DIVISIONAL UNITS

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>UNIT SUPPORTED</u>	<u>CH-47 DAYS</u>	<u>UH-1 DAYS</u>	<u>CV-2 HOURS</u>	<u>CH-54 HOURS</u>
Nov 66	Support 4th Inf with 24 UH-1Ds & 12 CH-47s	10	24	0	0.0
	Support USMC 1 CH-54, recovery of CH-46	0	0	0	3.8
Dec 66	Support III MAF 1 CH-54, Recovery of CH-46	0	0	0	3.6
Jan 67	101st Abn 1 CH-54	0	0	0	11.0
	USAF, 1 CH-54 Da Nang	0	0	0	5.0
	III MAF 1 CH-54	0	0	0	4.9
	540th at QN CV-2 Recovery	0	0	0	4.7
	3/25th Inf	4	0	0	0.0
	3/17th Arty	1	0	0	0.0
TOTALS		15	24	0	33.0

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PART V
SIGNIFICANT AVIATION OPERATIONS
PERFORMED BY ORGANIC AIRCRAFT

29 Oct - 27 Dec Operation "FAUL REVERE" PHASE IV

62 Infantry battalions airlifted
40 Artillery batteries airlifted

PART VI
MONTHLY AVIATION STATISTICS

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>FLYING HRS</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>TONS CARGO</u>	<u>PASSENGERS</u>
Nov 66	24,417	59,713	7,853	91,975
Dec 66	26,639	64,803	10,308	97,183
Jan 67	25,829	64,105	8,570	87,644
CUMULATIVE	76,885	188,621	26,731	276,802

PART VII
AIRCRAFT HIT DATA AND AVIATION CASUALTIES

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TOTAL HIT</u>	<u>SRR</u>	<u>SRN</u>	<u>SNR</u>	<u>DAG</u>	<u>DEG</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>
11th Avn Gp	68	2	0	0	0	0	0	7	0
1/9th Cav Sqdn	96	2	4	1	0	0	2	17	0
Div Artillery	13	0	0	1	0	0	3	4	0
Sup Command	13	1	0	0	0	0	0	9	0
1st Brigade	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2nd Brigade	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
3rd Brigade	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTALS	200	6	4	2	0	0	5	39	0

PART VIII
MONTHLY MISSION READY AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY

<u>TYPE AIRCRAFT:</u> <u>% AVAILABLE</u>	<u>OH-13</u>	<u>UH-1B/C</u>	<u>UH-1D</u>	<u>CH-47</u>	<u>CH-54</u>	<u>CV-2</u>	<u>OV-1</u>	<u>C-1</u>	<u>ACH-47</u>
IN; Nov 66	60	63	67	45	66	50	43	53	0
Dec 66	67	72	71	43	75	64	43	66	0
Jan 67	68	68	71	44	69	0	56	65	85
CUMULATIVE:	65%	68%	70%	44%	70%	57%	47%	61%	85%

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Supporting Forces

DAZZLEM - 1 Nov 66 - 31 Jan 67

Missions	146
Sorties	369
Bombs	386,500 lbs
Napalm	138,250 lbs
Rockets	282
B52 Missions	1
Sorties	9
Bombs	162 tons

PAUL REVERE IV - 25 Oct 66 - 24 Dec 66

Missions	222
Sorties	567
Bombs	397,000
Napalm	260,500
B52 Missions	2
Sorties	30

THAYER II - 25 Oct 66 - 31 Jan 67

Missions	1,106
Sorties	2,330
Bombs	3,172,710
Napalm	449,500
Rockets	1,377
B52 Missions	27
Sorties	140
Bombs	2,538 tons

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VISITORS

1 Nov 66	Gen Javarntausch (Ret)	Finish Author
	Adm David L McDonald	Chief Naval Cpns
	Dr T.W. McKnew	Chmn Bd Trustees Nat Geo Soc
	LTG Heinghes	
	V Adm I.J. Galantin	Chief of Naval Materiel
	Rear Adm G.S. Moore II	Deput Cndr for Sup Cpns, Naval Sup Systems
2 Nov 66	Col Bolton	Chief of Staff IPFV
4 Nov 66	LFG Stanley Larsen	CG, IPFV
	BG Brownfield	JUSPA
7 Nov 66	BG Frances L Sampson	Deputy Chief of Chaplains, O.
8 Nov 66	BG Boneff	
	LFG Stanley Larsen	Chief of Staff IIV
	Gen Westmoreland	CI, CV
9 Nov 66	Dr J.C. Jacobs	
	Fr R.J. Lanzer	
	Dr H.K. Hoak	
	Col . . atson	Dir of Plans, HQs USA Combat Development Command
	Maj Burner, Roth	USAFAC
	Maj Kastner	USAF Escort
	Cpt , attox	USAF IL
10 Nov 66	BG James A. Hebbeler	Dir CTF and Nuclear Ops, Office Asst Chief of Staff Force Develop
	BG F.F.K. Thompson (Ret)	Royal Arty, Mil Editor Corres London Daily Telegraph
11 Nov 66	LFG Stanley Larsen	CG, IPFV
	Col Moanh	CG for Dev Development
	LTC Loomis	Deputy or Advisor
	Col John E. Kidd	USAF, Deputy J-3, Ch. C.A.C
	Stuart Alsap	Host Magazine
12 Nov 66	Col Leo C. Brooks	USAF, Chief Doctrine and Analysis M.C.V, J-34
13 Nov 66	Maj Gen John C.P. Tillson	Asst Chief of Staff for Cpns, MACJ3

