I.
The Battalion's Mission
II. Executive Summary of Battle Operations
III. Overview of Company Operations
A. Alpha "Reaper" Company in Tarmiyah, Iraq
B. Bravo "Bushmaster" Company in Rowad and Sadr
City, Iraq
C. Charlie "Rock" Company in Mushadah, Iraq
D. Hqtrs & Hqtrs Company (HHC) "Hellhound" Company
in Sheik Hamad Village,
Iraq
IV. Commander's Comments
Photos:
www.longwarjournal.org - Tarmiyah-Sons-of-Iraq
I. The Battalion’s Mission
From the outset of 2008, CTF 1-14's
mission was to control Qada Tarmiyah by partnering with Iraqi Security
Forces (ISF) to neutralize Al Qaeda Iraq (AQI), promote responsive local
governance to preserve conditions
for effective reconciliation, and maintain a safe, stable and secure
environment. CTF 1-14 also had the mis-
sion to transition to tactical over-watch with ISF assuming the lead
role in securing the Tarmiyah Qada.
II. Executive Summary of Battalion Operations
Combined Task Force 1-14 (CTF 1-14)
served in combat from 15 January 2008 through 15 January 2009
during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 07 - 09 vicinity Tarmiyah, Iraq
while assigned to the 2d Stryker Bri-
gade, 25th ID and Multinational Division-Baghdad (MND-B). The ist
Battalion, 14th Infantry Regiment
"Golden Dragons", deploying from Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, joined
Soldiers from the Macedonia's
Special Operations Forces and operated in partnership with the Iraqi
Army (IA), Iraqi Police (IP), 1st Infantry
Division's Military Transition Teams, and the 18th Military Police
Brigade's Police Transition Teams to form
CTF 1-14 in December 2007.
Over the next 14 months, CTF 1-14
disintegrated numerous terrorist and insurgent cells, eroded AQI
Northern
Belt's strategic and operational caches, and rendered the enemy
incapable of stemming the rapid progress
throughout the Qada in security, ISF capability, markets, essential
services, and governance. In the first 11
months, CTF 1-14 had executed over 30 named battalion-level missions:
Operation DRAGON NA'AR, Oper-
ation DRAGON VOLCANO I-II, Operation DRAGON GUARD, Operation VIGILANT
DRAGON, Operation
DRAGON MUKHABA, Operation DRAGON SAYTARA, Operation LUAU, Operation
DRAGON MASHA-
REEA, Operation FORGIVING DRAGON I-XI, Operation THEAB TARIQ, Operation
TAREEQ TANEEN,
Operation DRAGON STRETCH I-II, Operation DRAGON HIMAYA, Operation
KAMEHAMEHA, and
Operation DRAGON VOTE. Collectively, CTF 1-14 would also execute over
60 additional named company
-level operations. These operations resulted in the capture of 52
battalion and higher High Value Individuals (HVI)
and a total of 243 targeted insurgents, 40% of the Stryker Brigade's
total. CTF 1-14 also captured and de-
stroyed over 175 caches and eroded the enemy resources so severely that
for months there was a dramatic
decline in military munitions used by the enemy. The pace and precision
of these offensive operations drama-
tically increased security and set the conditions for amazing gains
across all lines of effort, including the hiring
and training of local IA and IP, the complete revitalization of the
local Iraqi economy, the drastic improvement
of local Iraqi infrastructure, including schools and roads, and a
remarkable enhancement of local governance.
All of this was accomplished in the decisive and most contested terrain
in Baghdad's northern belt, an area of
operations (AO) which early in the deployment was established as the 2d
Stryker Combat Team's main effort.
By the time CTF 1-14 assumed
responsibility of the Tarmiyah Qada, there were many areas and villages
that
had not seen US forces in well over a year and the threat of Large
Buried Improvised Explosives Devices
(LBIED) limited routine movement to less than 35 kilometers along two
major roads. By August 2008, CTF
1-14 controlled the entire Qada, routinely patrolled its 400 (+) square
kilometer area, and rendered the enemy
unable to sustain effective attacks anywhere in the CTF 1-14
battle-space. Remarkably, the two areas pre-
viously receiving the highest frequency of Improvised Explosives Devices
(IED) attacks are now a thriving
market and an IA checkpoint with almost no enemy activity. This control
and freedom of improvement was
in part attributable to a dramatically increased forward presence that
is unmatched throughout MND-B.
In January 2008, less than one third
of the previous unit was forward securing the population in their commun-
ities. CTF 1-14 quadrupled the number of platoons and companies forward
near the population centers securing
the Iraqi people, enabling CTF 1-14 leaders and soldiers to develop
close relationships with the local Iraqi
leaders, develop the trust and confidence of the Iraqi people, provide
quick action against developing threats,
and give responsive support to the Iraqi people and ISF. The effect was
so profound that the population believed
that CTF 1-14 was twice the size of the previous (and identical) unit.
During this time, CTF 1-14's soldiers suf-
fered from the elements, cramped conditions (living in Stryker Infantry
Vehicles and dilapidated hallways), poor
sanitation, and limited communication with loved ones back home. After
several months, CTF 1-14 built
safe forward bases for it's Soldiers with reliable electricity, AC/heat,
latrines, showers, sleeping areas, cable TV,
internet, and phones at al of CTF 1-14's Golden Dragon companies.
Indeed, robust retention rates and increased
morale were then and have since been pervasive throughout the
battalion... as the solid and empowering feeling
of real camaraderie.
In early 2008 there were fewer than
30 IA Soldiers assisting US forces to secure Qada Tarmiyah. Ctf 1-14
acted deciseively to partner with the 37th IA Brigade as it went through
force generation, training the 3rd Bat-
talion, 37th IA Brigade and executing developmental operations with the
balance of the battalions. This close
partnership quickly increased IA combat power operating in the Tarmiyah
Qada by a factor of 20 from a single
platoon at a single checkpoint in Tarmiyah to a brigade (-) executing
partnered company level operations and
living forward at the JSSs and patrol bases throughout the entire CTF
1-14 area. IA patrols became ubiquitous
in the Qada and IA leadership was coached to develop close working
relationships with tribal, government, and
police leadership. By July 2008, the 37th IA Brigade had been relieved
in place by the 36th IA Brigade, with
whom CTF 1-14 continued to approach of close partnership and shared
responsibility and risk, and quickly pro-
gressed to the point of full tactical over-watch in one third of its
area and completed a decisive transfer of the
Sons of Iraq (SOI) to the control of the 36th Brigade. Both the 37th
and 36th Brigades are now well trained and
the 36th Brigade IA is well prepared to secure this Qada with little
Coalition Force assistance. The successful
partnership with the IP was no less impressive. Throughout 2007, Al
Qaeda had forced the withdrawal of all IP
from the city, but by June 2008 CTF 1-14 had reestablished the IP
district headquarters in Tarmiyah and sub-
stantially enhanced the local IP's capability to fight an urban
insurgency. The IPs are now increasingly serving
warrants, routinely enforcing the rule of law, and executing local
recruiting activities.
CTF was equally aggressive in pursuing its non-lethal objectives and
achieved unprecedented success in market,
essential services, and governance development. In January 2008 all of
the markets in Tarmiyah and along the
Baghdad-Mosul Highway were brown, lifeless, and more likely to be used
for an enemy ambush than a place of
business. The Mushadah Market exemplifies the progress made in all nine
of the Tarmiyah Qada's markets. By
mid-summer 2008, these markets had only three functioning shops, but
with the return of security, the applica-
tion of numerous small entrepreneurial grants to prospective business
owners, and the targeted application of
essential services projects, this market (and most others) has bloomed
with color, activity and a variety of new
shops. More specifically, this single market now has well over 250
shops and is growing rapidly; note that this
is 80 times the number of shops present in January 2008 and more than
triples the number under the pre-war
economy.
When CTF 1-14 assumed responsibility
for the Tarmiyah Qada, deteriorating security had resulted in every
single
US dollar and Iraqi dinar having been withdrawn from all projects and
there was no government budget and little
connectivity between village, township, and Qada. The Qada government
and tribes were completely disassoc-
iated from Baghdad and almost no one dared travel to the city of
Tarmiyah. As CTF 1-14 secured the Qada, it
initiated a bold plan to simultaneously invest in education, roads,
markets and essential services while using the
project management process to exercise atrophied local governance
functions. Beginning at the township/Nahia
level with school projects, CTF 1-14 continued to raise the expectation
for governance participation and over-
sight, until almost all of the latent governance functions at the Nahia
ande Qada level were being fully exercised
and Iraqis were selecting, prioritizing, managing and quality
assuring/quality controlling (QA/QC) all of their own
projects. Encouraged by their progress and security, the Tarmiyah
leaders continued to reach out to Baghdad,
holding two Joint Rural Planning Committees (JRPC) and a high visibility
Expo where key governance and re-
construction issues were discussed. These and other media events
highlighted their successes, demonstrated that
Tarmiyah was again ready to receive GoI investment, and helped the
Tarmiyah Qada reconnect with Baghdad.