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VICTIMS

15 Nov 66	BG Augustus Hendry	Dep Chief, CV, USAF
16 Nov 66	Col Richard C. Catledge	Commander 3d Tac Ftr Bg, Bien Hoa
	Col George Hart	Commander 35th Tac Ftr Bg, Phu Phan
	Col Joe A. Holt	Commander 12th Tac Ftr Bg, Con Thien Bay
	LTC Sir Michael Carver	Head Army Commander Far East Land Forces-Commander in Charge Far East
	Mr Peter Wilkinson	British Ambassador to Vietnam
	Col J.M. Trinsley	Specialist to Gen Staff, USAF
17 Nov 66	Col Tufts	USAF
18 Nov 66	Amb Henry Cabot Lodge	
	Gen Westmoreland	CG, MACV
	Gen Larsen	
	Maj Gen Lew	USA
	LTC Bain	Advisor ROK
	B2 Lee	Advisor 11 Corps
	LTC Lin	75 II Corps
	Col Hieu	CG, 22 ARVN
	Cpt Ahoy	District Chief
21 Nov 66	Col Luther Jones	CG, 34th Gen Spt Group
	BG Choi	New ADC, ROK, CMI
	BG Lee	Old ADC, ROK, CMI
	BG Bernard Rogers	Asst Div Commander 1st Inf Div
22 Nov 66	BG Augustus Hendry	Dep Chief, CV, USAF
	Gen Westmoreland	CG, MACV
	LTC Stanley Larsen	CG, I RVN
23 Nov 66	Col Yount	USAF, Project Mgr for Inf
	Col Guidara	CG, 15th AF Gp
25 Nov 66	LTC Jolly	USAF
	Col Mascot	USAF, Wing Commander of the 6 CV-2 Squadrons in RVN
	Col Bullock	USAF, Dep Wing Commander

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VISITORS

25 Nov 66	LTC Dennis S. Wood	Asst British Military Attache
26 Nov 66	Bertha Ray	
4 Dec 66	LTG Sir John Wilton	Chmn Australian Conf
	LTG Pckay	COMFV
	Wing Cmdr J.S. Latham	
	Dr Maurice Rubli	Int Committee, Red Cross
	Gen Westmoreland	CG, I. CV
	Mr Johnson	De Havilland Aircraft Co
5 Dec 66	Gen S.L.A. Marshall (Ret)	
	Col David Hackworth	
6 Dec 66	Col Tutin	RVN - CMC from Dalat, U.S.
	Sen Henry W. Jackson	Dem. Wash. D.C., Senate Committee on Armed Services
	LTG Charles ...eyer	CG, Qui Non Opt Comd
	Gen Westmoreland	CG, I. CV
7 Dec 66	Sir John ... Davis	Nat Comdr of the American Legion
	Col Hunter	USA, Senior Advisor
	LTG Lee	Asst Dir to II Corps, USA
	Col Petrilli	USA, I. CV
	Harry ... Pack	Dir Marketing Vertical Division, Boeing Company
8 Dec 66	Dr ... Hurst	Research Scientist Aero Lab, Def Dept of Sup, Australia
9 Dec 66	Col Edgar C Wood	COMARC Liaison
	Col ...izza	
	Col Edward J. Beda	
	L. C. ... Rusey	
	LTC Phiel, William J	
	Maj Sousa, G-3 U.S. V	
13 Dec 66	LTG Wisler	CG, 1st Log Cndr
14 Dec 66	LTC Rodford Barry	
	John Steinbeck	Writer
15 Dec 66	LTG Larsen	CG, I. CV

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15 Dec 66	MG Lew	CG 2nd ARVN DIV
	Col William	US, Senior Advisor, 22nd AVN Div
17 Dec 66	Mr Leo Anderson	Nat Comdr American V-t Org
18 Dec 66	BG J.L. Chaisson	USC, Dir, 1st Av C Co (Desinate)
20 Dec 66	BG Lollis	CG, 1st Log Cntr
	Mr Vu	Vietnamese Local Official
	BG Beniff	
21 Dec 66	Col Mildred L. Clark	Chief of Army Nurse Corps, DA
23 Dec 66	MG Keith L. ...	Chief of Info Office, DA
24 Dec 66	Dr Billy Graham	Evangelist
25 Dec 66	Gen Westmoreland	CG, 1st Av
26 Dec 66	Bob Hope	
27 Dec 66	Cardinal Spellman	Military Vicar US Armed Forces
	Rep John C. Parsh Jr	Representative 7th District, Va
29 Dec 66	Gen Johnson	
	LTC William G. Sullivan	Chief Material Readiness Div 2-4, 1st Av
	Mr & Mrs Vu	
	Col Kovalevsky	ISPV G4
30 Dec 66	Col Henry P Greer	Senior Advisor, 22nd ARVN Div
	BG De Saussure	ISPV rtv Comdr
2 Jan 67	Conq Joseph Y. ...	0 m, New York
3 Jan 67	BG John L. Klingenhagen	USM Material Command
	BG J.L. Raymond	Dir of Construction, 1st Av
	LTC Dennis Hood	Br Embassy
	Lt Albert ...	USM Seal and ...
	Cpt Welsh	USM G3
5 Jan 67	Col Haiv	CG 22nd ARVN Div
6 Jan 67	LTC Larson	
	LTC Vinh Loc	II Corp CG
	BG Lee	CG, II Corps
	Col ...	CG 22nd ARVN Div