Amazingly, CTF 1-14 and the Tarmiyah government, in a period of only
nine months, had rebuilt 50 schools and
completed or initiated an additional 85 essential services projects for
over $24 million and secured projects and
budgets from the GoI for over $40 million.
Perhaps the best measure of CTF
1-14's effect is the profound increase in cooperation from the Iraqi
people who,
because of the enormous multi-pronged lethal and non-lethal efforts of
CTF 1-14, became committed to ridding
their communities of insurgents. Because the Iraqi people placed more
and more trust in CTF 1-14, the local
populace began to believe they were secure from retribution, and have
since experienced a profound improvement
in their own quality of life. As evidence of this, local Iraqis have
continued to share information which prevents
the insurgent from hiding among the population. By early Fall of 2008,
Al Qaeda had no safe haven in the CTF
1-14's AO. CTF 1-14 has eroded Al Qaeda's resources and has confiscated
over 100 large weapons and explo-
sives caches from areas Al Qaeda believed beyond CF's reach. CTF 1-14
continually disintegrated Al Qaeda's
networks of leadership, resources, and membership, thus effectively
defeating his every effort to reestablish an
effective presence.
III. Overview of Company Operations
Alpha: Reaper Company in Tarmiyah,
Iraq
The collective accomplishments of CTF 1-14 are demonstrable by the
best of metric proving results. However
the accomplishments of individual companys towards the overall battalion
mission also merit specific recognition.
CTF 1-14's Alpha Company, the "Reapers", executed 10 named operations:
Operation REAPER ALLIANCE,
Operation REAPER KAMEENA, Operation MUKHABA, Operation REAPER CHARGERS,
Operation REAPER
SIDJIN TEDMEER, Operation REAPER REPAIR, Operation SAYTARA, Operation
REAPER MO ZAIN
QUANAS, and Operation REAPER VOLCANO I-II. Reaper Company, the
Brigade's main effort company com-
prised of a Task Force of 263 men and women, secured the battle-space in
and around the pivotal, and at one time
Al Qaeda stronghold, city of Tarmiyah, Iraq. By assuming responsibility
for Joint Coordination Center (JCC)-
Tarmiyah, the Reapers added to their combat power an entire IA
Battalion, an IP Station, and a 500 strong SoI
local security force. From four fixed sites, this company was able to
effectively secure the population and deny
the enemy freedom of maneuver. In this, the Reapers made a strong
impact on the city of Tarmiyah in a number
of ways. One of these ways involved the capture of the Al Qaeda "Arms
Room of Tarmiyah". Through local in-
formants, intelligence preparation of the battlefield, and standard
infantry small unit tactics, Reaper Company
managed to locate and remove over 50 caches across the Battalion's area.
The scope of these caches ran the full
spectrum of capabilities from tactical to operational levels. The
significance of these caches was obvious as the
Reapers eroded literally tons of homemade explosive (HME) material and
even long-range rocket systems capable
of ranging CFs on nearby combat outposts (COP), joint security stations
(JSS), and forward operating bases
(FOB). Additionally, the Reapers captured a significant stockpile of
direct action cell weapons and ammunition.
These weapons included "silenced" long range sniper systems, complete
IED systems, mortar firing systems com-
plete with ammunition, and surface-to-air missiles located along a key
air maneuver corridor between Baghdad and
Balad. Also, significant to the cache finds were the discovery of four
underground bunker hide sites, and multiple
AQI facilities (bed-down locations for foreign fighter elements, prison
cells for kidnap victims, and VBIED and
IED manufacturing centers). During Operation REAPER TEDMEER and
Operation REAPER MUKHABA,
Reaper Company first effectively eroded enemy resources and then
destroyed the capacity for them to return to
their historical support zones.
The Alpha Company Reapers also established local governance and rebuilt
local economy in the greater Tarmiyah
area as the local economic markets and basic social services of Tarmiyah
suffered greatly under the iron-rule of Al
Qaeda. So pervasive was the Al Qaeda influence that not one instrument
of governance or commerce was immune
to its influence. During the 14 months of their deployment, the Reapers
oversaw the re-emergence of the Tarmiyah
Qada as a legitimate governing body and an infusion of capital
investment that transformed once nearly empty mar-
ket streets into a vibrant and booming center of trade. Effective
security set the conditions for sustainable economic
growth, active governmental participation, and the reconnection of what
was once the self-declared capital of the
Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) to the Baghdad government. Because Reaper
Company was also able to protect all key
infrastructures in their area of operation, it was able to revitalize
Tarmiyah's moribund economy through the crea-
tion of a tailored network of security, employment projects, scores of
business grants, and over 50 major essential
service and education projects for more than $10 million. Hundreds of
reconstruction projects and micro-business
grants, countless hours of coordination and planning meetings, coupled
with a clear primacy of purpose and a ten-
acious work ethic, allowed the men and women of Reaper Company to guide
Tarmiyah back onto the path of re-
conciliation and a return to normalcy.
Reaper Company also relentlessly disintegrated AQI and Islamic State of
Iraq (ISI) attack cells. An example of this
was during Operation REAPER MO-ZAIN, when the Reapers aggressively
targeted terrorists and their support net-
works. The Soldiers of Reapers Company detained dozens of high value
targets (HVT) from Division, Brigade, and
Battalion level. Its intelligence Support Team (IST) was often the
catalyst in identifying, developing, nominating,
and actioning on these targets. Its ability to draw from all levels and
disciplines of intelligence and then fuse them
into actionable targets were key to this company's success. Captures
ranged from local IED emplacers to AQI emirs
and financiers. Through a network of information and sources, Reaper
Company always targeted with precision and
restraint, ensuring that AQI found no safe haven among the population,
and all the while maintaining dignity and re-
spect of the citizens of Tarmiyah for their continued support in the
fight against Al Qaeda.
CTF 1-14's Reaper Company also built and enabled the most effective,
though targeted, SoI partnership. In this en-
deavor thee was an unprecedented level of cooperation and support
between the men of Reaper Company and the
SoI in Tarmiyah. this city, once known as the headquarters for AQI and
a hotbed for Sunni insurgent groups, com-
pletely transformed after the establishment of the SoI program. Despite
suffering 14 deaths from terrorist attacks and
dozens of casualties to their ranks, the SoI stood firm against
terrorism. Their confidence was bolstered by the efforts
of Reaper Company supporting elements which included dozens of MEDEVAC
flights to treat casualties to include
five MASCAL events. The supporting elements also included the mortar
section which alone fired over 50 mortar fire
support missions to SoI troops in contact. The company launched well
over 100 Quick Reaction Force (QRF) mis-
sions in response to IED threats, small arms contacts, and other attacks
against SoI and the citizens of Tarmiyah.
Reaper Company also oversaw the manning, managing, pay distribution, and
eventual transition of arguably the most
successful SoI program in the Brigade's battle-space.
One of the most rewarding achievements of Reaper Company was that it
secured the people of Tarmiyah in the areas
where they lived and slept. Even the most determined and calculated
efforts of Sunni Insurgent Groups and Al Qaeda
Iraq were defeated with superb intelligence, the precise application of
combat power, and an ubiquitous security pre-
sence that included an average of nearly 24 platoon patrols each day,
control over all access in and out of the city,
and over 30 Iraqi manned/Us supervised checkpoints. From the outset,
the men and women of Reaper Company de-
ployed forward into JSS - Tarmiyah and made it their home, rarely
returning to the larger FOB in Taji, Iraq. This
company continuously manned joint IA/IP/SoI and CF checkpoints which all
effectively gated the city of Tarmiyah.
The end result of these efforts was a renewed sense of security in the
population; this in turn enabled local security
forces to gradually assume a larger role in securing its people. As
part of Operations REAPER DAKHALIYA and
Operation REAPER SAYTARA, the company's unparalleled and aggressive
patrolling kept the enemy at bay and al-
lowed the civil services to grow by leaps and bounds. Moreover, the men
and leaders of Reaper Company interacted
daily and in most cases hourly, with the citizens of Tarmiyah and became
quite familiar faces in the town. Reaper
Soldiers mastered the Counter-Insurgency Operations (COIN) strategy of
gaining rapport with the population, demon-
strating our resolve and commitment to help, and then fostering this
bond to the benefit of the Mission.