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6 Jan 67	Col Greer	1A, 22nd AB Div
	LtC Vance	Dinh Bien Prov Chief
8 Jan 67	1st Lt Byron L. Stoger	Chief Surgeon, Ho, 1st MHC
	SG James ...	Burg Co, USAF
	Col Charles ...	Office of Chief Surge, U.S. MAC
	1st Lt Noizel	USAF, Surg Off
9 Jan 67	LtC Troy	COMUSMACV Liaison Officer
10 Jan 67	Col Dick	C., 149th Av Gp
11 Jan 67	1st Lt Stanley W. Resor	Secretary of the Army
14 Jan 67	1st Lt Robert M. Williams	Director of Army Aviation
	1st Lt Larsen	
15 Jan 67	Col Jay Vanderpool	Old C-125 Cond
	Col Mc Bride	New C-125 Log Cond
	Col ...	
	1st Lt ... Brown	1st Lt ...
	1st Lt John ...	Chief of all Helicopter Co
16 Jan 67	1st Lt Leverage L. Allen	
	Cpt James E. Hancock	
17 Jan 67	1st Lt M.W. Nesbitt	Scientific Advisor to the Australian Army Military Board
	Col Edmond, USAF	Deputy MACV Chap
	Cdr Fairchild, USK	1st Lt NACV Chap
	LtC Koyana	
	LtC Renshur	
	Cpt Sheffield	
18 Jan 67	C-3 Alfred J. Rose	
	R.L. Chumley	15-14
	R.L. Adams	15-14
19 Jan 67	Col Frank J. Petrilli	1st, USRV
21 Jan 67	1st Lt Duke	CG, 1st Avn Bde
	1st Lt John A. Wright Jr.	Project Manager Aviation Requirements Combat Structure of the Army

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VISITORS

23 Jan 67	SGM Wickham	USARFAC
	SGM Ramsey	USARV
	SGM Keeler	IFFV
	Gen Maxwell D. Taylor	USA, Retired
	MG Floger	CG, Engr Cmd
24 Jan 67	Gen Dwight E. Beach	CINCPAC
25 Jan 67	Col M.D. Weeks	Com Sec Team, DA
	Maj G.A. Jarret	
26 Jan 67	BG Earl F. Cole	Dep Col, USARV
	Bishop W. Angie Smith	Chairman, Commission on Chaplains, Methodist Church
	MG Oren Huribut	USARFAC G4
27 Jan 67	BG Salve H. Matheson	CG (designate) 101st Airborne Div
28 Jan 67	BG Robert L. Terry	USARV Sig Off
29 Jan 67	LTC Dillard	Project Officer, AMC, CH-47
30 Jan 67	Col Braucher	937th Engr Gp Cmdr
31 Jan 67	Pro Football Players	
	Meredith	Dallas QB
	Wilson	St Louis HB
	Bass	LA HB
31 Jan 67	BG J. Hayes	Dir of Professional Services, Surgeon General's Office

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1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (AIRMOBILE) ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

1. Units listed below are organic, attached, or provide support to the division.

a. Organic

1st Brigade (Airborne)
2nd Brigade
3rd Brigade
1st Aviation Detachment (Provisional)
5th Cavalry, 1st Battalion
5th Cavalry, 2nd Battalion
7th Cavalry, 1st Battalion
7th Cavalry, 2nd Battalion
7th Cavalry, 5th Battalion
8th Engineer Battalion
8th Cavalry, 1st Battalion
8th Cavalry, 2nd Battalion
9th Cavalry, 1st Squadron
11th Aviation Group
11th General Support Aviation Company
12th Cavalry, 1st Battalion
12th Cavalry, 2nd Battalion
13th Signal Battalion
15th Medical Battalion
15th Administration Company
15th Supply and Service Battalion
15th Transportation Corps Battalion (AM&S)
17th Artillery, 2nd Battalion, D Battery (Prov)
19th Artillery, 2nd Battalion (105 Towed)
20th Artillery, 2nd Battalion (Aerial Arty)
21st Artillery, 1st Battalion (105 Towed)
27th Maintenance Battalion
77th Artillery, 1st Battalion (105 Towed)
82nd Artillery, E Battery
227th Aviation Battalion (Assault Helicopter)
228th Aviation Battalion (Assault Support Helicopter)
229th Aviation Battalion (Assault Helicopter)
545th Military Police Company
HHC, 1st Air Cavalry Division
HHB, Division Artillery
HHC, Support Command

b. Attached

14th Military History Detachment
16th Artillery, C Battery (155 Towed)
17th Artillery, 2nd Battalion
25th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog)
26th Chemical Platoon
34th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog)
41st Civil Affairs Company (Teams)
Team #4
Team #6
Team #11
54th Infantry Detachment (Ground Radar)
184th Chemical Platoon
191st Military Intelligence Detachment
241st Signal Detachment (CH-54 Avionics support)
371st Radio Research Company
382nd Transportation Detachment (CH-54 Ds Maint)
478th Aviation Company (CH-54)

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c. Support

- HHC and lettered companies, 70th Engineer Battalion
- 84th Engineer Battalion, B Company
- 511th Engineer Company (Panel Bridge)
- 585th Engineer Company (Dump Truck), Det from company
- 630th Engineer Company (Light Equipment), Det from company
- HHD, 509th Signal Battalion
- 36th Signal Battalion, D Company
- 69th Signal Battalion Photo Detachment
- 69th Signal Battalion RTT Detachment
- 586th Signal Company (Support)
- 34th Supply and Service Battalion
- 4th Medical Detachment (Vet)
- 25th Ordnance Detachment (EOD)
- 52nd Engineer Detachment (Fire Truck)
- 56th Medical Detachment (DS)
- 86th Engineer Detachment (Utilities)
- 178th Maintenance Company (Di) (Div)
- 205th Ordnance Platoon (Ammunition)
- 235th Quartermaster Detachment (ICL)
- 252nd Quartermaster Detachment (POL)
- 522nd Transportation Detachment (Hy Reg)
- 523rd Transportation Detachment (TK)
- 527th Engineer Detachment (Fire Truck)
- 527th Personnel Service Company, Detachment of
- 541st Transportation Company (Light Truck)
- 537th Engineer Detachment (Fire Truck)
- 554th Signal Detachment
- 602nd Engineer Detachment (Water Point)
- 625th Supply and Service Company (Di)
- 727th Engineer Detachment (Water Point)
- An Khe Area Transportation Office
- Pacific Architects and Engineers, An Khe Office
- 2nd Surgical Hospital
- 15th Aerial Port, Detachment 6
- 5th Weather Squadron, Detachment 24
- 537th Troop Carrier Squadron, An Khe Detachment
- 834th Air Division, An Khe Detachment
- 54th Signal Battalion, Detachment 1

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Doan Cong Kien, 26 years old.
 Rank 2nd LT
 Profession: Assistant CO.
 Unit: 1st Company, 7 Bn, 18 Regiment.

20-11-1966 I brought a m. chinogun with me when I gave up to the U.S. Army of the 1st Air Cavalry Division.

I am being well treated, I have received complete medical care when I was sick. I have enough food to eat and have a home to live in. I do not lie on ground in jungle any more.

I am very happy by the Chieu Hoi regime. My life is not afraid of death any more.

Doan Cong Kien



[Handwritten text in Vietnamese]

Tên: Doan Cong Kien
 Ngày: 20-11-1966
 Địa điểm: ...
 Tôi đang được điều trị y tế đầy đủ...
 Tôi có đủ thức ăn để ăn và có nhà để ở...
 Tôi không còn nằm trên mặt đất trong rừng nữa...
 Tôi rất hạnh phúc với chế độ Chieu Hoi...
 Cuộc sống của tôi không còn sợ cái chết nữa.

[Signature]
 Doan Cong Kien

On 19 Jan, the special day for Quy-Chanh (returns), which is the time for saving the brave soldiers of the 13th Regiment. The year is coming very soon, Tet is the time for family gaiety and to pay homage to your ancestors. It is also the time to forget misery and killing. Now is the time for you to enjoy the gaiety of the people and leave Communism. The people will welcome you as a Hoi Chanh Vien. Your family needs your love and many of your comrades are still alive and have joined their family gatherings because of the Chieu Hoi policy. You should follow your comrades on 19 Jan. You, our friends, the North soldier, can not gather with your families but you will live to see your family again.

In order for the soldiers of the 13th Regiment to return and have a happy New Year, the 1st Air Wing will receive you on 19 Jan from 12:00 sunset, the army forces and artillery of the Division will not operate or open fire until they are attacked. Come to the place having a sign on the map, look for smoke that is black, red, or yellow which show exactly when the place for returning is. Listen to the guidance by megaphone, observe the helicopter and narrow airplane, wave to the plane when he is flying towards you, showing your faith by raising your hand, come to the position where the Allied unit is located. Carry your weapon pointing down to the ground, when you see the US Army or VC Army, raise your hand above your head and talk loud, you will be supplied with medicine, food, and a reward for your weapon that you carry back with you. Let us enjoy a calm New Year. Don't lose this chance.

All of these Interruptions will help you.

HÃY QUI CHÁNH VÀO NGÀY 19 THÁNG GIÊNG DƯƠNG LỊCH 'NGÀY QUI CHÁNH ĐẶC BIỆT' ĐÁNH CHO CÁC CHIẾN SĨ DỪNG CÁN CỦA TRUNG ĐOÀN 13.

TẾT SẮP ĐẾN RỒI. TẾT LÀ MỘT THỜI-GIAN VUI VẺ CHO GIA ĐÌNH VÀ SỰ THỜ PHƯỢNG TỔ TIÊN CỦA CÁC BẠN. BÂY GIỜ LÀ LÚC TAM QUÊN ĐI NHỮNG NỠI NHỌC NHÂN KHÓ ĐAU VÀ CHÉM GIẾT. BÂY GIỜ LÀ LÚC BẠN HÒA ĐỒNG VÀO NIỀM VUI CHUNG VỚI DÂN CHÚNG VÀ TỪ BỎ CHỦ THUYẾT CỘNG SẢN. DÂN CHÚNG SẼ ĐÓN TIẾP BẠN NHƯ LÀ MỘT HỒI CHÁNH VIÊN. GIA ĐÌNH CÁC BẠN ĐANG CẦN SỰ SỐNG CỦA CÁC BẠN. NHIỀU ĐỒNG CHÍ CỦA CÁC BẠN CÒN SỐNG VÀ TÀI HỢP VỚI GIA ĐÌNH HỌ QUA CHÍNH BÁCH CHIÊU HỒI. CÁC BẠN HÃY THEO CÁC ĐỒNG CHÍ CỦA MÌNH VÀO NGÀY 19 THÁNG GIÊNG DƯƠNG-LỊCH, BÌNH SĨ BẮC VIỆT CÁC BẠN CỐ THỂ SẼ KHÔNG KUM HỢP ĐƯỢC VỚI GIA ĐÌNH MÌNH TRONG ĐỊP TẾT NĂM NAY NHƯNG HỌ SẼ ĐƯỢC AN LÀNH. CÁC BẠN SẼ SỐNG DE GẶP LẠI ĐƯỢC GIA ĐÌNH MÌNH.