B. Bravo "Bushmaster"
Company in Rowad and Sadr City, Iraq
Also of note, CTF 1-14's Bravo Company "Bushmasters" executed nine
named operations: Operation BUSH-
MASTER ALLIANCE I-III, Operation BUSHMASTER CLAY, Operation BUSHMASTER
ARTOISE, Op-
eration BUSHMASTER BEAUMONT, Operation BUSHMASTER BRIDGE DENIAL,
Operation BUSH-
MASTER BRIDGEPORT, and Operation BUSHMASTER SLINKARD. One of the more
versatile companies
in the 2d Brigade Stryker Combat Team, the Bushmasters conducted a
variety of fundamental operations. One
of their well-executed reoccurring missions were the regular combat
patrols in Abayachi and Rowad, Iraq ---
an area of over 150 square kilometers of terrain that previously had not
seen significant US or CF activity or
support in over two years. The Bushmasters also actively patrolled and
retained a skillful combination of lethal
and non-lethal targeting. Through relentless projection of combat power
to every corner of the battle-space,
Bushmaster Company succeeded in reconciling the vast majority of the
population and successfully disintegrated
several IED and small arms fire (SAF) cells operating in and around the
Route Tampa corridor. During the entire
period that the Bushmaster Company owned and operated within this
battle-space, no CF or ISF Soldier was
killed, nor was there a single catastrophic IED strike on any route,
including MSR Tampa, within the boundaries
of the Bushmaster AO.
In an impressive feat of training and organizations, the Bushmasters
organized, stood up, and managed six separ-
ate SoI contracts, employing over 1000 personnel manning over 45
security checkpoints. this action directly re-
sulted in the development of an environment inhospitable to AQI and
other special groups attempting to conduct
enemy operations within the Bushmaster AO. It also produced the most
stable and secure environment the area
had experienced since the initial US military's invasion in 2003.
Furthermore, the Bushmasters successfully
partnered with two different IA infantry battalions, integrating them
into areas and population centers that had
zero previous exposure to ISF units. Through dedication to joint
training and combat operations, the Bushmasters
accelerated the transition to tactical over-watch and helped to cement
local confidence in the competence and
capabilities of the ISF. Key accomplishments included the establishment
of the first permanent IA patrol base in
Abayachi and the successful transition of all SoI contracts to 100% ISF
management and GoI control.
Another task at hand was the literal creation from scratch of a JSS in
the Brigade Operational Environment (OE)
near the village of Rowad. With the determination to fight for scant
resources, the Bushmasters planned, con-
structed, and secured what would become the largest JSS in the Brigade
OE. This JSS occupied key terrain border-
ing directly on MSR Tampa and centrally located between three of the
four principal municipalities in the Bush-
master AO. As the most forward staging area for joint operations, JSS
-- Rowad was integral to the Battalion's tre-
mendous success in degrading IED cells operating along the Route Tampa
Corridor. JSS -- Rowad was a tremen-
dous example of the extensions and grip of combat power at the company
level.
Perhaps the most impressive of its feats during its OIF rotation, was
its conducting a no-notice intra-theater deploy-
ment to defeat a Jaysh Al Mahdi (JAM) uprising in Sadr City, Iraq. The
Bushmasters were chosen for this high-
profile mission as one of only three companies in the entire Brigade to
deploy to Sadr City in order to defeat the
violent rebellion. For nearly two straight months, the Bushmasters
conducted high-intensity, kinetic combat opera-
tion. In spite of being engaged daily with IED, rocket propelled
grenades (RPG), and SAF attacks from every
direction, the Bushmasters succeeded in completely dominating its area
of responsibility, routinely receiving the high-
est accolades from all general officers in Multi-National Division,
Baghdad. Within only one week, the Bushmasters
had denied the enemy use of every historic point of origin in Thawral,
effectively preventing all rocket attacks di-
rected at Camp Taji and the International Green Zone. Within a mere
month, they had defeated all JAM and special
groups operating North of Route Plutos and South of Phase--Line Gold.