ĐỂ CHỌ CÁC BÌNH SĨ CỦA TRUNG ĐOÀN 13 VỀ HỒI CHÁNH VÀ VUI HƯƠNG TẾT, ĐỀ NHẤT TOÁN KỸ BÌNH SĨ ĐÓN TIẾP CÁC BẠN VÀO NGÀY 19 THÁNG GIÊNG DƯƠNG-LỊCH TỰ RANG ĐÓNG ĐẾN LÚC HOẢNG HỒN QUẢN LÚC VÀ TRONG PHẠO CỦA SỰ ĐOẠN SẼ KHÔNG KHAI HỢP TRỪ PHÍ BỊ TẤN CÔNG. HÃY TIẾN ĐẾN CHỖ ĐÁNH DẤU TRÊN BẢN ĐỒ, TÌM KHỎI ĐEN ĐỎ, HOẶC VÀNG ĐÁNH DẤU NỔI RA QUI CHÁNH NHƯT ĐÌNH. HÃY LẮNG TAI NGHE LOA PHỎNG THANH HƯỚNG DẪN. HÃY QUAN SÁT PHÍ CỎ TRÚC THẮNG VÀ PHÍ CỎ THƯỢNG. VẦY MÂY BAY KHI CHÚNG BAY VỀ PHÍA BẠN. HÃY CHÚNG TỎ SỰ TRUNG THẠNH CỦA BẠN BẰNG CÁCH GIỎ MỘT TAY LÊN TRỜI KHI BẠN TIẾN ĐẾN NHỮNG VỊ TRÍ TRẦN ĐÓNG CỦA QUẢN LÚC ĐÓNG MÌNH. HÃY ĐEO SỤNG VỚI MŨI CHỨC XƯƠNG ĐẤT. KHI BẠN THẤY QUẢN ĐỘI MỸ HÃY VIẾT NAM CỘNG HOÀ. BẠN HÃY GIỎ HAI TAY LÊN KHỎI ĐẤU VÀ QOI HỌ. CÁC BẠN SẼ ĐƯỢC CUNG CẤP THUỐC MEN, THỨC PHẨM, VÀ ĐƯỢC THƯƠNG TIỆN VỀ VŨ KHI BẠN MANG THEO HÃY THƯƠNG THỨC MỘT CÁI TẾT BÌNH YÊN. ĐỪNG BỎ LỠ CƠ HỘI NÀY.

CÁC THÔNG DỊCH VIÊN NGƯỜI VIỆT SẼ CHÚC MỪNG BẠN.

285F-109-87

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Many of you have known the senseless aim of the VC. They want to use their power on the Vietnam people, who only want freedom and peace. Hundreds have used the Chieu Hoi policy of the GVI, where they were warmly welcomed.



Rất nhiều người trong các ban đã nhận định mục đích vô dụng của Việt Cộng muốn đặt quyền lực của chúng trên nhân dân Việt Nam chỉ muốn tự do và hòa bình. Hàng trăm người đã lợi dụng chính sách Chiêu Hồi của Chính Phủ Việt Nam để trở về ủng hộ Chính Phủ của Việt Nam. Họ được đón tiếp thật sự bởi chính phủ của ta.

245(F)-90-67

1, NGUYEN MIT, born in 1934, was teacher of classes of the VC. I left the VC ranks and returned as a Chieu Hoi on 2-10-66 (annual calendar). I hope that you will follow me and leave the Communist ranks to return to the National Cause. You will be welcome by the Government and be happy with your families.



Tôi tên là NGUYỄN-MIT sinh năm 1934, làm giáo viên dạy lớp I cho Việt Cộng. Đã tôi bỏ hàng ngũ Việt Cộng và về Chiêu Hồi ngày 2 tháng 10 âm lịch. Tôi sẽ không bị đánh đập và còn được bồi dưỡng tư tế. Tôi mong rằng các bạn cũng như tôi nên rời bỏ hàng ngũ Cộng Sản trở về với Chính nghĩa Quốc gia sẽ được Chính Phủ đón tiếp quý bạn và quý bạn sẽ được sống no ấm với gia đình.

MIT
 Nguyễn-Mit
 BÌNH ĐỊNH PHỤ MỸ

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An intelligent Hoi Chanh and happy

The above picture is Lo-Minh-Chau, a Hoi Chanh. It is very clear, he is enjoying a new life. He has been studying English and will be studying more about medicine.

The above picture is a former medical student in Hanoi. He is receiving jungle boots, after just a short time after returning to the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

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MỘT HỒI-CHÁNH-VIÊN THÔNG MINH VÀ ĐANG VUI SỨC.



Trên đây là hình ảnh anh **LÊ-MINH-CHÂU**, một hồi-chánh-viên. Thật là quý rõ ràng anh ta đang hưởng thụ một đời sống mới. Anh được trao đổi thêm môn Anh-Văn và sẽ được tiếp tục học hỏi thêm về ngành Y-Khoa.



Trên đây là hình ảnh một cựu-sinh-viên trường Đại-học Y-Khoa tại Hà-Nội. Anh ta đang tiếp nhận một đôi-giày boot sau một thời gian ngắn trở về với Chính-Phủ Việt-Nam Cộng-Hòa.

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TO ALL CADRE IN VC RANKS

I, L. L. I. C. Lt., 4th Company, 97th Battalion, 21 Regiment of the Yellow Star division have returned to the National Government and Allies. From the first minutes, I have been well treated by officers and men of the 1st Air Cavalry Division, it is very different from what the cadresmen tell us daily. I am a person who made an early revolutionary idea to save myself from the darkness of God and death. I sincerely send this truth to you and hope that it will reach many of you in life. Dear friends: Living in the jungles and mountains, with death there is your only shroud. Your lives are very close to a hole, be assured that you shall not see your relatives or return your native land. The conditions of living are very miserable, you can't sleep at night for moving, then you often hear the criticism such as "incomplete endeavor" ...etc... it is all that you are waiting for the date of death. The Party sent you to South Vietnam, where you died, nobody to bury you, when you are wounded, they send you out for adoption. It is a violent picture which you have never seen in the "history of the world of war. You try to account for how any of your comrades have died through the jungles of the south. The Party say "lets complete the revolution in the South of Viet Nam"; in order to camouflage their standpoint, which is to scorn the life of people. They throw the North Vietnam "outh" into the war in the south, that is a picture you have never seen. When your family will be sorry to receive a paper "Honorable Soldier" how sorrow it was. It is not too late to choose a way for your lives, go out to a clear area and make a sign, a helicopter will land at your place and welcome you.

A former fighting man,

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Chửi các bạn cán binh hồng hàng ngũ Việt Cộng!

Khi Lê minh Xuân Đại diện Tiểu đoàn 99 Trung đoàn 1 huyện Gò Công đã về với chính phủ được gia và Quân đội Tổng mình. Ngay từ phút đầu lời đã đả đốn các lý luận và binh lý kẻ nhát sợ chiến tranh kỳ đờ xù và cũng tử tồ. Hoàn toàn khác với cái cán bị đờ vì thường hò hàng ngày. Là người đã tìm làm cuộc Cách mạng tại vùng đờ của mình ra khỏi màn đờ của thân chết. Tôi chào thân gửi sự thất bại các bạn và mong rằng sẽ gặp nhiều bạn hồng cực sống.

Chửi các bạn: Sống thời nhùng nui cũng non

Chết thì mạnh vai bỏ hồn là xong

Cuộc sống kẻ mệnh bỏ chửi các bạn cũng chẳng lý luận gì gặp lại người thân, về với quê hương nữa. Cảnh sinh hoạt quá kham khổ. Thức đêm quá nhiều vì di chuyển và còn phải nghe những lời nhân xét "thiếu cố gắng" vãn vãn... và vãn vãn. Để rồi chết thì ngay chết mà thôi.

Đảng đưa các bạn vào Nam, có khi chết còn không chín nữa. Đi thường họ đưa đi làm con nuôi con máy. Thật là một điều mà hồng lịch sử chiến tranh thế giới chưa bao giờ có. Ban thử kiểm lại xem biết bao nhiêu bạn đã bỏ xác ở khắp hai vùng miền Nam này. Đảng đã đưa vào "tiền tuyến Cách mạng miền Nam" để nguy hàng cho quan điểm cơ sở con người, họ ném thanh niên miền Bắc vào cuộc chiến tranh ở miền Nam. Mà điều mà các bạn chưa thấy. Để rồi cha mẹ bạn sẽ vô cùng đau xót nhân tâm giãy "bằng gia đình vô vàng" thật chưa hết biết bao!

Vấn chưa muốn để các bạn chôn con đường sống. Các bạn hãy đứng ra chỗ hồng làm hậu phủ cơ tức thắng sẽ xuống đời bạn.

Người bạn Chiến đấu cũ.

Im Gram



SỰ THẤT BẠI CỦA VIỆT CỘNG ĐƯA TỚI SỰ TÀN SÁT

Một hành động dã man của Việt Cộng đã làm cho cả thế giới văn minh kinh tởm và thù ghét xảy ra vào ngày 10 tháng 10 năm 66 trên một ngọn đồi gần làng Mỹ-An, khoảng 40 Km về phía Bắc Qui Nhon.

19 người đàn ông và trẻ con vô tội. Không biết gì về Việt Cộng buộc tội họ là đã chống bản lại chúng. Họ bị 3 tên lính gác Việt Cộng hèn nhất điệu tới địa điểm hạ sát.

Các nạn nhân không được phép nói. Họ bị trói giết cánh khí và bị Việt Cộng tước hết tiền nong và quần áo. Họ bị cưỡng bách phải đứng trên các mỏ đá. Thành lính mấy tên lính gác hèn hạ rút chốt tung lựu đạn ném và dùng súng tự động bắn xối xả vào đám nạn nhân vô tội ấy.

Trong số các nạn nhân đó có một cậu bé. Em chỉ có mỗi một tội duy nhất là một nhân chứng. Sở dĩ em sống sót mà thuật lại chuyện này cho thế giới nghe là bởi vì thân hình quá bé nhỏ của cậu được xác của các người chết che lấp bốn người khác cùng sống sót trong đó có hai người mất tích.

12 người trong tình trạng hấp hối. Cái chết của các nạn nhân để lộ cho người ta thấy những cố gắng tuyệt vọng cuối cùng của bọn Việt Cộng để thống trị là ám sát.

Bọn Việt Cộng biết rằng chúng đang thua trong trận chiến tranh này.



(CONFIDENTIAL)

SLAUGHTER CAUSED BY VC KILLERS.

A brutal action by the VC has caused all civilized countries to disdain and hate them. On 10 Oct 1966, at the top of a mountain near My An village, approximately 40km on the north of Qui Nhon 19 innocent men and children didn't know for what reason the VC lay the blame on them for firing against the VC. These victims were led by the 3 VC guards to the place of execution.