While there, the Bushmasters engaged in
over 40 days of continuous fighting in difficult urban terrain.
Upon their return to the Abayachi and Rowad AOs, the Bushmasters
remained in the lethal fight. Through effective
targeting and skilled analysis of key intelligence, they captured over
16 brigade and battalion HVI and also captured
over 25 weapons and munitions caches. The cumulative effect of these
successes, along with millions of dollars
spent on reconstruction efforts, severely degraded the capabilities of
AQI operating in the area, completely eroded
any support these insurgent organizations may have still had with the
local populace, and completely disintegrated
the North Tampa AQI cell that was previously untouched...
Charlie: "Rock" Company in
Mushadah, Iraq
Also greatly contributing to the many successes of the Golden
Dragon Battalion was CTF 1-14's Charlie "Rock"
Company which executed 27 named operations: Operation HARD ROCK,
Operation ROCK CHAOS I-VI,
Operation ROCK DENIAL I-V, Operation ROCK OVERWATCH I-II, Operation ROCK
RECON I-II, Opera-
tion ROCK RED HONU, Operation ROCK SCORPION I-III, Operation WHITE
EAGLE, Operation ROCK
SEARCH, Operation DIAMONDHEAD I-II, Operation ROCK MUKHABA, Operation
ROCK SAYTARAM,
and Operation ROCK DISRUPTION. Rock Company, which owned key
battle-space in the greater Mushadah
area, is one of the more accomplished and aggressive units in the entire
Brigade, capturing twice as many de-
tainees as the average maneuver company in the Brigade with a
significantly higher rate going forward to FOB
Cropper for future imprisonment due to thorough, standard-setting
sensitive site exploitation (SSE) and intelli-
gence development. As a result of this hard intelligence work, Rock
Company captured 35 caches, causing a
major shift from military grade munitions to homemade explosives (HME)
in their AO. Moreover, Rock Com-
pany significantly contributed to the complete disintegration of the
Jamal Ali Salih North Tampa IED Cell and
completely disintegrated the Nadeem/Nassir 57mm rocket cell. By
establishing control over the perilous Route
Coyotes, Rock Company was able to precipitously reduce IEDs on this road
within 90 days of the Transfer of
Authority (TOA), changing the most dangerous 'Black' route in the
Brigade into a route that has become a
major business artery traveled many times daily by Deliberate Combat
Logistics Patrols (DCLP), ISF, and CFs.
As a unit, Rock Company exhibited endless energy, the average Rock
platoon averaged over 100 combat patrols
each month since the TOA. This omnipresent approach helped extend
Rock's reach from the Route Tampa
corridor to every road and village in the AO from western Nubai and the
quarries to the palm groves along the
Tigris.
Rock Company also partnered with an IA BTR battalion, bringing it from
force generation through independent
and IA led platoon level patrols in only 90 days. Rock Company then
developed the Mushadah IPs from a sta-
tion bound force to the point of routinely serving warrants and
executing missions to enforce the rule of law.
This was all accomplished in an area with a dramatically increased risk
to the CFs due to their pushing out to the
local communities and extending their reach and contact with the
population. This meant living forward at the
JSS, which in turn meant sleeping in Strykers, on the roofs of
buildings, and sleeping in shifts and hot-bunking
for a period of over six months. Rock Company, true to its namesake,
negotiated these challenges as it did all
others --- determined to "get tough or die".
Hqtrs & Hqtrs Company (HHC)
"Hellhound" Company in Sheik Hamad Village, Iraq
CTF 1-14's Headquarters Company (HHC), the "Hell Hounds", executed
12 named operations: Operation DRAGON
HOUND, Operation BLOODHOUND i-iv, Operation PREDATOR CANDY, Operation
HOUND AMPHITERE,
Operation HOUND OVERWATCH, Operation HHC FAFNIR I-II, and Operation MIKE
SAYTARA I-II. Hell Hound
Company, though initially a traditional HHC, in a remarkable display of
innovation, creatively developed into a maneuver
unit unto itself. CTF 1-14's Hell Hound Company was the only HHC
throughout the entire Brigade, and for a time the
only HHC in the theater, to not only own battle-space but also execute
missions and conduct full spectrum operations
as a maneuver unit.
Upon the arrival of the Hell Hounds to the Sheik Hamad
Village/A1Hesayway area, the local Iraqis had little or no cap-
ability for self-governance. The Hell Hounds established a local Town
Council in the Sheik Hamad Village/A1Hesay-
way area which was then able to manage and begin to meet the needs of
the populace. Built from the ground up, the
local counsel mirrored the official Nahia councils of the GoI. This
council was able to help facilitate projects and jobs
throughout the area Sheik Hamad/A1Hesayway areas. The Hell Hounds, as
CTF 1-14's Time Sensitive Target (TST)
mission company, were responsible for the capture of multiple brigade
and battalion HVIs and accomplished this through
demanding and short-notice TST missions, executing both ground assault
and air assault operations. An example of the
no-nonsense approach which pervaded the Hell Hound Company is found in
their first month in country. Within their
first 30 days, the Hell Hounds were responsible for the capture and
detainment of Hardan Muhammad Hardan Al-
Mashadani and Muhammad Jasim Hardan Al-Mashadani, two of the Brigade's
High Value Targets (HVT). The Hell
Hounds also conducted several other TST missions throughout the
deployment resulting in the capture of Jamal Thabit,
Adnon Muhammad Jusayn Al-Jumayli and numerous other HVTs.
CTF 1-14's Hell Hounds were later assigned the responsibility of
training an entire IA infantry battalion, which was so
well coached and mentored that it was able to assume battle-space after
only a few months of intensive yet professional
training. Impressively, each Hell Hound platoon took on the
responsibility of training an infantry company, while simul-
taneously maintaining their grueling patrol schedules and pursuing major
Public Works Projects and lethal targeting in
the Hell Hound AO. Still, the end result of the US/IA partnership
training program was arguably one of the best trained
battalions in the 2d Stryker Brigade Combat Team's battle-space, and an
IA battalion able to flexibly partner successfully
with both the Bushmaster and Rock companies -- which the IA Battalion
did effectively on multiple occasions.
While assuming Bushmaster Company's battle-space during their operations
in Sadr City, the Hell Hounds were directly
responsible for degrading and the SAF cell operation along Route Tampa,
north of Mushadah. This was accomplished
through the capture and detainment of the infamous financier "Mohammed
Fadil Hardan" and his active elements of the
SAF cell Mahmud Mohammed Mahmud, Awos Adnon Jasim, and Mushtak Talib
Shanath Thamir. In short, when this
lethal SAF cell was effectively put out of action, CF's lives were
saved. The Hell Hounds were also responsible for the
decapitation of key Jaish Al Rashadien (JAR) operation in their support
zone of Uzri village during Operation DRAGON
NA'AR. Before, during and after this operation, the Hell Hounds
systematically targeted and captured multiple leaders
of this JAR cell, to include Mahmud Fadil Ismail, Sa'ad Sabir Naji
(another infamous financier and spiritual leader for
JAR), and multiple cell members. Indeed, the Hell Hounds demonstrated
their unique blend of flexibility, mentorship,
and lethality in any mission assigned to them at any time and at any
location on the battlefield.
IV. Commander's Comments
Over the course of 14 months, CTF 1-14 executed with excellence
nearly 100 named operations across 6400
kilometers of battle-space with a network of 10,000 miles of roads.
This brave battalion of dedicated Golden
Dragon Soldiers would endure the heartbreak on one KIA, one DOW, and 15
WIA brothers-in-arms. Deter-
mined to make a difference in Iraq's future, the Golden Dragons overcame
the tremendous loss of their com-
rades, rebounding to re-organize the moribund Concerned Local Citizens (CLC)
into a well-organized, purpose-
ful 4000 man militia. This organization, which became the history
making group known as the "Sons of Iraq",
is an organization now known around the world. CTF 1-14 would make it's
grit known amongst all other units
by earning over 300 awards for combat service and valor, finding and
clearing over 175 caches, capturing 52
HVIs, and detaining 243 individuals who posed a direct threat to
American and CFs. In these and any other
quantifiable metric of success with which an Infantry battalion might be
honored, CTF 1-14 succeeded well
beyond all expectations. The Golden Dragons offered the greatest of
sacrifices, accomplished it's missions with
the utmost precision and determination, all the while exhibiting an
unending sense of duty and compassion
which profoundly touched the lives of the Iraqi people and decidedly
changed their futures forever.
www.longwarjournal.org
Tarmiyah-Sons-of-Iraq
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