The victims were not allowed to speak after the VC tied their hands behind their back, and took all their money and clothes, and forced the victims to stand on a mound of rocks. Suddenly, the VC guards threw grenades and used automatic rifle fire on the innocent victims.

Of all the victims, there was a little boy who is the only witness who is still alive and tells his story to all the world, because his body was too small and he was hidden by the other dead bodies. Four more men are alive but 2 of them died later.

The 17 people were in a hard situation and the deaths of the above victims proved to be the last desperate effort of the VC to terminate by assassination.

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In the darkness, this VC has come in as a thief to terrorize innocent people. These security men have been his neighbors. Now he lies here with his wounded face staring at the sky with blind eyes. He ought to have been with the JV, and help construct a powerful nation and freedom, taking part in the successful election of South Vietnam in September. It is pitiful for his wife, a widow who cries for his death, but of course his death is a prior warning to all VC. Two things, must happen get out of An Loc district and return to the Government and Allied forces before you end your lives like him.

VÀO ĐÊM TỐI, VC NÀY ĐÃ ĐẾN NHƯ KẸ TRỘM ĐỂ KHÙNG ĐỒ DÂN LẠNG HẠN MÃ NHƯNG NGƯỜI AN-NINH NÀY ĐÃ CÓ LẤN LÃ BAN LẠNG. GIẾNG CỦA HẠN GIỜ HẠN NẢM ĐÂY VỚI ĐỒ MẮT BỊ THƯỜNG NHÌN CHỖNG CHOC VÀO BẦU TRỜI VỚI ĐÔI MẮT ĐUI MŨ ĐANG LÝ RA TÊN VC NÀY NÊN TRỞ VỀ VỚI CHÍNH-PHỦ VÀ XÂY DỰNG MỘT QUỐC-GIA HÙNG-CƯỜNG VÀ TỰ-DO ÔNG TA ĐÃ SẴN TRÂM DỰ VÀO CUỘC BẦU-CỬ THÀNH CÔNG CỦA MIỀN-NAM VN VÀO THÁNG 9.

ĐÁNG THƯƠNG THAY VỚI ÔNG TA, NGƯỜI ĐÀN-BÀ GÓ: ĐÃ PHẢI KHỐC CHO CÁI CHẾT CỦA ÔNG TA, NHƯNG LẼ DĨ NHIÊN CÁI CHẾT CỦA ÔNG TA ĐÃ GIÚP CHO VC BIẾT TRƯỚC 2 ĐIỀU LÀ PHẢI RỜI KHỎI QUÂN AN-TỤC VÀ TRỞ VỀ VỚI CHÍNH-PHỦ LỤC LƯƠNG ĐÔNG-MINH TRƯỚC KHI CÁC ÁNH KẾT KHỨC CUỘC SỐNG GIỐNG NHƯ ÔNG ẤY.

246(P)-64-67

(CONFIDENTIAL)

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The VC and soldiers of North Vietnam are using Kim Sor Valley as a war zone to fight against the VN people. They are using the power of people and your property to nourish and help them to fight against your friends, your relatives and harm your country. If the VC or soldiers of the North remain in your hamlets, they will harm you. Therefore, we request that all of you, the true people of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam please move out this area and follow the map on the other side of this leaflet.

Within 5 days, starting today's date, this area will be considered a free artillery fire area and will be subjected to artillery fire, bombs, rockets, and search and destroy operations. No ground shelter can protect the VC, we will continue to operate in this area until all VC and soldiers of the North Vietnam in NW of Binh Dinh province are killed, captured or surrender to the Republic of Vietnam or free world forces. We don't want to harm the innocent people, save your families.

Study the map carefully on the other side of this leaflet. Leave your area and come to the place signed X. Warning: If you don't leave your area to the safe area, within 5 days the government can not protect you.

The Government of the Republic of Vietnam

VIỆT-CỘNG VÀ QUÂN ĐỘI CỘNG SẢN BẮC VIỆT ĐANG XỬ DỤNG TRUNG LUNG KHU SƠN LAM CÁN CỨ CHIẾN TRANH VỚI DÂN QUÂN VIỆT-NAM. BẠN CHỨNG ĐANG XỬ ĐƯỢC NHIỆM VỤ VÀ ĐANG ĐƯỢC BẢO ĐẢO ĐỂ NƯỚC CHUNG HOA VÀ QUÂN TRUNG CỘNG CÓ THỂ ĐƯỢC BẮC VIỆT QUYỀN QUẢN LÝ VÀ THẢ HÒA BÀ BÈ ĐỂ ĐƯỢC HỒI SỨC VÀ VƯỢT QUÁ ĐƯỜNG LÍNH ĐỘI QUÂN ĐỘI CỘNG SẢN BẮC VIỆT VÀ CÁC NHÂN CHỨNG SẼ PHẢI HOA TÁ BẠN. VÌ VẬY CHÚNG TÔI YÊU CẦU TÀI CẢ CÁC CÔNG-ĐÂN TRUNG THÀNH VỚI CHÍNH PHỦ VIỆT-NAM CỘNG HÒA HÃY RỜI BỎ KHU VỰC NHƯ ĐÀ GIỚI TRONG KHU VỰC NÀY.

VIỆT-CỘNG VÀ QUÂN ĐỘI CỘNG SẢN BẮC VIỆT ĐANG XỬ DỤNG TRUNG LUNG KHU SƠN LAM CÁN CỨ CHIẾN TRANH VỚI DÂN QUÂN VIỆT-NAM. BẠN CHỨNG ĐANG XỬ ĐƯỢC NHIỆM VỤ VÀ ĐANG ĐƯỢC BẢO ĐẢO ĐỂ NƯỚC CHUNG HOA VÀ QUÂN TRUNG CỘNG CÓ THỂ ĐƯỢC BẮC VIỆT QUYỀN QUẢN LÝ VÀ THẢ HÒA BÀ BÈ ĐỂ ĐƯỢC HỒI SỨC VÀ VƯỢT QUÁ ĐƯỜNG LÍNH ĐỘI QUÂN ĐỘI CỘNG SẢN BẮC VIỆT VÀ CÁC NHÂN CHỨNG SẼ PHẢI HOA TÁ BẠN. VÌ VẬY CHÚNG TÔI YÊU CẦU TÀI CẢ CÁC CÔNG-ĐÂN TRUNG THÀNH VỚI CHÍNH PHỦ VIỆT-NAM CỘNG HÒA HÃY RỜI BỎ KHU VỰC NHƯ ĐÀ GIỚI TRONG KHU VỰC NÀY.

TRONG KHU VỰC NÀY, KỂ TỪ NGÀY HÔM NAY TRỞ ĐI, VÙNG NÀY SẼ BIẾN THÀNH VÙNG TÁC XÁ TỰ DO VÀ CÁC KHU NÀY SẼ ĐƯỢC BẢO ĐẢO CHO CÁC TRẦN PHẠO KỊCH HAY DANH KIỆT VÀ CÁC ĐỐI ĐO BÓM, HỎA TIẾN, NHỮNG CUỘC BẮC VIỆT ĐƯỢC SOÁT VÀ TIÊU Hủy. CHẶNG CỘN HẦM ĐƯỢC BẢO ĐẢO CHO BẠN VIỆT-CỘNG NỮA CẢ. THÊM NỮA CHÚNG TÔI SẼ TIẾP TỤC HÀNH QUÂN TRONG KHU VỰC NÀY CHO TỚI KHI NÀO MỌI TÊN VIỆT CỘNG VÀ BÍNH LÍNH CỘNG SẢN BẮC-VIỆT Ở KHU VỰC TÂY BẮC TỈNH BÌNH ĐỊNH ĐỀU BỊ GIẾT, BỊ BẮT, HAY QUÍ HANG VỚI QUÂN-LỰC VIỆT-NAM CỘNG HÒA VÀ THẾ GIỚI TỰ-DO.

TRONG KHU VỰC NÀY CHÚNG TÔI KHÔNG MUỐN LÀM HẠI NHỮNG ĐỒNG BÀO BẠN HAY CỨU VẬT LẤY GIA ĐÌNH CÁC BẠN.

HAY NHƯNH SỬ DỤNG ĐỒ ĐÓNG SẮC ĐỂ MẮT SAU, TỔ TRUYỀN ĐÓN


HÃY RỜI KHU VỰC NÀY VÀ ĐẾN NƠI CỜ-ĐÁNH DẤU CHỖ THẤP

CẢNH GIÁC CÁC BẠN KHÔNG RỜI KHU VỰC CỦA MÌNH ĐỂ CHỖ AN TOÀN THÌ CHỈ SAU NĂM NGÀY CHÍNH PHỦ KHÔNG THỂ BẢO ĐẢO AN NINH CHO CÁC BẠN NỮA CHÍNH PHỦ VIỆT-NAM CỘNG HÒA.

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From Binh Son to Bunu stream 5 km. From Bunu stream to Bong Son 16 km.

Hoi An Chict Ai Office



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Dear Friends:

We, NGUYEN DUU AN, QUYNH VAN ANH, NGUYEN THANH and VAN HAI, Company 2, 1st Battalion, 195th Regiment, after a violent air-strike were captured by the US Army and the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam. at first, we were afraid of them and thought we could not escape from the brutality of the US Army.

But, it was otherwise, so we would like to tell you that although we were captured, we were not beaten, we have enough food to eat, enough medical care if wounded and we are all very cheerful.

We who are your friends appeal to you and hope that you will leave the VC ranks and return to the National Government. Don't believe the cadre, who often flatter you and Abuse the US Army and the National Government.

We, who are fighting together, sincerely appeal to you to return to the National Government where there is a chance for our reunion.

Sincerely Yours,

Cái bạn Thảo Anh.

Có người ở đây tên là Nguyễn Văn Thạch, Nguyễn Văn Thạch
và Văn Hải trước đây ở đây, lúc trước ở hàng đơn 195
Sau trước bị đánh lúc chúng ông bay về bị quân đội Mỹ
và quân đội Cộng Hòa bắt được. Sau đó chúng tôi có
qua từng chút không thể thoát được rồi sai đi họ của
quân đội Mỹ.

Một số cái bạn ở chúng tôi bị bắt nhưng
không bị đánh đập, đãi ăn uống đầy đủ, bị nhốt
đốt hàng bị ăn đi ăn thì chúng ông chúng tôi
thì rất phải khỏe.

Là người bạn ở ở đây, chúng tôi kêu gọi ông chúng
tôi: cái bạn hãy bỏ hàng ông với công in hời về với
chính phủ quốc gia đang nghe lời chính phủ của các
bà ông của quân đội Mỹ làm chính phủ quốc gia.

Là người bạn cũng chính là chúng tôi có ông lời
chào thật kêu gọi các bạn trở về với chính phủ quốc
gia để ông chúng tôi được gặp.

Trân ái chào các bạn

(Handwritten signatures)

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